Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/12–753

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 7, 1953.

Subject:

• Approach to French on EDC Alternatives

We have studied carefully papers prepared in S/P, RA, and GER on the subject of EDC alternatives.² We agree with the conclusion reached in RA’s paper of November 4 that there will probably not be outright rejection of the EDC, and that accordingly the basic premise of the S/P paper probably does not represent the situation we will actually face. On the contrary it seems that in France the practical alternatives are further delay, ostensibly based on non-fulfillment of France’s condition, or ratification about March.

If the results of the presidential elections (if, for example, Laniel is elected) and the formation of a new cabinet (if, for example, Pinay becomes Prime Minister with Bidault or Schuman as Foreign Minister) indicate that France will push ahead on EDC our problem is probably not so critical. On the other hand, if Auriol should be reelected President and/or a left-centre cabinet come into existence, further delays seem inevitable. In this event, even if an apparently satisfactory Saar settlement were reached, and the British association and U.S. assurances problem settled along the lines the Socialists have wanted, it is perfectly obvious that other conditions can easily be created if any of several major political groups so desire. A long-drawn out four-power conference would present another possibility for delays in France, and indeed might further put off ratification, even given the best will in the world of the French Government.

Therefore, it seems clear we may easily be faced with a situation where we can no longer permit more or less indefinite delay to continue. At that point we will have to consider our course of action with the French. There is very little chance of forcing a vote in the Assembly, and such a vote would probably be negative unless the French conditions had been met, new ones could easily be discovered, giving the Government a chance not to push to a vote on the grounds that it would be disastrous unless condition “X” had been satisfied.

At about this time, obviously we will be considering very seriously ourselves the alternative possibilities to EDC, and it occurs to us that perhaps it would be advisable in the fairly near future to disclose some of these alternatives to the French. Our reason for so doing would of course be the impossibility of holding the line further in the United States. Obviously we should consider what alternatives we presented very carefully. For example, it seems to us that direct German membership in NATO would not be satisfactory as an alternative to present to the French because it would be time-consuming, requiring the Parlimentary action of fourteen countries, (we would present the problem to the French as being urgent) and presumably could be vetoed by France.

Any alternative which we presented should be susceptible of implementation, to at least some degree, rapidly and without falling under a French veto. Alternatives as little distasteful as possible to France should also be sought, but one of the purposes of the exercise would be to demonstrate practically and on a case basis that EDC itself is more palatable to France than any alternatives we can envisage. Of the possibilities thus far presented, something along the lines of alternative “D” in the RA paper would be most desirable (see attachment). Obviously this is not a happy solution from the French viewpoint (nor from the German either probably). However, it does have certain advantages and meets the criteria of being susceptible of implementation without French concurrence (UK concurrence is an unknown quantity too), and would be speedy. Above all, it has the advantage of not killing off the EDC. It could be presented to the French as an indication of our thinking of EDC alternatives, with the stipulation that it was not intended to supersede EDC but merely to enable us to get on with some of the essentials of European Army plan while awaiting French Assembly action, the absence of which we so regretted.

Such an approach to the French should of course await the Presidential elections, and at least the investiture of a new Prime Minister. However, if at that time there are strong indications of considerable further delays in scheduling the definitive EDC debate, and if a Saar settlement still seems in the rather hazy future, it is believed that discussion of EDC alternatives with the French must be undertaken if only to demonstrate the relative painlessness of EDC as compared with other lines we might take. The basis for our talking with the French along these lines would be that neither Congress nor the Administration could continue on dead centre on this issue, and we now had reached the point where speedy progress towards obtaining a German contribution was a necessity.

[Attachment]

Alternative “D” to the Paper Prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

We have also considered a fourth possibility which is not really an alternative but rather an interim solution consistent with the attainment of EDC. Although it appears to meet more of our criteria than any of the foregoing alternatives and is perhaps worth further examination, it also involves serious drawbacks. This plan would involve the following elements.

1. The Federal Republic of Germany would complete its ratification of the EDC.

2. The U.S. and the U.K. would announce their intention of giving administrative effect to those provisions of contractual agreements which are necessary to begin the buildup of the German defense contribution to EDC.

3. Simultaneously, the U.S., U.K. and Germany would negotiate an interim defense agreement which would provide that pending the coming into force of the EDC and without prejudice to any of the provisions establishing it:

a. The U.S. and U.K. will cooperate with the West German Government in raising, training, and equipping German defense units.

b. The Unit contributions will be temporarily attached to U.S. and U.K. forces in Germany, until such time as the coming into force of EDC makes possible their transfer to that organization.

c. Interim command arrangements which would insure U.S.–U.K. control of these units.

Tested against the criteria, this solution would be:

(1) Acceptable from the Congressional timing viewpoint.

(2) Workable for a limited period, but must obviously be replaced by some definitive solution.

(3) a. More salable to the French than C and perhaps than A, but less so than B; but

b. Immune from a French veto.

(4) Deficient in that it is discriminatory towards the Germans, but nonetheless representative of an advance for them.

(5) A continued open door for EDC and EPC, perhaps even providing an added incentive to bring them into being as the best receptacle for the German units.

(6) Probably acceptable to Congress.

1. Drafted by McBride. Copies to Moore, Kidd, Fessenden, Elbrick, Fuller, and Galloway.
2. Reference papers are presumably those discussed in editorial note, supra.