Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

New Delhi Post Files: Lot 58 F 95

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)

top secret

New Delhi, March 29, 1951.

Dear Bert: Without instructions I tarn taking certain action with regard to Tibet to which I hope the Department will not take undue exception.

Mr. Henrig Harrer, Austrian tutor of the Dalai Lama, was brought in to see me by Mr. James Burke of Life and Time magazines. Mr. Burke is getting some important stories from Mr. Harrer and has been keeping him under cover in New Delhi.

Mr. Harrer told me that the Dalai Lama is very much in need of advice. He says the young man is much more intelligent and is better informed regarding world affairs than any of his advisers. The Dalai Lama is also deeply conscious of the need for social and other reforms in Tibet. He trusts the United States more than any other country and has been disappointed in the ability [inability?] of Tibet to establish closer relations with the United States.

With great reluctance the Dalai Lama is sending the present mission to Peking. He has not given this mission any plenipotentiary powers since he fears that even though his brother-in-law is a member of the mission that it might yield to pressure. The Dalai Lama has doubts about returning to Lhasa. Some of the monks about him, however, insist that he should come to terms with Peking and do so. The Dalai Lama does not know which way to turn for advice.

I am inclined to believe that Mr. Harrer is telling me the truth. Mr. Burke, who has been carrying on long conversations with Mr. Harrer, also believes in him. Mr. Burke knows necessarily part of this story and is sworn to absolute secrecy.

I am convinced that if the Dalai Lama goes back to Lhasa with his treasures both he and his treasures will eventually fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, if he leaves his treasures in Sikkim, where they are at present, I am afraid that the Government of India will treat them in exactly the same way that they treated the funds left in India in special accounts by the Nationalist Government of China; that is, freeze them until the courts decide what is to be done with them. The Dalai Lama is also very much afraid that at the last moment the Indians will even refuse him asylum. According to Mr. Harrer, the Government of India has thus far not promised to give the Dalai Lama asylum. It seems that unless someone in whom this young man might have confidence should give him advice, he will fall into the Chinese Communist trap, or he will be in an extremely unenviable position in India.

On my own initiative, therefore, I am endeavoring to send to the Dalai Lama a message, a copy of which is attached. I am trying to send this message by two channels: (1) I have given a copy to Latrash,¹ who has left this morning for Calcutta. In Calcutta he will discreetly endeavor to get in touch with one of the two members of the Tibetan Trade Mission and inquire if one of them is in a position to take the message and to hand it personally to the Dalai Lama in Yatung. If one of the members of the Trade Mission cannot undertake to give the message to the Dalai Lama personally, Latrash is not to entrust the errand to the Trade Mission.² (2) . . . .

The paper on which the messages are written has been purchased in India and will bear no indication of origin. Both Mr. Latrash and Mr. Harrer are to insist that there shall in no event be anything in writing which will indicate that the messages come from me. The Dalai Lama is, however, to be told orally that I am sending a message to him. I shall have to trust the ingenuity of Latrash to arrange for this oral message to be delivered.

I realize that a considerable amount of risk is involved in sending a message of this kind. My judgment is that it is better for this risk to be taken than to see the Chinese Communists succeed by trickery in taking over Tibet and in gaining control of the Dalai Lama and his treasures. I have not informed the Department of this matter by telegram or asked for its authority, because of my fear of a leak. Furthermore, if my message should become public, the Department is free, if it desires, to disclaim any responsibility in the matter.

My taking of this action does not mean that I have any intention of following the practice in the future of going ahead in matters of this kind without proper authority. I realize the danger of officers in the field committing acts on their own which might not be in line with the policies of the Department. It seems to me, however, that this was one of the rare occasions when I should move forward fast, taking upon myself the entire responsibility for the consequences.

Please inform George McGhee and Dean Rusk of my action. I leave to your and their discretion the decision as to who else should be brought into the secret. The appropriate members of the unnameable agency should, of course, be informed.

Sincerely yours,

Loy W. Henderson

[Enclosure]

top secret

[New Delhi, undated.]

A high foreign official who has recently visited Asia and who has sympathy for Tibet and deep concern for the welfare of His Holiness and His people sends the following earnest suggestions to His Holiness:

• “1. The Peiping Communist regime is determined to obtain complete control over Tibet. No concession made to that regime by His Holiness can change this determination. The Chinese Communists prefer to gain control through trickery rather than through force. They are therefore anxious to persuade His Holiness to make an agreement which would allow them to establish a representative in Lhasa.
• “2. The establishment of a representative of the Peiping Communist regime in Lhasa would serve only to speed up the seizing of all of Tibet by the Chinese Communists.
• “3. Until changes in the world situation would make it difficult for the Chinese Communists to take over Tibet, His Holiness should in no circumstances return to Lhasa or send his own treasures or those of Tibet back to Lhasa. … Any treasuries which might be returned to Lhasa would eventually be taken over by the Chinese Communists.
• “4. His Holiness should not return to Lhasa while the danger exists that by force or trickery the Chinese Communists might seize Lhasa. He should leave Yatung for some foreign country if it should look like the Chinese Communists might try to prevent his escape.
• “5. It is suggested that His Holiness send representatives at once to Ceylon. These representatives should try to arrange with the Government of Ceylon for the immediate transfer to Ceylon of the treasures of His Holiness. They should also try to obtain permission for His Holiness and His Household to find asylum in Ceylon if His Holiness should leave Tibet. After the Government of Ceylon has granted permission for asylum, His Holiness should ask the Government of India for assurance that if he and His Household should leave Tibet they could pass through India to Ceylon.
• “6. If His Holiness and His Household could not find safe asylum in Ceylon he could be certain of finding a place of refuge in one of the friendly countries, including the United States, in the Western Hemisphere.
• “7. It might also be useful for His Holiness immediately to send a mission to the United States where it would be prepared to make a direct appeal to the United Nations. It is understood that His Holiness is already aware that favorable consideration will be granted to the applications made by members of a Tibetan mission to the United Nations for United States visas.”

1. Frederick W. Latrash, Vice Consul in New Delhi.
2. According to a letter to Henderson from Fraser Wilkins, First Secretary of Embassy in New Delhi, May 23, 1951, not printed, Henderson’s message was not sent through the Tibetan Trade Mission. On May 13, during a visit to Kalimpong, India, for discussions with Tibetan officials, Wilkins gave a copy to Dzasa Liushar, the Tibetan Foreign Secretary (New Delhi Post Files: Lot 58 F 95).