Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 139

Minutes of United States–United Kingdom Political Talks, March 5, 1953¹

secret
[UKPT MIN–1]

Washington, March 5, 1953.

Participants

• U.S.
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Matthews
  • Mr. Allison
  • Mr. Bonbright
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. O’Connor
  • Mr. Beale
• U.K.
  • Foreign Secretary Eden
  • Ambassador Makins
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Sir Christopher Steel
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Tomlinson
  • Mr. Henderson

European Defense Community

Foreign Secretary Eden said that they had sent the French a note in reply to their proposals concerning association with the European Defense Community.² He thought they had done what they could to meet the French. They had said that they would consult with the EDC before withdrawing British troops. They could not, however, meet the French request not to move British troops from the Continent. He noted that the press had gone badly in connection with the exchange.

Secretary Dulles said that Ambassador Bonnet had called, as a result of a telephone message from Paris, to express the great concern felt by his Government over the British reply to the French proposals. The Secretary said that he had a word or two to say on tactics in connection with ratification of the EDC Treaty. He felt that we were not going to get anywhere until we have brought about ratification of the Treaty by countries other than France. It is at that point that we should marshal our forces. In his opinion to placate the French by dibs and dabs would fritter away our influence. He said that the way to get ratification through is to get other countries to ratify and thereby focus a sense of responsibility on France. The Secretary said that he himself could not get excited about meeting the French position today because they will want us to give more and still more.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he agreed absolutely with Secretary Dulles’s statement of the situation. He said that the British were sorry they had had to do what they did.

Secretary Dulles said that he anticipated that the French, when they come to Washington, will want to talk about the Tripartite Declaration, Indochina and North Africa. He felt that it would be best if we were to bring everything into play when the French are standing alone. It was his understanding, subject to check, that there were no serious obstacles to prior action by the other five EDC countries except possibly the protocols. He recalled that during his trip to Europe he had told these other countries that the best thing to do is to get the Treaty ratified and then tackle the protocols.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that the French are being a. bit difficult about this whole problem. He said that the matter concerns not only the French but other countries and yet the French were insisting that the other countries should not be told about the British position.

Secretary Dulles said that we should forget about the French for the next thirty days and concentrate on pushing through ratification of the Treaty. He felt confident that French ratification could be achieved as a result of the cumulative pressures we can exert on the French. He pointed out that the consequences of failure would be catastrophic. He noted that whereas Mayer in his opinion was honestly trying to put the thing through, Bidault presented a more complicated problem and no one could know quite where he stood.

Foreign Secretary Eden repeated that he agreed with Secretary Dulles on tactics.

Secretary Dulles said that the next thing to consider was what could be done.

Mr. Matthews said that the Italians were ready to go forward with ratification and that the Dutch were also ready. He noted that Mr. Adenauer had indicated the possibility of German ratification by March 19. He said that the Belgians appeared to be the most sticky on the problem and that Van Zeeland had said he wanted to wait until the French ratification.

Secretary Dulles said that the Belgian situation seemed to reflect more Van Zeeland’s own view than the view of his Government. He noted that the opposition was carrying the ball on ratification and that the domestic political situation created difficulties. He felt as a result of his conversations that the Prime Minister’s views on ratification were more forthright than those of Van Zeeland.

Mr. Matthews noted that Van Zeeland will be in Washington during the week of March 17.

Secretary Dulles said that the matter could be discussed with him at that time. He said that our Ambassadors in the EDC countries should be told we have a common view in this matter.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he agreed. He felt that Adenauer is fully aware of the importance attached to early ratification but there was certainly no harm in repeating the position to him.

Secretary Dulles said that it should be understood that the U.S. and U.K. would take corresponding action, not concerted action.

Foreign Secretary Eden replied in the affirmative. He then noted that the French socialists had told the British Ambassador in Paris that what they wanted was an extension of the NATO period to 50 years. He said that he did not know how difficult that question was for the United States.

