Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/12–1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State ¹

secret

Paris, December 17, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 13. Cotel. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting. Morning December 17, items I, II, III, IV agenda (CA(54)50 revised).

Chairman (Greece)² opened meeting with brief remarks and turned it over secretary general³ who proposed item IV (most effective pattern military strength for next few years (MC–48)) be discussed subsequent restricted meeting.⁴ This meeting will be reported separate telegram.

Item I of agenda (report by secretary general of progress during period 3 December 1953 to 7 December 1954 (CM(54) 115)).⁵ Secretary generally stated he had nothing add to report save express regret delay issuance five-year NATO survey caused by need inclusion for reference purposes London-Paris agreements. Survey would be released next month. No comment on report and report adopted.

Item II (exchange views political matters common interest including Soviet trends paper (CM (54) 116)).⁶

Italy⁷ welcomed increased cooperation NATO powers as shown recent joint reply Soviet note which demonstrated NATO not only military alliance but also political diplomatic union. Advocated increased propaganda efforts in political and vaguely alluded to desirability increased coordination NATO relationships on psychological front. He later gave brief summary ratification process Paris agreements in Rome which he expected would be favorably terminated immediate future.

Turkey. While London-Paris agreements⁸ gave confidence for future, beware over-optimism and keep up guard, increasing NATO defense unity cohesion and firmness. Then Soviets will be less aggressive. If Soviet threat seems less remote today this due to strength of West especially in nuclear weapons. West cannot permit East close gap between East inferiority and West superiority nuclear weapons. Anticipated German contribution must not give West false confidence. More attention must be directed to econ-social conditions underdeveloped areas order to increase their potential and show up false Communist flirtations. Helpful role of OEEC stressed as well as need increase econ–social collaboration within NATO. Ended remarks be advocating door should be kept open conversations with Soviets when certain conditions met ratification Paris agreements, increased NATO military strength, et cetera.) But stressed theme negotiation through strength.

U.S.⁹ Soviet policy resembled powerful stream whose surface sometimes ruffled sometimes calm. Current can’t be judged by surface which, ruffled or calm, is no indication of force below. Most important consideration is build up Western strength and avoid dangers being lulled into false security by calm, frightened into paralysis by rough, or provoked into hasty and ill-considered actions. Soviet trends paper shows no basic change Soviet policy or any diminution Soviet military strength including nuclear capacity. This includes China. Vast manpower Communist world being ruthlessly employed not primarily for raising standard living but for increasing war potential. At same time Communists continuing subversion especially in underdeveloped and colonial areas. This is close adherence basic thesis Lenin–Stalin that road to victory of revolution in West lies through revolutionary alliance with liberation movement of colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. Recently Soviets are playing “soft line” but they have not deviated by deed or action from basic policy. They have refused contribute to President Eisenhower’s plan create atomic bank for peaceful purposes or respond to efforts U.N. Armament Subcommittee to limit and control atomic and conventional weapons. They used for propaganda purposes and not for constructive ends all meetings held in 1954 to bring about unification Germany, liberation Austria, and unification Korea. We must not be lulled into sense of security merely by words in fact Soviet deeds. Regarding second danger we must not be paralyzed by fright into avoidance of actions which Soviets disapprove. Soviets always seek by threatening words to prevent unification and strengthening of free world. They are always violent in their denunciations of constructive moves towards unification by free world. Secretary then cited chapter and verse, including quotations from Soviet sources of Soviet denunciations and threatening gestures vis-à-vis Marshall Plan, organization of NATO, Turkish adherence NATO, Japanese peace treaty, Manila pact, etcetera. He pointed out that such denunciations, whenever they were followed by concrete steps on part West to unify and strengthen non-Communist world, were followed on part Soviets by conciliatory gestures and that record of the last ten years give proof that West could be confident that if it proceeded to build up its strength Soviets would give increasing deference to that strength and that its mood of hostility might change. Secretary continued that we must not be provoked into violent, ill-considered actions which would disturb harmonious unity our alliance. U.S. subject to severe provocation in Far East, deliberately planned in hope provoking U.S. into actions which European allies would regard ill-advised and which would possibly shake our unity at time when we hoped it would be reinforced by London-Paris agreements. Secretary assured NATO U.S. would not be provoked into reckless action and quoted President Eisenhower’s statement to effect “hard way is to have courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us in hope eventually of leading other side to a little better understanding of honesty of our intentions”. Instead taking unilateral action to retaliate against flagrant wrong involved in imprisonment U.S. fliers, we took action to U.N. This connection Secretary wished express appreciation to NATO U.N. members for their support and efforts being made bring about release U.S. fliers. In conclusion Secretary stated free world has come long way since early post-war days, that there was increasing unity and strength and increasing likelihood peace and freedom. Task ahead long and hard but he felt confident that NATO partners would not be lulled into complacency, frightened into paralysis or provoked into hasty actions.

