Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

Trulock Minutes¹

secret
ST MIN 3 (Draft)

Washington, July 15, 1953.

[Here follows a list of the subjects discussed by the Foreign Ministers.]

The Far East

The Secretary’s Report on the Status of the Korean Situation.²

The Secretary opened the meeting with a report on the status of the negotiations in Korea.³ He said that about a month ago it seemed as if the Communists were prepared to sign the armistice agreement. The first indication of this was the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

Throughout this period there had been mounting opposition by President Rhee to an armistice under the proposed terms. As the likelihood of an armistice increased, Rhee’s resistance became more open and culminated with the release of the non-Communist North Korean prisoners by South Korean police under direct orders of Rhee. This act made it impossible for the U.N. Command to fulfill the terms of the armistice agreement. It came without warning and in spite of Rhee’s assurances that he would take no unilateral action without consulting U.N. Command. Subsequently Rhee said that his assurances had related only to the withdrawal of ROK troops.

As Rhee’s opposition became more open the U.S. Government undertook took such measures as it could. The Secretary said that negotiations between Assistant Secretary Robertson and Rhee have been the most difficult he could recall. He said that Mr. Robertson had conducted these most difficult discussions in an able and skillful manner, matching patience against impatience and reason and persuasion against emotion. As a result Rhee has apparently agreed to go along with the armistice. We have agreed to negotiate a security treaty with the Republic of Korea similar to the treaties now in existence with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The area covered by the security treaty will be limited to that under the control of the Republic of Korea. We have also agreed to aid in the reconstruction of South Korea. This will probably involve a substantial sum over a period of about three years. The security treaty, of course, will be subject to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate and the funds for the rehabilitation of Korea will be subject to Congressional action. We also agreed to attempt to obtain the peaceful reunification of Korea in the post-armistice conference. This is in line with the initial objectives of the U.N.

The Secretary believed that the situation is in shape so that we can reasonably proceed to consummate an armistice if the Communist are willing to do so. If they are not, we are prepared to carry on the war.

Our contacts with them since the talks have been reopened have been inconclusive. The Communist wish the U.S. to: (1) guarantee observation of the armistice by the ROK and (2) agree to attempt to recapture the North Korean prisoners released by Rhee. They had previously dropped this last demand, but it reappeared during last night’s session.

The Secretary said that the U.S. had made it clear that we were not prepared to enforce the observation of the armistice terms by any other government. We have told the Communists that we would not use the U.N. forces against the ROK forces. We have, however, taken measures and obtained assurances which lead us to believe that there is little likelihood that the ROK will attempt in the near future to carry on the war independently.

The Secretary said that in any political conferences following an armistice, the U.S. would expect to maintain a strong front with Rhee on peaceful reunification with Korea. We would assume that the rest of the U.N. delegation would support this but in any event the U.S. would do so.

Policy Toward Communist China in the Event of an Armistice.⁴

The Secretary hoped that the economic measures on trade against Communist China would be continued and that there would be no relaxation of these restrictions.⁵ He said that there were two important reasons for this: (1) as a pressure on the Communist during the political conferences and (2) as a measure against increased Chinese aid to the Communists in Indochina. In view of the importance of the latter the Secretary hoped that the French would add to their embargo list certain items which were now on the U.S. and U.K. lists, i.e., certain iron and steel products.

The Secretary hoped that the U.K. and France would adhere to the present policy with respect to non-admission of Communist China to the U.N.

He said that the U.S. attached great importance to the Greater Sanctions Statement which had been agreed to by all U.N. countries with forces in Korea. He said that the additional French language had been agreed to by all except the Philippines. He wondered if it would be desirable to consider making public the Greater Sanctions Statement.

Lord Salisbury congratulated the Secretary on his statement and said that he was much encouraged by it. He paid tribute to the skill, patience and tenacity of the U.S. negotiators whose task had been made doubly difficult by an intransigent enemy and a stubborn ally.

The Secretary asked if he could interrupt to express his government’s appreciation for the confidence which our Allies had shown in us during the difficult period of negotiations. He referred particularly to the U.K. and French support on the matter of calling a special session of the General Assembly during the delicate negotiations with Rhee and the Communists.

