740.5/9–2053: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
Colux 3. Limit distribution. From Merchant and Chiefs of Mission.2
1. Adenauer’s remarkable victory, firm support of UK for EDC, and disclosure of negative position of Soviets3 combine to make next few months auspicious for policy of European integration. In these favorable circumstances it should be possible to prevail upon governments of six continental nations to initiate and to push vigorously [Page 809] process of EDC ratification in each of their parliaments this fall with view to ratification and implementation of EDC in early 1954. It is urgent that our continental partners demonstrate their intentions in this unequivocal manner for following reasons:
- (a)
- Imperative to demonstrate to Congress at outset January session that US Administration has heeded Congressional structures in utilization of US aid and influence to bring about European integration. Inability to state positively to Congress that EDC is fundamental policy of our continental partners and that it will in every probability be reality in very near future would jeopardize continued appropriations by Congress of substantial funds for Western Europe.
- (b)
- Uncertainty as to intentions of France on EDC continues to create confusion and differences among Western nations at very moment when common policy and trust are critically necessary in relations with Soviet Russia. German elections have improved this dangerous atmosphere but new delays and hesitations could quickly degenerate into serious and perhaps disastrous conflict between certain of Western nations.
- (c)
- Adenauer’s success in leading Germany back along road of sanity and to integration in Western Europe is an historic opportunity to resolve the German question. Response from all Western nations, particularly France, should be quick and generous. Procrastination in removing Germany from occupation status risks adverse reaction in Germany which might lead to extremism. We submit following comments with regard to each interested nation for your consideration in developing line of action for US Government in this urgent matter.
2. A statement from Churchill emphasizing in his inimitable prose belief of UK in development of a strong continental Europe to replace present national divisions, necessity for new political status for Germany as full partner in Western nations and implementation of EDC as a practicable military grouping and as most practical manner of contribution by Germany to Western defense, would be highly desirable and important.
3. Political fact in Italy is that Italian Government must have positive proposals on position of Western Allies with regard to Trieste before any initiation of ratification process. Response from US, UK and France on this question is urgent. Italy has linked Trieste question with EDC ratification. If quick action on tripartite proposals for solution is taken and solution is found, EDC ratification becomes real possibility. However, we should not permit the Italian Government to unlink the two questions after acceptable solution is worked out, and then increase the ante before it will proceed firmly with EDC ratifications. Also we should settle clearly with Italians that we do not approve of Italy’s using delay in Italian ratification to enable France in turn to delay French ratification, particularly when Italian Government leaders have a firm understanding with US to follow the contrary policy.
[Page 810]4. Ratification process in Germany should be completed well before end of year. Federal Republic can, however, help greatly to facilitate ratification in other countries by clearing up court issue immediately and by taking active initiative in Saar negotiations and in certain other questions outstanding in EDC Interim Committee such as status of forces, support costs, US-EDC bilateral agreement, European logistical organization to receive US end-items in Germany, UK association with EDC, signature of protocols, et cetera.
Chancellor should also recognize that substantial progress on the Treaty for Europe Political Community is still necessary insure support of French Parliament. Therefore, in his dealings with Bidault and Quai d’Orsay he should remember that, if in the progress towards a Political Community Treaty the principle of supranational institutions—particularly executive—to control EDC is abandoned, supporters of EDC among the Socialists, MRP and elsewhere may be alienated. Therefore, compromises should not be made to the present negative position of EPC of the Quai d’Orsay just to hurry action because such compromises might jeopardize first US interest of obtaining ratification of EDC Treaty. Rather a general pressure should be maintained for a really supranational Political Community, and concrete agreement in Rome and The Hague meetings postponed until EDC is ratified or until the unequivocal support for supranational approach in the French Cabinet can be brought to bear on the French officials conducting negotiations.
