Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 186

Paper Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)¹

top secret
[BM Special 3c]

Washington, December 2, 1953.

Outline of U.S. Policies

bermuda

I. General Direction of Policy

In the face of the Soviet threat, the U.S. will seek to develop and maintain economic and military strength for itself and its friends, and to strive for cohesion and unity of purpose and policy to counter Soviet divisive tactics.

II. Military Strength

A. U.S. will maintain a respectable military posture, including strategic retaliatory power as a basic deterrent to Soviet aggression. This involves continental defense and overseas bases.

B. The U.S. will help NATO to build and maintain respectable military strength in Europe. There should be periodic review of (a) force requirements in the light of new weapons and techniques; and (b) force goals, on the basis of changing estimates of the risks and of political and economic capabilities.

C. EDC is essential to assure adequate European continental defense; without EDC, radical changes of U.S. policy are inevitable.

D. With NATO, reinforced by EDC, U.S. expects to maintain substantial forces in Europe, recognizing their political as well as military significance.

E. Indochina must be held for sake of all Southeast Asia. U.S. will continue to furnish military and financial aid and believes that U.K., France and U.S. should agree on the military action to be taken in case of open Chinese Communist intervention.

III. Maintaining Free World Unity

A. In Korea, the U.S. will—

1. Seek to prevent the renewal of hostilities by the Communists or South Koreans;

2. Continue, so long as there is hope, to work for a Political Conference;

3. Seek a unified Korea, under a free representative government, withdrawal of all foreign forces; and, if necessary, a northern demilitarized zone.

4. Actively assist to rehabilitate Korea.

B. The U.S. will do its utmost to help to achieve stable solutions as quickly as possible in—(1) Trieste; (2) Egypt; (3) Iran; (4) Arab-Israel; (5) Kashmir.

C. The U.S. strongly supports EPC and other measures for European integration as essential for European stability and cohesion.

D. Trade and Aid Policies

1. The U.S. is dedicated to the expansion of mutually beneficial world trade and investment and recognizes the importance of its own economic policies in this regard.

2. The U.S. will tend to eliminate economic grant aid except as necessary to support military efforts (such as in Turkey, Greece, Formosa, and Indochina) and except for modest aid in special situations (Middle East, South Asia, and South America).

3. In the underdeveloped areas, the West must find ways to reconcile strong nationalism with necessary cooperation and to assist efforts to improve living standards, by extending technical knowledge and encouraging investment.

IV. Attitude Toward Soviet Bloc

A. Negotiation

U.S. will be prepared to settle any concrete issues by negotiation whenever the Soviets are willing to talk realistically and without unacceptable preconditions.

Top-level talks of a general character might well be damaging. The U.S. is prepared to engage in private talks with the Soviets on disarmament in conformity with the U.N. resolution.

B. Satellites

The U.S. will continue its policy of not accepting as permanent the rule of the Soviets over the Satellites, but will avoid actions likely to increase the risk of war.

C. Communist China

Until the regime stops promoting aggression in Korea and Indochina and shows its willingness to conform to principles of UN Charter, the U.S. will not consider recognizing the Communist regime in China, will oppose its admission to the U.N., and will maintain a trade embargo.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that this paper had been revised following its discussion with Secretary Dulles, that it was being distributed on a limited basis, and that it had been designated BM Special 3c in the records of the U.S. Delegation for the Bermuda Conference. No previous or subsequent drafts of this paper have been identified in the Department of State files.