Lord Salisbury said that the U.K. felt—and still feels—very strongly that it would not be helpful for the General Assembly to meet on Korea during the very delicate negotiations now taking place. He said that he had been immensely interested in the Secretary’s remarks re: (1) the security treaty; (2) economic assistance and (3) peaceful reunification of Korea. On the latter point he said that it might not be able to attain this goal immediately, but said that it was an aim with which “we all have sympathy.”

The Secretary wished to clarify some of the references in the press to “the 90-day guarantee”. He said that Rhee was afraid that the political conferences might be used by the Communists solely for propaganda purposes and as a cover for further build-up. We had assured Rhee that, if after 90 days we believed that the conference was being used by the Communists as a strategem for strategic or propaganda purposes, we would be prepared to discuss with Rhee the termination of the conference. We pointed out we could only speak for the U.S. in this matter.

With respect to economic sanctions, Lord Salisbury said that he thoroughly agreed with the Secretary that there could be no automatic relaxation of trade controls following an armistice in Korea. He felt that the present controls should be maintained and that this matter should be re-examined later in the light of the Communist Chinese behavior. He felt the same way with respect to the question of Communist Chinese representation in the U.N. The Secretary replied that the differences between the U.S. and U.K. on this matter were differences of degree not in kind.

Lord Salisbury doubted the utility of publishing the Greater Sanctions Statement during this period when we are attempting to create a harmonious atmosphere in order to conclude an armistice. He said, however, that his government would be glad to give further consideration to this question.

The Secretary said that it had been felt that publication of this statement might give certain reassurances to the ROK but that this might now be accomplished by the Security Pact. He said that it might be useful if the Communist Chinese knew that there was such an agreement as the Greater Sanctions Agreement in existence, but that it might be well not to release it publicly until it would be useful to do so.

M. Bidault expressed his appreciation and admiration for the perseverance shown by the U.S. during our negotiations with “the enemy and the ally”. He felt that the result is not beyond hope and that the successful conclusion would be a tribute to those whose efforts had obtained the truce. He felt that publication of the Greater Sanctions Agreement should not precede the certainty of an armistice but he did not feel that this statement should be relegated to oblivion and he put in a strong plug for the additional French language.

With respect to trade controls he said that when the French Delegation had been in Washington 3 months ago they had reported certain logical progress. He pointed out that there was some feeling in France against reducing exports of iron and steel products in view of the expanding German shipments. He said that it was entirely logical that the economic and military potential of Communist China should not be increased by those who were fighting the Chinese. He agreed in principle with the Secretary’s remarks regarding control of iron and steel shipments and stated that he was forced to say “in principle” because there were ships on the way that he could not stop. He said that before leaving Paris he had instructed that further shipments of these materials be halted.

Indochina.

M. Bidault warned that “peace in Korea might mean war in Indochina”. He referred to Indochina as the wound in the side of Southeast Asia and suggested that the three Ministers should probe all possible means of improving the situation in the essential area of Southeast Asia. He said that he had nothing specific to propose at the moment but simply wished the other Ministers to reflect on this problem. He added that he might have more to say on this subject later.

M. Bidault pointed out that his concern with Indochina did not grow out of a French desire to pull out, but because the French desired to liquidate the war with honor. He urged that the Ministers not neglect the possibility of preventing in Indochina the loss of “the good that might come elsewhere”.

The Secretary said that he had listened attentively to M. Bidault’s remarks, especially his inference that Indochina might be discussed in any political conference following a Korean armistice. He pointed out that the UN had never taken any part in Indochina nor had it been invited to do so. He agreed that no opportunity should be thrown away to explore ways to extend the areas of peace in the world. He said that to attempt to agree that Indochina should be on the agenda of the post-armistice political conference would raise many difficulties.

Lord Salisbury said that the point raised by M. Bidault was most important, but very complicated. He said that Indochina had never been before the UN and that it was his understanding that the French had not wanted this. He said that since the political conference was a matter of UN concern and would be called on an ad hoc basis to deal with Korea, it would not be appropriate to put Indochina on the agenda. However, if Korea was dealt with satisfactorily in the conference and if it were found that a favorable atmosphere existed, then we should keep an open mind about other matters to be explored. The policies of the Soviet Government and its satellites are unclear at the moment, but it might be that they will wish to liquidate all of their wars.

