Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–1653: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Bonn, September 16, 1953—3 p.m.

1055. In response HICOG request for elaboration Chancellor Adenauer’s proposal for European security system,¹ Blankenhorn has informed us that Blank office and Foreign Office study groups formed to develop Chancellor’s idea have evolved preliminary suggestions along following lines:

1. Demilitarized zone would be formed both sides Oder-Niesse line extending roughly from Elba to Vistula and from Baltic southward across Europe and converging on either side of Trieste.

2. Balance of Germany west of Elba line would be garrisoned only by EDC troops.

3. Europe west of Germany would be garrisoned by NATO troops.

4. Satellite areas cast of Vistula line would be garrisoned only by satellite troops (except Rumania).

5. Soviet troops would be withdrawn to within Russian boundaries except for Rumania.

Questioned re latter point, Blankenhorn admitted it was logical Russian troops should also be withdrawn from Rumania.

Chief of Eastern Division of Foreign Office, Braeutigam, has given us following additional information in connection with above and press reports to effect that Chancellor was proposing that Soviet zone be demilitarized as part of reunification of Germany. He said Foreign Office had begun about two months ago under instruction from Blankenhorn preparations for Four-Power conference to which FedRep hoped to send observers if it took place. He explained that “team” had been set up of Foreign Office to work on Chancellor’s “security proposal” to Soviet Union and that other study groups had been set up at Blank Office, All-Germany Affairs and Economic Ministries to deal with elections, economy and related matters. He thought that Foreign Office team’s “suggestion” that present Soviet zone become free of “all” troops, whether foreign or German in return for which Moscow would accept EDC and agree to withdraw all troops, including Polish and Soviet, between the Oder and Vistula was “worth consideration”. He termed “fanciful” plan suggested by study group at Ministry All-Germany Affairs proposing that all troops be removed from “all four zones”. He thought creation of such a vacuum would be “highly dangerous”. As for Blank office, he said thus far it had not submitted any plan along these lines for discussion at Foreign Office.

Touching on various problems that would arise from German reunification, Braeutigam said that in unlikely event that Kremlin consented thereto, relations between Soviet troops and new All-Germany Government would be most thorny and accordingly Foreign Office was thinking along lines of freeing zone of “all troops” as sop to Soviet security considerations as well as means of simplifying political problems.

As for possibility of Four-Power conference in October,² he was most skeptical and thought Moscow would place so many conditions thereto that it would not be held at this time. He believed Kremlin might suggest conference at Prime Minister level to discuss global settlement in hope of agreeing upon Soviet zones of influence throughout world, but would refuse to discuss German problem on basis of our latest note.

Globke gave us today almost identical information adding that Chancellor had not yet even seen any of these “working papers” and that he would not study them until it became clear that Four-Power conference would take place. He assured us that Chancellor would not publicly discuss or propose any plans of this nature without first consulting with us.³

Conant

1. Reference is to a proposal which Chancellor Adenauer had initially raised on July 8 in a letter to Secretary Dulles as Chairman of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington; not printed.
2. Documentation on the Four-Power Conference proposed for Lugano in October and subsequently held in Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954 is presented in volume vii .
3. Telegram 1086 to Paris, Sept. 22, repeated to Bonn, reported that Van Zeeland had discussed with Dulles the proposal which envisaged a neutralized East Germany and defense of West Germany solely by EDC contingents which seemed basically the same as that reported in the source text. “We also gather Spaak mentioned similar plan last few days in Strasbourg.” Conant was requested to informally point out to the Federal Republic Government that any such proposal would have “very considerable implications in terms our present defense strategy” and that, therefore, it was hoped that West German officials would refrain from releasing any such plan as an official statement “in absence prior consultation with us”. The Embassy in France was requested “to let us have any information or indications it can pick up as to what French reaction might be to such proposal” (740.5/9–1653).