Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

CA Files: Lot 59 D 228: Telegram

The Commander, Seventh Fleet (Struble) to the Commander Naval Forces, Far East (Joy)

top secret

27 February 1951—11:46 p. m.

271546Z. On 22 Feb Com 7th Flt visited Chinese Naval base Tsoying USS Gurke and all Chinese naval vessels full dressed. Called on Generalissimo for about 1 hour. General discussion primarily concerning Korean War and fight against Communism.¹

Com 7th Flt, CG 13 AF,² ComNavPhil,³ Alusna Taipei and staff attended MND briefing on 23rd. No particularly new information brought out.

Discussion with Gen Chou Chih-jou⁴ and top Chinese military held on morning of 24th that MND. Attended by Struble, Turner, Old, Jarrett and very limited staffs. Chinese presented plan for their action in case of invasion of Formosa. First speaker got off subject and discussed plans for invasion of Mainland. Chinese themselves noted error and later speakers covered defense of Formosa. Nothing particularly new in defense planning. Noteworthy that considerable thought and planning being developed for invasion of mainland.

Com 7th Flt replied to Chinese comments and questions.

a. A number of Chinese estimates concerning probable size of invasion forces, size of vessels, and probable loading area were accepted as fair estimates.

b. The “inner Defense Zone” which had been established by Com 7th Flt was considered by Chinese as being too restrictive. Adm Struble eliminated the zone and in lieu thereof proposed surf ace traffic lanes which were accepted in principle by Chinese.

c. Chinese asked whether after an air raid had been delivered against Taiwan or Pescadores will U.S. forces attack Communist airfields on the mainland, if not will Chinese be permitted to do so. Adm Struble replied that interpretation of the 28 June agreement⁵ would have to be taken up through diplomatic channels as he did not have the power of interpretation of that agreement.

d. Chinese asked whether if an air attack were launched against Taiwan would dropping of first bomb be considered an invasion. Adm Struble replied not necessarily. On his part he indicated that he would not consider a single plane dropping a bomb as starting invasion. He stated that circumstances at the time would have to dictate his actions in deploying the 7th Fleet. That CINCFE and COMNAVFE would be appraising the problem and that circumstances at the time would have to dictate when “the invasion started”.

e. Chinese questioned whether 7th Fleet mission include stopping an air attack. Com 7th Fleet replied “If I were in Korea at the time I could not stop it. If 7th Fleet were in position I would attempt to stop attack. I assure you General MacArthur and Adm Joy are considering the situation continuously and movement of the fleet would depend upon evaluation of the situation at the time”.

f. Chinese indicated that Soviet submarines might engage covertly in mine laying and Chinese at present had no means of mine sweeping. Com 7th Fleet replied number of mine sweeping forces available to U.S. is small. Problem will be presented to Adm Joy. If available and needed, mine sweeping forces will come with 7th Flt.

After the discussion of the specific items mentioned above Adm Struble asked if the Chinese would like to make an estimate as to the probable time for the start of the invasion and what the enemys strategy would be. The question was not answered directly but the reply indicated that the Chinese expect raids on the island of Formosa particularly Quinmen. They emphasized the superiority of Red Chinese air over their own air and the readiness of his airfields in the provinces adjacent to Formosa Straits. They anticipate early air raids on Formosa and requested assistance in connection with the present radar procurement. Com 7th Fleet recommends that increased priority be assigned to current Chinese radar procurement.

They presented their views on the necessity of their being able to take prompt action against the Red Chinese airfields and invasion buildup before the enemys forces actually had commenced an invasion. More freedom of action for U.S. forces as well as Chinese forces in this respect is militarily desirable. Recommend CINCFE procure such leeway as practicable in this matter from JCS. The Chinese were again informed interpretation 28 June agreement was diplomatic matter.

Atmosphere at conferences cordial although Chinese unhappy over Mainland restriction.

Services Adm Jarrett and staff excellent.

1. Telegram 1191 from Taipei, March 5, 1951, reported that according to Admiral Jarrett, the conversation had been “confined to such teatime civilities as Generalissimo’s asking Struble about Korean war and requesting suggestions from Jarrett for improvement Chinese Navy, Madame’s inquiring about mutual friends, et cetera” (793.00/3–551).
2. Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, Commanding General, Thirteenth Air Force, Philippines.
3. Rear Adm. Francis P. Old, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines.
4. Lt. Gen. Chou Chih-jou, or Chow Chih-jou, Chief of the General Staff and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Republic of China.
5. For texts of the U.S. aide-mémoire of June 27, 1950 and Chinese reply, see Telcan 39 to Taipei, June 27, 1 a. m., and telegram 1000 from Taipei, June 29, 1 a. m., Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, pp. 188 and 226.