M. Bidault agreed with the U.S. and the U.K. that procedural difficulties existed, but pointed out that procedure was not always a factor uppermost in the public mind. He added that he had not stated that the conference should deal with Indochina but only that the Indochina situation should be dealt with. He was not very optimistic about the atmosphere in the political conference. Since Indochina is of great interest, not only to France, but also to the U.S. and the U.K., he might have some specific proposals to make to the two governments through normal diplomatic channels, provided a Korean armistice is achieved.

The Secretary asked M. Bidault if he wished to report further on Indochina, particularly with respect to the recent French notes⁶ to the Associated States.

M. Bidault said that the steps taken by the French had been welcomed by the Associated States, especially Laos and Viet Nam. He said there had been a less favorable reaction from Cambodia.

“What did we say? We said that independence, not something else, would be granted”. He said that the Associated States would determine the nature of the negotiations, which would be conducted immediately and rapidly with all States. The negotiations will deal with political, economic and military matters as well as symbols which, M. Bidault said, are more important than at first glance. He referred to the problem of the rights of the Chinese population under existing Treaty arrangements. He said that military commands would be transferred under existing agreements. As for state officials, the French would keep only those requested by the Associated States, but he predicted that the Associated States may ask for more French officials rather than less. He referred to the new French Ambassador as a man well known to the U.S. and U.K. representatives, a man of great prestige and merit. He said that no one could believe that he would have a “proconsular state of mind”.

He said that many people wondered why the situation in Indochina had appeared to deteriorate, particularly by comparison with de Lattre’s statements. He said that “the front is nowhere and the enemy is everywhere”. While the enemy has no large quantities of heavy weapons, it was extremely difficult to conduct a war against people who appeared to be peasants by day and were soldiers by night. In Indochina, he said, there was always the “burglar-policeman” relationship, that is, the policeman must always wait for the burglar to make the move. He said that it was impossible to find large concentrations of the enemy against which military maneuvers could be conducted. The foe was extremely mobile and operated principally in small groups by night.

He referred to the new plan devised by the French Government which involved: (1) an acceleration of the U.S. [use?] of Associated States troops and (2) expansion of “means”. He said that an expansion of means would involve increased expenditures and that, while France had received considerable aid from the U.S., the increased expenditures could not be carried out on the basis of the present level of aid. He said that a new French plan envisaged gaining superiority over the Vietminh in quality and means, if not numerical superiority. He said that he had discussed the details of this program previously with both the Secretary and Lord Salisbury.

He asked that the action taken by the French with respect to the Associated States be recognized by the conference and referred to the final communiqué. He said that this would encourage his Government and the Associated States and call the attention of the world to this recent action. He added that the French delegation would table a suggested statement on this for inclusion in the communiqué.

Lord Salisbury said that his government was most interested in the steps being taken by the French toward the Associated States. He said that M. Bidault had referred to them as independent and sovereign states and he wondered if they would be analogous to members of the British Commonwealth. With respect to the military situation, he said that the British experience in Malaya made it easy for them to understand and appreciate the French difficulties in Indochina. He referred to the new French military program and asked if it were true that the French Government was prepared to initiate new measures at considerable sacrifice in Indochina. He asked this not from idle curiosity or because of the British interest in Southeast Asia, but with reference to M. Bidault’s earlier remarks regarding negotiations. He stressed that if the French Government were considering negotiation, they should negotiate from strength. If the French negotiated from weakness, it would do far more harm than good.

M. Bidault said that the situation in Indochina was not deteriorating in any deep or inevitable way. He stressed that the French were holding the vital points and areas. He pointed out that there was the question of whether it was advisable to decrease strength in Europe in order to increase strength in Asia, and he touched briefly on the problem of sending conscripts to fight 2, 000 kilometers from home.

In answer to Lord Salisbury’s question, he said that the relation of each member of the French Union is determined by “statutes” agreed between states concerned. He referred to the chapter on the French Union in the text of the French Constitution.

Lord Salisbury hoped that it would be possible to return to Far Eastern questions later in the conference.

