S/S Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 48 Series
The Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay) to the National Security Council
top secret
Washington, September 25,
1951.
United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of
Action in Asia
References:
- A.
-
NSC 48/51
- B.
- Memo for NSC from Acting
Executive Secretary, subject, “United States Courses of Action
in Korea”, dated September 5, 19512
- C.
- Memo for NSC from Executive
Secretary, same subject, dated September 11, 19513
The enclosed memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and its
attached Progress Report with respect to NSC 48/5 on the subject, prepared jointly pursuant to the
direction of the President and in accordance with the understanding of
the State and Defense Departments stated in the enclosure to the
reference memorandum of September 11, is transmitted herewith for the
information of the National Security Council and is being scheduled on
the agenda of the Council meeting on September 26, 1951.
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Attention is invited to the fact that the enclosed Progress Report
provides background for Council consideration at its meeting on
September 26, of the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and submitted by the Secretary of Defense in the enclosure to the
reference memorandum of September 5, 1951.4
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Secretaries
of State and Defense to the Executive Secretary of
the National Security Council (Lay)
top secret
[Washington, September 25, 1951.]
Subject: First Quarterly Progress Report on NSC 48/5—“United States Objectives,
Policies and Courses of Action in Asia”
Ref:
-
NSC 48/5 and note by the
Executive Secretary to the National Security Council, 17 May
1951
- Joint State-Defense Memorandum of 5 September 1951 to the
Executive Secretary, National Security Council on
“Responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments for
Coordinating the Implementation of NSC 48/5”*
In accordance with the President’s directive on the implementation of
NSC 48/5 and the
above-referenced memorandum, there is submitted herewith the first
quarterly progress report on NSC
48/5. It is requested that this be circulated to the Council members
for information.
Dean G. Acheson
[Attachment—Extract]5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect of Economic Restrictions Against Communist
China: (Paragraph 8e)6
On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations
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adopted a Resolution
recommending that every State embargo shipments to North Korea and
Communist China of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic
energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic
value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and
implements of war. This Resolution also recommended that every State
prevent the circumvention of controls applied by other States under
this Resolution. The action which this Resolution envisaged each
State would take unilaterally, represented a long step toward such
complete control, although such action would be narrower than the
position adopted by the United States in December 1950 when this
Government terminated virtually all economic relations with
Communist China.
A majority of the members of the United Nations have reported
compliance with this Resolution in one form or another, as have
several non-member countries. In addition, largely subsequent to the
adoption of the Resolution, many States recently have taken measures
going beyond the generally understood scope of the Resolution. For
example, Danish ship owners have agreed not to charter vessels for
China trade. Greece has placed in force a law prohibiting the
chartering of Greek vessels for transporting items embargoed under
the Resolution. Honduras prohibits all vessels flying its flag from
calling at Communist Chinese ports and from transporting materials
which might serve the Communist Chinese war effort. Italy prohibits
its public vessels (85% to 90% of its total shipping) from loading
strategic materials destined for Communist China. Liberia prohibits
vessels under its flag, except on written approval, from carrying
any goods embargoed under the Resolution to any place in the Soviet
Bloc, including China. The Norwegian Government has reported steps
to prevent Norwegian vessels from transporting such embargoed goods
to Communist China. The Republic of Panama, by Decree dated August
18, 1951, prohibits any vessels flying the Panamanian flag from
calling at Communist China ports, and Panamanian shipping to
Communist China has diminished greatly during the past month.
There are indications of a falling off in the total water-borne
carriage of Free World shipping of goods to Communist China.
However, United States authorities are aware of possible loopholes
permitted by transfer of registry and continuing trade by other flag
vessels, and studies are going forward on an urgent basis looking to
appropriate multilateral action within and outside the United
Nations to further tighten controls over shipping by friendly
nations. Increased activity by satellite shipping lines,
particularly Polish, complicates the problem of total supply.
There continues to be a substantial volume of goods shipped into
China. This trade still includes a certain amount of strategic
commodities,
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but very
little consists of direct war materials. Increased smuggling has
followed the imposition of more rigid controls in Hong Kong in June,
including reported smuggling activities from the US-controlled
Ryukyus. The United States continues day-by-day efforts to observe
and bring to the attention of responsible authorities infractions of
their regulations by smugglers and others who attempt to evade
controls applying to trade with Communist China.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
