Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Cowen) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Brussels, March 11, 1953—8 p.m.

986 Subject: EDC.

1. In view short time before Van Zeeland visit² I am reporting in considerable detail EDC ratification situation in Belgium, including Van Zeeland’s views, our efforts develop drive for immediate ratification, and various Belgian interpretations of Van Zeeland tactics.

2. It is my judgment that best hope of obtaining early ratification Benelux countries lies in Secretary making abundantly clear to Van Zeeland our conviction that other signatories should proceed with ratification as rapidly as possible in advance French ratification and in persuading Van Zeeland accept leadership in obtaining agreement Benelux countries for early concurrent ratification.

3. In conversation with Foreign Minister last night I conveyed susbtance of Secretary’s letter of February 26.³ He stated that when he could tell Parliament that French are going to ratify EDC he could easily obtain at least two-thirds favorable vote in Belgian Parliament and earlier effort would result at best in small majority which would be damaging to ratification elsewhere and the future of the treaty itself.

4. Van Zeeland said he had been working for months lining up political “chessmen” and slowly but surely had prepared key elements in Parliament for ratification adding that he had needed space in which “to maneuver”.

5. Van Zeeland again described himself as no prophet but said he would promise Belgium “would not be the last to ratify and ratification elsewhere would not be delayed one second by Belgium.”

6. Van Zeeland said that EDC Interim Committee is making progress and he again informed me (see Embtel 908, February 23)⁴ that he is convinced the French Government is really sincere in efforts to pass treaty through French Parliament. Without protocols this would be utterly impossible and it will be difficult enough even with protocols.

7. Van Zeeland pointed out it was agreed at Rome⁵ that protocols would be interpretative. He said that should protocols slightly alter sense of unimportant articles in treaty he thought this was a price worth paying for French ratification but he could not accept material alteration of treaty. Treaty itself is most complex and he implied that one could make too much of protocol problem. French had accepted and even welcomed draft protocols from other countries and he thought EDC Interim Committee was moving forward.

He added that one reason for his conviction that French Government is making a sincere effort is that it cannot now turn back and must fall if it fails to make French Chamber vote on treaty.

8. In recent talks with Moch and Guy Mollet, he found the former was now taking a somewhat less favorable position and the latter had moved still farther in opposition to treaty.

9. He referred to the obvious French weakness in Europe increased by its fully recognized good effort in Indochina, in consequence he thought French were quite honestly and justly concerned about danger of Germany. There are already signs that Italy is being attracted by growing strength of Germany and without counterweight from Britain he could not belittle French fears.

10. Of course, if the British should make really conciliatory proposals French ratification would be easy. Asked what he thought of British proposals⁶ and the rumors that France had been withholding them from the other signatories for fear that those signatories would find them favorable, Van Zeeland said this was not the case. He had seen the British proposals and regarded them as “meaningless,” and less helpful than the “position” of British three months ago.

11. Asked re reports that Italy and Germany might ratify before examination of protocols, Van Zeeland said such a move in Italy is due solely to urgency caused by forthcoming Italian elections. This was agreed to and fully understood by all six at Rome. Effect of German ratification is of little importance since Germany “has no other course,” He added that if purpose early German ratification is to injure French chances of obtaining approval protocols he doubted this was good tactic. After all, treaty without France is no treaty; it is in the interest of all six to have treaty; therefore, they must accept some protocols as otherwise, as stated above, treaty simply could not pass French Chamber.

12. Asked whether a concurrent Benelux ratification of the treaty might not help those in other countries who are favorable to ratification, Van Zeeland said he was not at all sure that this would necessarily be the case. France is certain that three Benelux countries will ratify: there is “no problem” in The Netherlands, Belgian ratification is certain and easy when French Government sees its way clear to ratify, and Luxembourg will follow Belgium. On the other hand it might easily have the reverse effect. French pride and excessive sensitivity might lead doubtful voters to take the position “France will not be influenced by those little countries.”

13. Asked whether he was really satisfied of sincerity French assertions that their protocols would only be interpretative of treaty and to make passage through French Chamber possible, and were not a delaying tactic to extract maximum from Britain, Van Zeeland said he would answer question in “another way.” If Britain would “join,” of course the protocols were completely unnecessary.