The Secretary suggested that each delegation nominate a member to work on the Far Eastern section of the communiqué. He designated Mr. Johnson for the U.S.; Lord Salisbury named Mr. Tomlinson; and the French named M. Roux.

(It was agreed that the meeting would recess for 15 minutes and reconvene to discuss the draft declaration on European Unity.)

Draft Tripartite Statement on European Unity

The Secretary referred to the “Draft Tripartite Statement on European Unity”⁷ and said that in many respects it was an admirable paper, but there were two ideas expressed in the U.S. draft⁸ (Annex A to draft Communiqué VI) which had been omitted. He read the two passages:

“These constructive efforts to build a stable, secure European Community are a major contribution toward world peace. This success is essential for the security and prosperity of Europe and the world.” and “Since the Community is an answer to long-term needs and interests, a reduction in tensions between the Soviet Union and the West would in no way remove the necessity for carrying it forward expeditiously.”

The Secretary strongly urged that these two ideas, not necessarily the specific language, be incorporated in the Communiqué.

He said that the U.S. has felt that since the end of World War II that the war would have been fought and won in vain unless there could be organic unity on the continent of Europe. This feeling has been expressed over the years by a whole series of statements by members of the Executive Branch and members of Congress. It underlay the Marshall Plan idea and this sentiment is now reflected in the strings attached by the Congress to the present Mutual Security bill which provides that end-items are to be deliverable to the EDC or its members and that, if EDC is not in existence within 8 months, the matter must be referred back to the Congress. He pointed out that the Executive Branch had tried very hard to leave this matter in the hands of the President but had not been successful in this.

He said that our whole strategy in Western Europe depends on the availability of the German contingency and that the whole question of future peace and security rests on this. He added that the President feels very strongly about this.

He stated that the consummation of EDC would not come about unless it was believed that its ratification is indispensable to peace and security in Europe. If, on the other hand, it is believed that it is not essential or that it is simply a response to tensions created by the Soviet threat then we should resign ourselves to the fact that it will never come into being. This is true because Soviet tactics, by words costing them nothing, can seem to relax existing tension and if the proponents of EDC believe that it is merely in response to those tensions, they will abandon the project.

The Secretary said that the U.S. has a large part of its military forces on the continent of Europe and that he could only express the views of his government and the probable position of this country. He expressed those views as a friend and as a helper. The delay in ratification of EDC is causing difficulties in this country. Many believe that the assurances that EDC would come into being has caused us to take strong steps and that unless we can soon give reasonable indication that there will be an EDC, these steps will have to be re-examined. The Secretary said that unless the three Ministers could make a strong statement re EDC at the conclusion of this meeting, it would be better to say nothing at all. He felt that the omission of the two points referred to above would be interpreted as an abandonment of EDC. He knew that M. Bidault did not wish this, because since the war he had been a strong advocate of European unity. The Secretary said that he knew EDC was close to M. Bidault’s heart and said that we depend strongly on him for French action. He strongly urged M. Bidault to agree to language which would indicate the two ideas referred to above. The Secretary said that if the French Foreign Minister was unable to do this at this time, this country would have to conclude that the future of EDC is problematic. The Secretary did not wish to predict what the consequences of this would be, but said that Ambassador Bonnet could advise the French Government of these consequences. The Secretary said that the President would be no more able to prevent such consequences than he was to prevent the EDC restriction in the Mutual Security Bill.

M. Bidault expressed his gratitude for the Secretary’s remarks about his personal role in regard to European unity. However, he was embarrassed at present circumstances because he was doubtful about the wisdom of coming out with a strong statement on EDC as a result of this meeting. He feared that it might have unfortunate repercussions in the French Parliament. He said that the language of the draft tripartite statement represented an attempt by the working group to take up the text of the U.S. draft. He referred to paragraphs (4a) and (4b) of the tripartite draft and said that this language seemed to take into account the facts which can be achieved. He pointed out that this language was further than his instructions allowed him to go. He did not feel that this language was weak and incompatible.

He said that this was a real problem in his own Parliament. His enemies would say that he went to Washington to get a mandate on something against which there is a majority at the present in the French Parliament. He said that this was not his last word and he had come this far because he wished to reach agreement. He said that all of this was a question of balance with the other papers to be discussed.

