Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Acting Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin)

secret

[London,] September 27, 1954.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister
• Mr. Beyen, Netherlands Foreign Minister
• Mr. Bech, Luxembourg Foreign Minister
• Mr. van Starkenborgh, Netherlands Permanent Representative to NATO
• Ambassador Bruce
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Martin

Subject:

• Prospects for Nine-Power Talks

1. The Secretary suggested that it would be desirable to have Mr. Eden act as Permanent Chairman of the Conference and wondered if one of the Benelux Foreign Ministers would care to nominate him. They agreed to do so.

2. The Secretary described Mr. Eden’s idea of dealing with major items one by one rather than trying to decide which of the three different papers to discuss in toto first. He also described the desire expressed to him by the French Prime Minister of making a statement on the whole of the French paper before any discussion of individual subjects. He also indicated the thought that the opening session might permit any Delegation head who wishes to make a statement of a general character which might be passed to the press. These arrangements were concurred in by the Benelux Ministers.

3. The Secretary indicated that the Foreign Ministers of the three occupying powers might meet early in the Conference with Chancellor Adenauer and ask the three High Commissioners and a representative of the Chancellor to continue the talks begun at Bonn on the papers involved in granting sovereignty to Germany on a basis other than that provided in the contractuals. He indicated our desire to keep the Benelux countries informed on the progress of this work in view of their interest in the matter, and in particular to seek their views before decisions were made by Ministers. The Benelux Foreign Ministers expressed appreciation for this.

4. The Benelux Foreign Ministers all expressed concern over difficulties of solving the Saar problem. They had a definite impression it was a “condition préalable” as far as the French were concerned, but that in the absence of EDC there was no obvious way in which a European solution could be found. There was inconclusive discussion as to whether or not this problem should be dealt with before concessions are made to the French on other issues which would be fruitless if this most difficult issue proved insoluble.

5. Mr. Beyen came to the meeting direct from a talk with Mr. Mendes-France. There was considerable interchange of information about his talk and the Secretary’s talk with Mr. Mendes. Mr. Beyen confessed he still did not know what French intentions really were. He also stated that despite some effort on his part, he received no real clarification on the specifics of the French proposals. He thought it clear that the French position was to accept membership in NATO provided all the arrangements under Brussels which Mendes considers necessary were accepted. He believed Mendes attached great importance to Brussels as opposed to NATO, to British participation in Brussels arrangements, and to having Brussels arrangements capable of exercising firm control and inspection of German rearmament. He was not clear that an armaments pool was an essential condition of Mendes’ program. In the light of past experience, he and the other two Foreign Ministers expressed strong suspicions of the French fundamental intentions and of the straightforwardness of their tactics. Mr. Beyen said he had gathered Mendes might submit NATO and Brussels to Parliament separately if arrangements were not entirely to his satisfaction. This would of course be fatal.

6. The Secretary suggested that if the armaments pool proved an essential point, it was desirable not to reject it outright, but rather to make clear that there was an alternative of a reasonable kind which might be acceptable to us. The more this could be made to look like merely a modification of Mendes’ scheme, the more difficult it would be for him to convince his Parliament that he had been unreasonably treated at London. He also felt there were positive advantages of an economic, and possibly political, character to be gained from a good armaments pool scheme which was simple and non-discriminatory. The Benelux representatives, and particularly the Dutch, expressed great hesitancy about indicating approval of any armaments pool scheme. This seemed to stem largely from their disbelief that the French would agree with anything reasonable, anything that did not discriminate against Germany or give preference to French industry. They also felt strongly that an armaments pool arrangement was more acceptable and workable as part of EDC, which was also responsible for logistical supply of forces, than as independent institution with countries retaining logistical responsibility. They believed that negotiation of a fair scheme would be complicated and time consuming. This discussion concluded with tentative agreement to consider the matter further.

7. Mr. Beyen called attention to the fact that Mendes had indicated he would not formally sign any agreement without consulting his Parliament and Parliament leaders. This might affect future time schedule.

8. Mr. Beyen asked if we had seen a more detailed German document. We said we knew nothing of it.