Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/11–2454: Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, November 24, 1954—8 p.m.

Polto 962. For Merchant from Martin—eyes only. After luncheon of PermReps only at his home today, SecGen¹ invited further discussion of capabilities study problem dealt with in brief fashion during regular council meeting today and reported on separately.²

Following points emerged from lengthy and sometimes heated discussion:

(1) For good and bad reasons, none of non-standing group countries appear to have commenced study from non-military point of view of military committee paper for council on capabilities studies.³ In most cases paper has not been seen outside technical military channels.

(2) Knowledge of paper and understanding of its background and purpose, and of action desired at December meeting, exceedingly sketchy among PermReps and, they feel, among their non-military ministers. As result, speculation has created many imaginary problems. References were made to thousand-page documents which must be analyzed and acted on, to necessity for concurring in necessary changes in infrastructure programs before December, to analysis of and agreement to substantial additional financial and economic burdens of specified character in December, and to need for final decision in December as to use of new weapons in case of emergency.

(3) In light absence of consideration of document and ignorance of its contents and nature of decisions proposed for December meeting, there was considerable shock and resentment at Standing Group position taken during council meeting in morning that ministers would be expected to approve paper on capabilities study. As result of ensuing discussion, believe that paper, even when studies and its limited nature understood, may be difficult for some governments to act on by December.

(4) Some governments, and in particular Norwegian and Danish, feel that any paper which they must approve rather than note, will require formal consultation with parliamentary committees which they would like to avoid in any case and which would also be difficult to complete before ministers meeting.

In order bring discussion to realistic level, I gave on personal basis broad outline and limited amount of background on decisions which paper as I had last seen it did propose ministers should make in December, pointing up their limited nature both in terms of fundamental policy and in terms of detailed implementation. Described it in essence as modification of strategic concepts paper.⁴ Also emphasized that in terms of N.A.T.O. planning and action, was highly important to take this step in December if at all possible, but that even more important to maintenance of deterrent effect, to conduct ourselves in considering the paper in such a way as to create no suggestion of disagreement on its central point. If delay were necessary, it should be made to appear as routine.

Most PermReps seemed reassured by general approach taken in paper and several said it appeared to be wise and clever handling of most difficult matter. Nevertheless, decisions actually involved were still vital ones and not to be taken quickly or lightly.

There is strong desire to meet again on similar basis after papers have been received and given at least preliminary consideration by non-military elements, for purpose asking question of S.G. members and discussing way in which paper can best be handled by ministers to accomplish N.A.T.O. objectives. I recommend that we approve action by PermReps within next ten days or two weeks along these lines. I also urge that U.S. PermRep be in position to give on official though informal basis background and philosophy underlying paper, and position paper is considered to occupy in long term approach to this problem.

Arising out of way in which this paper was handled by governments, there was strong general feeling that arrangements should be made for papers which have received Standing Group approval and which are of interest to the council, to be forwarded to council members through SecGen without waiting for action by M.R.C. or M.C. This considered only way to insure initiation of consideration by non-military elements at proper time. I consider this would be a useful step in assisting some of our less well-organized allies. U.K. rep also endorsed it strongly.

Martin

1. Lord Ismay.
2. Telegram Polto 958, Nov. 24, not printed. (740.5/11–2454)
3. The reference here is to NATO document MC 48, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years,” not declassified by NATO military authorities at the time this volume was ready for publication. See the editorial note, p. 524.
4. The paper under reference here has not been further identified.