Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

INR-NIE Files

National Intelligence Estimate

secret

Washington, April 10, 1951.

NIE–27

Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Taiwan¹

the problem

To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to securing control over Taiwan in 1951.

conclusions

1. We believe that the Chinese Communists could not launch a large-scale attack on Taiwan without a major shift or troops from other parts of China into the coastal staging areas. We further believe that such a depolyment would adversely affect their commitments or operations in Korea and elsewhere.

2. In the absence of US participation in the defense of Taiwan, the Chinese Communists could, after the necessary redeployment, probably capture Taiwan by a large-scale invasion. We believe, however, that, if the US Fleet participates in the defense of the island, the Chinese Communists do not have the capability of launching a successful large-scale invasion on Taiwan without substantial Soviet assistance. The USSR would probably estimate that it would incur a substantial risk of war with the US if it furnished assistance of the type and scale that would be required to make the operation successful. We do not believe the USSR is likely to incur this degree of risk solely on account of the advantage to be gained from Chinese Communist conquest of Taiwan in 1951.

3. Although military and logistic difficulties severely limit immediate Chinese Communist capabilities for a large-scale invasion, we estimate that the Chinese Communists currently have the capability for a limited assault on Taiwan. Such an assault might be launched in the expectation of making a landing before the US Fleet could intervene effectively and of exploiting whatever potential dissidence exists on the island.

4. Although there is insufficient intelligence available at this time to make a positive prediction, it is estimated that Communist China is not likely to attempt either a large-scale or limited attack on Taiwan during 1951 so long as US policy with regard to Taiwan remains unchanged and the Chinese Communists continue to be committed in the Korean war. The likelihood of a Communist invasion attempt would be greatly increased, however, under any of the following circumstances:

a. If the Chinese Communists should achieve a decisive victory in Korea before summer or should otherwise be able to disengage themselves from the Korean campaign;

b. If the tactical situation in Korea made the redeployment of the US Fleet units in Korean waters unlikely;

c. If the Chinese Communists were convinced that the Chinese Nationalist Government and its defense forces had become so weakened that they would disintegrate after an initial show of Chinese Communist strength;

d. If over-all Communist strategy required the conquest of Taiwan regardless of the risks involved.

5. The Chinese Communists, if they decided to make an assault on Taiwan, would be most likely to attack in the spring or summer, when weather and sea conditions are most favorable. (See Appendix A.)

6. We believe that the courses of action that Communist China is most likely to follow during 1951 are:

a. Maintain the threat to Taiwan.

b. Attempt to expand a network for subversive activity on Taiwan.

c. Emphasize in domestic propaganda that US support to the Nationalist Government constitutes aggression against China.

d. Stimulate international disagreement over the disposition of the area and international criticism of US support of the Chiang regime.

e. Exploit the Taiwan issue in connection with proposals for a peaceful settlement in Korea.

f. Perhaps exercise its capability for capturing the small Nationalist-held islands off the east China coast.

[Here follows the discussion section of the paper dealing with Communist and Nationalist Chinese military capabilities and with estimates of Sino-Soviet intentions. Appendix A, “Weather Conditions in the Taiwan Straits,” and Appendix B, “Recent Chinese Propaganda Line on Taiwan,” also follow; neither is printed.]

1. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 5 April 1951, except as noted by the Director of Intelligence, USAF, on page 4.”