740.5/9–854
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Palmer)
Subject:
- German Defense Problem
Participants:
- Mr. Adam Watson, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. Walworth Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
- Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Director, RA
Mr. Watson called today to inform the Department about a conversation which the British High Commissioner at Bonn had with [Page 1158] Chancellor Adenauer. Adenauer had begun the conversation with a lecture on the deterioration in the German situation and had emphasized that there was no time to lose in finding an alternative solution. He emphasized that there must be no watered-down EDC and expressed the view that we should work for a NATO solution. He indicated that Germany would be willing to accept safeguards, but that these must be non-discriminatory in character. Moreover, they must be willingly accepted by the German Government and not imposed by the other powers. The Chancellor stated that he felt that the German and other authorities concerned with this problem should begin immediately to work out the necessary arrangements for accomplishing a solution along these lines. He felt it particularly important that this work should be done in the first instance by experts and expressed himself as being chary of entering any discussions at the Ministerial level until this had been accomplished. The Chancellor also expressed concern that if an early solution to these problems were not found, the U.S. reappraisal might result in a decision involving a withdrawal from Europe. Hoyer-Millar confirmed that he thought this concern was legitimate.
Mr. Watson went on to say that he was somewhat confused about the procedural arrangements which would have to precede the NATO Ministerial consideration of the question and asked what the Department’s thinking was on this subject. Mr. Barbour stated that, as the Secretary’s message to Mr. Eden on the 9-power conference had indicated,1 we were still uncertain as to how the necessary diplomatic preparation could best be handled. Mr. Barbour said that he thought that it would be much wiser if we de-emphasized our concern about the procedural aspects of the problem and concentrated on the substance. Once we had achieved a position, it would be much easier for us to see how the procedural aspects of the problem should be handled. Mr. Watson indicated agreement and said that he presumed that meanwhile there would be no harm in the U.S. and U.K. representatives in Bonn and Paris exploring with Adenauer and Mendes-France their views on the substance of alternative solutions. Mr. Barbour indicated agreement insofar as this indicated normal diplomatic intercourse, but felt that we should be careful to avoid any impression of anxiety to ascertain French views. Mr. Watson indicated agreement and observed parenthetically that he did not believe that the continuation of Mendes-France in office constituted any vital interest of HMG. On the other hand, he thought that the British could be helpful in smoking Mendes-France out, since the latter seemed to place great importance on the necessity of a close tie with the U.K.