Lord Salisbury said that he had just received a reply from London in response to his cable asking for instructions re the proposal discussed on Friday and Saturday. Her Majesty’s Government is ready to join in an early 4–Power meeting in advance of ratification of EDC. The date suggested was the same considered in the meetings on Friday and Saturday, i.e., late September or early October. His government took the view that careful consideration should be given to: (1) the agenda and (2) the terms of reference of such a meeting, in view of the effect on public opinion or a failure of the 4–Power meetings. His government believed that the principles with respect to Germany should be those contained in the note of September 23, 1952. There should be no question of reopening agreed policy such as the EDC. There should be no question of deciding that there was no need for EDC. He stated that firm reaffirmation of the attached three governments to the EDC was absolutely necessary and that the present draft was hardly firm enough. There was little reference to the EDC as an immediate objective and there was no sense of urgency expressed. Failure to recognize this urgency would be disastrous.

If Germany is on the edge of unification, Lord Salisbury felt that this might be the last chance to assure German alignment with the West. Lord Salisbury said that if he was told that he had no right to say all of this he would reply that the U.K. has done everything possible to assist in the consummation of EDC and that—along with the U.S.—his government has maintained large forces in Germany without which the Soviets might have swept across Europe. Germany must be given every opportunity to share in the burden of defense in Europe.

He said that he knew that M. Bidault would agree with all of this and he recognized M. Bidault’s dedication to EDC and integration. He hoped that M. Bidault would agree to strengthen the language of the present draft. He added that he had some suggested language to table for the experts’ consideration. He concluded that, since the three governments had made great progress toward an agreed position regarding a 4–Power meeting, he was sure they would be able to agree on this matter.

The Secretary welcomed the views of Her Majesty’s Government. He said that his own government had been inclined toward the earlier view of the U.K. that no 4–Power meeting should be held before EDC is ratified, but that our advice from Germany indicated that this might not be the wisest position. He said, however, that when he indicated that the U.S. was prepared to agree to a 4–Power meeting, it was with the understanding that it would be made quite clear that there was no question about a strong statement to the effect that such a meeting would have no effect on the urgent need for EDC ratification. If there was to be a question about this, then the U.S. might wish to revert to the position held by the U.K. earlier.

The Secretary asked M. Bidault to look at the U.K. suggestions and to consider the two points outlined by the Secretary and to see if the language could be strengthened without creating an unfavorable reaction in the French Parliament.

M. Bidault said that he was ready to consider any revision within his terms of reference. He said, however, that the whole of this document (the draft tripartite statement) was related to EDC. He said that all of the documents to be considered were related to each other. With respect to the question of freedom of the German Government, he referred to article VII of the Contractual Agreements.⁹ He stated that European integration was certainly not a question to be negotiated with the Soviets and this should be stated in such a way not to disturb those that do not believe it.

He proposed that this matter be referred to the experts. He also suggested that it would be preferable to shorten the plenary sessions.

Lord Salisbury agreed with M. Bidault that these documents should be given to the experts. He suggested that the tripartite meeting scheduled for this afternoon might be at the expert level and that the principals should instruct their experts. The Secretary suggested that the three Ministers should meet again at 5:00 p.m. to consider all three of the documents. M. Bidault agreed and suggested that if after examining the products of the expert working group, the Ministers could not agree, they should meet in a small room with only a few advisers. This was agreed.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the minutes had been prepared by Trulock, but had not been cleared or approved. The Department of State transmitted to London a summary of the third meeting in telegrams 230 and 232, July 14. (396.1 WA/7–1453) The first telegram, which summarized the discussion on European unity, was repeated to Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Bonn. The second telegram, which summarized the discussion on the Far East, was repeated to Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Taipei, Pusan, and New York.
2. Further documentation on Korea is presented in volume xv .
3. Documentation on the armistice negotiations between the United Nations and Communist Commands in Korea is presented ibid .
4. Documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to China is presented in volume xiv .
5. Documentation on trade with China including material on the Greater Sanctions Statement is presented in volume xiv .
6. See footnote 3, p. 1644.
7. Not found in the Department of State files.
8. Dated July 9, p. 1699.
9. The text of the convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, is printed in volume vii .