14. Asked for more detailed attitude Belgian Government on ratification, Van Zeeland said a good percentage of PSC and a large percentage of the Liberals are favorable now, though some PSC members may never vote for treaty. The Socialists are the uncertain factor and are greatly influenced by attitude of French Socialists. If, as he hopes, Bidault will be able to tell him that French Parliament will ratify, many of doubtful voters particularly in Socialist Party, will swing in favor of treaty. He mentioned possibility that if treaty were put up too soon Socialists might try vote of nonconfidence not on ground of opposing treaty but on ground that a coalition government is needed to put through so important a measure.

15. We have received estimates that Parliament would now ratify by large majority. We have been acting to clarify situation and develop drive for ratification, especially as Van Zeeland position vis-à-vis party and Parliament would be more advantageous if he appeared bring treaty to vote under pressure rather than purely on own initiative. PSC government is weak with bare majority in Parliament representing minority of voters and is subjected to disruptive internal pressures.

16. Van Zeeland position in party is weakened by lack personal following and rests on personal ability and accomplishments. Due these circumstances we have made many oblique approaches to develop support among prominent Parliamentary and financial leaders. We have paid particular attention to Van Zeeland’s personal opponents such as Eyskens, leaders Liberal Party and Spaak with view that these men are more susceptible to pressure from US than from Van Zeeland. We have also approached financial leaders including prominent representatives of Societe Generale and Brufina, great Belgian holding companies, as Van Zeeland is reputed as having been associated with Brufina group. All have agreed to feasibility of early Belgian ratification on ground it presents only advantages with no serious disadvantages to Belgium and have promised to present such views to government.

17. I have tentatively discussed with Chapin (Hague) possibility of three Benelux countries proceeding with early concurrent ratification to remove any onus which any one of them might fear in taking the lead alone. Chapin studying possibility.

18. I discussed concurrent Benelux ratification also with Eyskens. He thought it a good idea, would be a new approach to problem and confirmed Van Zeeland’s estimate above that Dutch have no ratification problem. He said he would talk with Van Zeeland along this line. Re special Chamber Committee now examining treaty, Eyskens said that rapporteur is one of his men. He added that if he were Prime Minister he would pass treaty now.

19. Various Belgian interpretations of Van Zeeland’s “waiting tactics” which my staff or I have recently received follow.

20. In order avoid Socialist–Liberal obstruction of treaty on minor points with consequent possibility fall of government, Van Zeeland may be forced make deal with opposition. Such deal would include dissolution of Parliament by early summer to allow revision of constitution adapting it to realities of Belgian participation in CSC, EDC, and possibly EPC. In order gain time for concluding passage of PSC clerical education program, government postponing such deal as long as possible.

21. Although no serious consequence to Belgium if EDC negotiations fell through after Belgian ratification, Van Zeeland’s personal position could be affected. Senior newspaper editor recently told Embassy officer Belgian tradition was to follow great nations in foreign affairs and not to take lead. Instances of ill-advised assumption of leadership were 24 months service issue (Van Houtte strongly concurs on this point), Spaak pursuit of grand European Design which has resulted in partial loss his strength in own party and Parliament and Van Zeeland’s application rigid sanctions against Italy in 1935 which cost him considerable prestige.

22. Van Zeeland shares French desire achieve utmost from British association with EDC. He is sincerely interested in German-French rapprochement and wishes to play honest broker in protocol negotiations.

23. In order aid French Government obtain French Socialist support for treaty Van Zeeland prefers defer Belgian ratification until he can obtain largest possible favorable Belgian Socialist vote.

24. I suggest Secretary set aside considerable time for talk with Van Zeeland in order to “nail him down” which is far from easy.

25. Van Zeeland necessarily concerned about his personal position (see 16 above). If Secretary can convince Van Zeeland his prestige would be enhanced and his position within Belgium strengthened by early ratification, he would be more cooperative.

Cowen

1. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
2. Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland visited Washington, Mar. 14–18, 1953 for discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other officials. See memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Mar. 16, p. 773.
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. Not printed. (740.5/2–453)
5. Reference is to the Rome meeting of the six Foreign Ministers of the proposed European Political Community. See telegrams Coled 4, Feb. 26, p. 740; Coled 1, Feb. 27, p. 741; and footnote 2, p. 755.
6. Reference is presumably to the British counterproposals on association with the EDC and the extension of the NATO commitments. See memorandum by Bonbright, Mar. 4, p. 745.