US High Commissioner might also support a series of actions with his French and British colleagues which will force French to recognize that ratification of EDC and new political status for Germany is urgent in order to bring Federal Republic activities under guarantees of EDC and contractuals before steps are taken unilaterally by Federal Republic in advance of ratification and with US and UK acceptance. These actions include relaxation of certain controls over industrials production, including some armaments, talks with Blank office under umbrella of EDC Interim Committee on logistical handling of equipment for initial cadres of German-EDC forces, plans for first construction of military installations, and possibly other steps anticipating EDC and contractual agreements.
5. However, chief obstacle is uncertainty on intentions of French despite recent oral statements of Laniel and Bidault to proceed with EDC ratification before end of year. Serious doubts on EDC ratification have arisen ever since Mayer and Bidault, in their efforts to obtain Gaullist support for present government coalition, refused to restate clearly French policy on bringing about a strong United Europe incorporating Germany irrevocably into its framework. At that time even though EDC Treaty was heavily weighted in favor of France, tending to maintain her present position in Europe and in [Page 811] the world, Bidault made new protocols, modifying delicately balanced EDC Treaty France had just formally signed with her partners, giving France even more preferred position a condition before France would proceed with ratification of her previous formal signature. Reason given by Bidault was that with these protocols he could obtain support for EDC from Gaullist Party. With US intervention, other European nations reluctantly agreed to protocols. Bidault then gave formal promise to us and to his EDC partners that French would not ask for any more protocols and would proceed with ratification. Now we receive unconfirmed reports that Quai d’Orsay suggests a new and more serious protocol changing EDC Treaty. It is same idea of gradual implementation of treaty once suggested by Bidault for Gaullist support and violently rejected by his own cabinet and other EDC countries except the Dutch, as in direct conflict with EDC Treaty and as necessitating time-consuming renegotiation of present treaty.
French also told their EDC partners that progress towards a political community based on immediate European elections for a European parliament and a supranational executive was necessary for EDC ratification by French Parliament. Bidault states that this French policy, now accepted by other European partners, should be revised in order to obtain Gaullist support for EDC ratification even though in doing so he risks losing support for EDC of French Socialists, some MRP and even such French advocates for Europe as Reynaud, Pleven, Teitgen, Mutter. Final position of French Cabinet on European Political Community, and indirectly EDC ratification, is still being debated in Paris thus increasing doubts of other nations on intentions of France.
Because French hesitations are so widely known and suspected, only public action by present French Cabinet can dispel them. This can be done in a number of ways. Easiest and most effective would be to prevail upon Laniel and Bidault merely to resume process of ratification of EDC Treaty already once started by the French Government, or, failing this, to make an appropriate public statement before any visit by them to the United States. In this way French action would appear as entirely normal and would not be subject to contention that it was dictated by United States. Such questions as Saar, support costs, and progress on EPC can and should be worked out by France with its European partners as ratification process proceeds. On most serious question, the Saar, Adenauer has already indicated to us his willingness to concede on question of currency which Mayer made clear was his real purpose when he took unfortunate action of linking Saar understanding with EDC Treaty. US, UK, Germany and other EDC countries have largely met all reasons raised by French for hesitating on EDC. Now we should keep France pinned to previous commitments to ratify EDC Treaty and not permit her to raise new questions and [Page 812] conditions which might create new delays in ratification in France or in other countries.
6. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg ratification process appears to be well advanced and no action by US administration is recommended at this time. We may, however, have to express our views if French renew tactics of creating doubts about ratification of EDC Treaty in present form.
- Repeated to Paris, Bonn, London, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Moscow.↩
- The Chiefs of Mission meeting was held on Sept. 18–19, and was attended by all the Chiefs of Mission in Western Europe plus Ambassador Bohlen from Moscow. Further documentation on the meeting, including a summary of the various sessions, is presented in volume vi .↩
- Presumably a reference to the Soviet notes of Aug. 4 and 15 regarding a possible Four-Power Conference, which was eventually held in Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954; documentation on these notes is presented in volume vii .↩