740.5/11–253: Despatch
The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Dowling) to the Department of State
No. 1387
Ref:
- Department’s CA–1860, October 5, 19531
Subject:
- Suggestions for HICOG action to expedite EDC
Suggestions for possible anticipatory action which would have useful effects on the French and be of value in speeding the German build-up for the EDC were requested in the reference airgram.
[Page 836]The most fruitful area of exploration of possible action by HICOG is the possibilities which exist for implementing certain provisions of the Contractual Agreements in advance of ratification. The political background against which such action might be projected consists of (1) the long interim period since signature in May, 1952, and (2) the new political fact of the September elections. It would seem logical for the U.S. High Commissioner to confront his British and French colleagues with the proposition that the occupation authorities are now dealing with a new German Government elected on the platform of Adenauer’s successful negotiation of termination of occupation controls. It could be argued forcefully that in the absence of ratification, steps should be taken to eliminate or amend substantially certain controls associated with the occupation. It might even be argued that if action is not taken with respect to some of these controls, the Germans might well unilaterally anticipate ratification and confront the Allies with some difficult situations to handle.
The obvious difficulty in such an approach through the Allied High Commission is the possibility that any such move might boomerang and result in stiffening French opposition to ending the occupation and ratifying EDC. One possible method of circumventing this difficulty would be to propose action with respect to a series of existing occupation controls without relating them to any pattern of pressure on the French. For example, a first step might be to urge relaxation of certain controls over industrial production, and in particular armaments production, administered by the Military Security Board. This could be done under the umbrella of the OSP program and on the basis of U.S. interest in solving the problem of the NATO-wide defense production deficit. The decision on relaxation of these industrial controls lies in some cases with a two-thirds majority in the MSB; in other cases the Council of the AHC may act on the basis of a 2 to 1 vote with the dissenting High Commissioner having the right to appeal to his government within 21 days during which time action is suspended. Some items of military production can be licensed by MSB only with the agreement of the three governments.
Relaxation of industrial controls offers a logical point of beginning in a policy of anticipating ratification of the Contractual Agreements because of the fact that the Germans are already violating these controls on a fairly wide-spread scale. The practical impossibility of applying sanctions to punish these violations under the political conditions which now exist in the Federal Republic should be obvious even to the French. Several other similar steps which would give recognition to Germany’s new status are suggested by a reading of the General Agreement and the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Forces. If this series of moves were made in a seemingly unrelated pattern, [Page 837] the French would most certainly get the point, but would not be able to accuse the U.S. of open pressure.
Another possible line of action to influence French thinking on EDC suggests itself. It would be possible to open up on a number of fronts bilateral discussions with the Federal Government on problems connected with the German forces build-up. Talks could be held with the Blank Office on the details of the U.S. end item equipment assistance program, and by bringing in EUCOM and USAREUR, actual plans could be formulated for the logistical handling of this equipment by the initial cadres of German forces. These arrangements would include provision of temporary storage at ports and transportation. In addition it would be possible to discuss the construction of German military installations required for the first stages of the build-up in the American Zone, and the turning over of certain installations now held by the U.S. forces. Moreover, HICOG could work closely with the Ministry of Economics on developing a plan for the early undertaking of munitions production on a substantial scale in Germany. All of these unilateral steps could be justified on the basis of the need for advance planning, including planning for U.S. assistance, and might well have the effect of convincing the French Government of the firmness of the U.S. intentions with respect to German rearmament. Simultaneously, the High Commissioner might request his British and French colleagues to cooperate in certain aspects of this planning; for example, on the stationing of troops and the supply of troops, consultation on which with the Federal Republic is provided for in the General Agreement and in the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Forces.
There is a limit to the unilateral action by the U.S. within Germany which would be desirable given the overall political and strategic situation. We would not want to so alienate French public opinion and so frighten the French Government that they might be tempted to fall back on some alternative solution of the German question, such as a pact with the Soviet Union.
However, in considering the action which the U.S. HICOG might take to further ratification of EDC, a step which might be taken as a last resort would be to suggest within the High Commission that the Contractual Agreements be made effective without awaiting ratification of EDC. Article 10 provides for revisions of the Contractual Agreements, and a simple amendment of Article 11 would eliminate the interrelationship of the two treaties. This would have to be agreed to by the four governments concerned, after which Germany would be free to rearm. The French would of course take the position that such an amendment would require substantive changes in the Finance Convention, which would certainly be true, but by simply advancing [Page 838] this suggestion in the first place, the U.S. would have made its point and accomplished the political objective.
Any drastic change in occupation policy towards rearmament would require unanimous consent. However, border line cases could be construed as falling under the High Commission two-thirds majority vote rule. An example of such a case is the question of increasing the strength of the Federal border police. There is the possibility of obtaining British agreement that these border line cases do not constitute rearmament and then proceeding with a two-thirds vote in the face of out and out French resistance.
What must be avoided at all costs is a further long delay in ratification of the treaties with a consequent deterioration of the authority and position of the AHC in Germany. The French must be made to see that action must be taken because the Germans will not wait forever. Surely the French Government must realize that if the Federal Republic takes matters into its own hands, and asserts its sovereignty in a number of fields without recourse to the High Commission, there would be very little the Allies, as a practical matter, could do.