France. Agreed fully Secretary’s evaluation surface phenomena Soviet foreign policy and stressed need studying deep intentions and trends Soviet policy which have not changed. Soviet note December 16 threatening abrogation Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty 1944 excellent example Soviet attempt intimidate French public opinion and parliament on eve national assembly debate ratification issue. No one should be alarmed by this “spectacular move.” France would not be influenced and would remain firm to its policy consolidating western alliance. Soviet move might well backfire and provoke or influence opponents or hesitants into giving fuller support to agreements since Frenchmen scorn such provocative action. Soviet note would not change government’s determination obtain ratification soonest.

U.K. completely in accord with U.S. and French statements and hoped that there would be increasing understanding of basic Soviet tactics. Emphasized need continual build-up position of strength and make clear to world this strength even with German contribution defensive strength. Stressed fact that WEU should not be rival to NATO but should contribute to unity western European defense. Links between WEU and NATO being studied and although too early predict precise form agreed by all they must be intimate. Aim now was to fortify unity of west by ratifying Paris agreements which parliament had done and as expected crude Soviet maneuvers to disrupt agreements were more active. After commenting on negative meaning peaceful co-existence in Soviet terminology, Eden strongly advocated need increasing unity, keeping up guard, et cetera. He felt growing strength of west might in time prevail upon east modify its tactics, that recent conference satellite states had not changed over-all situation, in fact it has done little more than confirm in name what existed in fact; and that strength and unity of west would give better prospects for peace.

Item II. (Trends paper) Noted with full approval.

Item III. (Military progress of NATO (MC–5/9)).¹⁰ General Guillaume requested commanders to speak. Admiral Wright stressed need improve collective ability withstand atomic aggression and maintain security of seas during duration emergency. He pointed out his plans provided for effective naval effort, not only on missions of primary importance to his command but also in support of channel command and SACEUR, that his main mission was to gain and maintain control of Atlantic and assure its availability for NATO. He stressed that closest possible coordination with SACEUR was being maintained throughout all his planning. Admiral Creasy spoke in generalities on responsibility NATO forces holding command of sea, vital necessity sea lanes be kept open to provide imports civilian population and armies of continent. General Gruenther tabled paper on air defense and technical center and requested cooperation NATO allies assist scientific staffing this organization. (Gruenther statement being air pouched.) Gruenther also stressed great need NATO governments intensify efforts popularize NATO in order inter alia facilitate passage national budgetary appropriations or forces assigned NATO. He was impressed by over one hundred leadership groups which had come to SHAPE during last year and which seemed to be quite unfamiliar with duties and responsibilities NATO. These groups should be encouraged. NATO peoples should be made much more aware of what NATO stood for. U.S. (Anderson)¹¹ supported Gruenther’s statement regarding air defense technical center pointing out that it was an adjunct to SHAPE, that it could be transferred to NATO or any other NATO body whenever NATO desired, that center was truly international, and that its real success depended upon full cooperation other NATO members making scientists available to it. He expressed appreciation to Netherland authorities for their cooperation in establishing center. Netherlands expressed appreciation initiative Gruenther and U.S. Government setting up center and stated would give full cooperation its development. Secretary General gratified with Gruenther’s remarks on “preaching NATO gospel” and expressed hope that international staff informational ideas be favorably considered by finance ministers, even if expensive.

Military progress report noted.

Remaining items on agenda will be reported in subsequent telegrams.

1. Transmitted in two sections. Pouched to all NATO capitals and Bonn, Wiesbaden, Heidelberg.
2. Stephanos Stephanopoulos.
3. Lord Ismay.
4. Held later in the day of Dec. 17. Summarized in telegram Secto 21, Dec. 18, p. 557.
5. A copy of CM (54) 115 is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416.
6. The formal agreed agenda, a copy of which is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416, indicates that this document was circulated to the Ministers, but no copy has been found in Department of State files.
7. Department of State files contain the verbatim records of only the afternoon session, Dec. 17, summarized in telegram Secto 14, infra. Therefore, it is impossible to identify the individual speakers whose remarks are summarized in the source text.
8. Documentation on the Four-Power and Nine-Power Conferences which led to the admission of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Brussels Pact and to the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO is on pp. 1294 ff.
9. Secretary Dulles’ lengthy opening statement to the Ministerial meeting herein summarized was transmitted to the Department in telegram Polto 879 of Dec. 20, a copy of which is in PPS files, lot M 88, box 168.
10. The formal agreed agenda, a copy of which is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416, indicates that this document was circulated to the Ministers, but no copy has been found in Department of State files.
11. Presumably Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense.