320.2/4–1451
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Congressional Liaison Officer for the House of Representatives in the Department of State (Moreland)1
Subject: Negotiation of a Cease-Fire.
| Participants: | Congressman John W. McCormack (D, Mass.) House Majority Leader |
| Mr. Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Liaison Officer |
Mr. McCormack stated that he had just had a talk with Joe Martin2 and he was convinced that the Republicans were banking on a deal between the U.N. and China which would permit China to cease firing in return for, in addition to retention of North Korea, (1) recognition by the U.S. of Red China, (2) a seat in the U.N. for Red China, and (3) the return of Formosa to China (Red China). I told Mr. McCormack that I had no specific information at all on this subject, and that I would have to speak entirely in a personal capacity. I stated that it was my opinion that such a move was completely out of the question.
I then asked Mr. McCormack if I could ask him some questions strictly in a personal capacity. He replied that he would be delighted to try to answer any questions I might ask. I asked him how he would feel if the U.N. was able to negotiate a cease-fire on the condition that the U.S. would recognize the Red regime. His response was that it would be a calamity. He stated further that he would rather see us pull out of Korea than to be guilty of such an act of “appeasement.” He stated that if the U.S. were to recognize the Red regime it would be a matter of a short time before the U.N. voted a seat for this regime, and it would really be only a short time subsequent to that before Formosa would be returned to China. He said that such a move would completely destroy all of the Democratic support for the Administration. He stated that he felt that the Democratic support was now more solidly behind the Administration in its policy for the Far East than it had ever been before. Such an act of “appeasement” would be so [Page 1631] repugnant to him personally that he would feel tempted to resign from public office.
I then asked Mr. McCormack to place himself in the shoes of the Red Chinese authorities for a moment. I then asked what would be his view to negotiating a cease-fire in the absence of a total victory over his forces. Would he negotiate without some concession on the part of his adversaries, and if not, what concessions would he feel that the U.N. could make which would make it attractive for the Reds to cease fire in the absence of a total military victory. His response got back to the original premise that any recognition of the Red regime would be “appeasement”, and these other dire consequences would flow from this act.
I know Mr. McCormack well enough to know that he thoroughly understood that I was speaking to him in a personal capacity. I am reporting this only to reflect the depth of feeling that he has on this issue.