740.5/10–2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

1592. MacArthur1 and I dined privately with Laniel October 21. He was much harassed with the Indochina problem. MacArthur outlined to him at some length Washington’s views on Europe along following lines: As a result German elections and other developments, next 3 or 4 months are a period with real possibilities for settlement of Franco-German problem, which has been major source of friction and discord in Europe for many years. We sincerely desire France maintain her position of leadership in world affairs and particularly on European continent. If France does not grasp present opportunity to move ahead with Eden, we will be faced, a few months hence, with new and difficult alternatives not of our making but as a result of fact that Germany cannot be expected to accept present status quo much longer.

MacArthur recalled what happened after World War I and said we greatly fear that if German participation in EDC made impossible by French rejection or postponement, Germany will be tempted to go it alone. Given German desire, as shown in Federal Republic elections, to align itself solidly with West, we could not support any policy which would lead Germany to go it alone. We have no intention [Page 829] of publicly needling France to get on with EDC, but French leaders must know that if present opportunity not grasped, we will be faced with new situation involving re-examination of our European policy. Furthermore, if French boot EDC, their role of leadership will pass to other hands.

We recognize that Saar is serious problem, and we will do utmost to urge Germans to be as forthcoming as possible. At same time, we urge France to be reasonable and constructive with respect to Saar. In particular, we believe raising Franco-Saar convention in next week or two may cause violent reaction in Germany, which will limit Adenauer’s ability to be constructive.

Laniel did not seem to know about Franco-Saar convention. He said he understood our position, and he was as determined as ever to go forward with EDC. However, presidential elections were complicating factor, but once these had occurred, France would move rapidly. It was evident, however, that he was so preoccupieed with Indochina and also with Cabinet meeting scheduled for 10 p.m. later same evening that he had difficulty in fully concentrating on European questions.

MacArthur saw Vidal this afternoon and went over same general ground with him. Vidal’s position is similar to Laniel’s. However, he volunteered to see what he could do to delay consideration of Franco-Saar accords in French Parliament.

Dillon
  1. MacArthur was in Europe as Head of the U.S. Delegation at the Paris tripartite working group. Further documentation on his activities is presented in volume vii .