740.5/4–353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Department of State 1

secret

1301. Yesterday morning Bruce and I had hour and half with two Foreign Ministers and Minister Defense Staf regarding EDC. Bruce led off with rather full account his recent conversation with ministers other EDC countries and gave an informal summary of what he believed to be current attitudes and prospects for ratification in each country. Foreign Ministers were obviously taken by suprise at Bruce’s statement that events of last week or ten days had greatly improved chances for consideration EDC treaty by French Assembly prior to summer recess and his feeling that because of progress made in obtaining [Page 785] British assurances two thirds of French Socialist deputies might vote for ratification thus providing necessary majority for passage in event Saar not obstacle. Foreign Ministers on other hand seemed to be aware and agree with Bruce’s analysis of situation in other EDC countries.

Bruce then outlined reasons why United States Government attaches so much importance to early ratification by Netherlands of EDC and stressed confidence of United States people and Congress in stable considered character of Dutch. He pointed out very real value which early action by Second Chamber would have in giving encouragement to Congress in consideration of final Appropriation Committee reports and in action on floor two Houses. Luns and Beyen stated they fully appreciated the advisability of early Dutch ratification and favorable effect it and similar action by other EDC countries would have on program. They reiterated in some detail mechanical difficulties encountered under Dutch constitutional system of obtaining rapid ratification which have been set forth in several previous messages. Luns stated that action on preliminary report by Catholic Parliament group had been now completed and intimated he believed that some indication of urgency from Beyen might have produced similar action by other non-Communist parties. Beyen who appeared slightly on defensive, explained he did not feel that he could call for “urgent” action which he felt might be counter-productive. However, when asked for timetable all three Ministers agreed that it should be possible to start formal debates in Second Chamber last half May with vote almost immediately ensuing.2 Beyen said main thing was of course to pass this first milestone since action by First Chamber and formal ratification would follow as matter of course.

During conversation there was some detailed discussion of protocols and Dutch Ministers stated that while they find them acceptable in principle as redrafted, they had of necessity convinced certain members of Parliament that protocols were interpretive only in character and did not really involve any change in substance of treaty.

In final discussion Staf expressed growing Dutch concern over number of high French command appointments in NATO, saying that he presumed effort would be made by France to duplicate this in EDF. In particular Staf said while Dutch Government had complete confidence in Juin as a soldier and commander there had been so much talk in press with regard to possibility abandoning north Europe in event of Soviet push that he had found it necessary make constant explanations to members of Chambers of Dutch Government confidence in Juin and other French Generals. Specifically it apparent Staf and other Dutch Ministers objected to retention by Juin and other [Page 786] French Generals of purely French functions such as that of inspector general army while holding concurrently high NATO command responsibilities. Bruce replied that this was interesting matter but felt this was subject entirely outside his jurisdiction. Staf expressed hope that perhaps in any further allotment of high command jobs Dutch objections could be taken into account.

Subsequently Bruce and I called on Prime Minister Drees, who with his usual candor stated his skepticism with respect to eventual success of EDC. He added, however, that he, far from opposing ratification EDC, thought it necessary take this action and he confident it would pass with very substantial majority both Chambers. He reiterated mechanical difficulties in obtaining early action. Drees appeared even more impressed than two Foreign Ministers had been at Brace’s optimism with regard to strong possibility of favorable action by French National Assembly prior to summer recess.

Chapin
  1. Repeated to Rome, Bonn, Paris, London; Luxembourg, and Brussels.
  2. No conclusive action was taken on EDC by the Dutch Parliament during the spring of 1953.