Secretary Dulles said that the matter would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate. He said that he would not totally exclude the possibility if it was the thing that would finally bring about ratification. He pointed out that the question was one of who acts first. He said that it would be impossible to put anything through the U.S. Senate before ratification by the French. He stated that the French would have to ratify on the assurance that the U.S. would try to get it done. He noted that fifty years is a long time. He said that he would not say today that it could be done and he emphasized that it would not be desirable to hold out any hopes. On an informal and confidential basis he indicated that the possibility could be explored with Senate leaders if it seemed the critical thing to do. He felt that there would be strong pressure on people to do whatever was possible when the critical juncture was reached. He expressed the opinion that it was foolish to put reliance in fifty-year treaties of alliance, since all such treaties are effective only as they reflect the interests and desires of the countries at the particular time. He noted that it would be a national disaster for both the U.S. and the U.K. if the Continent of Europe were to fall into hostile hands.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he did not think the extension to fifty years was necessary nor could it mean a great deal, but he noted that the French socialists might feel that they needed it.

Secretary Dulles noted that the NATO was not limited to twenty-year life and provided the right of withdrawal.

Sir Roger Makins said that from what Secretary Dulles had said he felt that the problem of extending the NATO commitment to fifty years was a point of less difficulty.

Secretary Dulles said that the point might be covered by an exchange of notes. He felt that it was inconceivable that a situation would arise which would lead the U.S. to want to withdraw from the basic position set forth in the Treaty. He felt that it was premature, however, to think in terms of those things at this stage.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that his Government was already tied up with the French in other ways. He said that even if they could do anything more than had already been done it would be most unwise to say so at the present time.

Secretary Dulles said that the French wanted a statement from us concerning meetings of the Three Powers.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he interpreted the French to mean that they wanted a Political Standing Group.

Secretary Dulles said that his understanding was not that the Three Powers would come together as a political standing group but that they would merely talk together when a critical situation arose. It was his understanding that the French wanted to emphasize that if the EDC goes into force the French would not be dropped out of discussions, in effect that the creation of the EDC would not mean their exclusion.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that his Government was willing to state that French membership in the EDC would not change ordinary relations. He noted that a formal organization for consultation was another thing and would be very difficult for them to do; the Canadians in particular would not like such an arrangement.

Secretary Dulles said that we could give assurances to the French that entering into the EDC would not push them down but to say that membership in the EDC would push them up was another matter. He was inclined to be somewhat evasive on this point at this stage and was against the establishment of tripartite machinery.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that their proposition was very much that of Secretary Dulles’. He said they were all for giving assurances without establishing machinery.

Sir Pierson Dixon expressed the view that the extension of NATO to fifty years would help the French.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that formal extension should not be taken for granted.

Foreign Secretary Eden noted that they had said something on the point in their note to the French and they would stand on that for the time being and would consult with the U.S. regarding any further developments.

Saar³

Secretary Dulles said that our position, which had been misrepresented in France and Germany, was that there was no organic relationship between the Saar and EDC. He said that the French were not justified in trying to run out on the EDC because the Saar problem had not been settled. He quoted Mr. Adenauer as having said to him, “I am prepared to resume discussions tomorrow on the Saar.”

Foreign Secretary Eden said that Bidault had told him that he was quite ready to receive British advice and keep the British informed but he would not accept outside intervention. Mr. Eden said that he had told Bidault that it was important to settle the Saar question before the German elections and Bidault had said that the point was much in his mind. Mr. Matthews, in response to a question from Secretary Dulles, replied that we had not had any detailed reports on the recent talks in Rome. Foreign Secretary Eden said he thought that we should inquire. Mr. Matthews said he understood that the technical people are meeting on the subject.

Secretary Dulles asked whether we should inquire of Paris and Bonn concerning what is going on about the Saar. Foreign Secretary Eden agreed that this would be desirable and Secretary Dulles instructed that a cable be sent out.

[Here follows discussion on British arrests of neo-Nazis in Germany, Trieste, Stalin, Indochina, and Far Eastern matters.]

1. Foreign Secretary Eden visited Washington Mar. 4–6, 1953 for discussions with various American officials including Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower. A cover sheet attached to the source text carries the designation UKPT MIN–1 and indicates the meeting took place in Secretary Dulles’ office and began at 10:30 a.m. Mar. 5. The source text does not indicate a drafting officer or whether these were the agreed minutes of the meeting. Material on Eden’s trip to Washington in March 1953, including the complete text of UKPT MIN–1, is presented in volume vi . A summary of this conversation was sent to London in telegram 5962, Mar. 7. (740.5/3–753)
2. Reference is to the British note of Mar. 3. See the Bonbright memorandum to the Secretary of State, Mar. 4, supra.
3. Further documentation on the Saar is presented in volume vii .