320.2–AC/9–1851
Memorandum by Ashley G. Hope of the Office of Chinese Affairs to the Deputy Director of That Office (Perkins)
Subject: Attached Memorandum:1 Possible Basis for Extending UN Embargo on Trade with Communist China
The attached memorandum, prepared by Foreign Service Officer Harrison Lewis, represents an exhaustive, well-organized, and well-prepared effort. To my knowledge, no similar comprehensive round-up of the action of the various States in compliance with the UN strategic embargo Resolution of May 18 exists within the Department, nor am I aware of a similar exposition of the actions taken by other nations pursuant to United States approaches and to their own desires to control their economic relations with Communist China. Mr. Lewis has spent several weeks in collecting and collating this material, and the result is a real contribution to the thinking of all who are concerned with this important subject.
With regard to the substance of the memorandum, we have recognized for some time the difficulties attending bilateral approaches to Governments whose ships have transported or are transporting to Communist China cargo forbidden under the UN Resolution, which [Page 2020] United States vessels, of course, are not permitted to carry. In a memorandum2 sent to you shortly before his departure for the Far East, Mr. Barnett indicated one of the problems in such approaches, the temptation to impose the United States will on small and weak nations in a field where the great Western Powers who are allied with us in the effort to stop Communist aggression are not willing, and have not been persuaded by United States argument or example, to hew to our line.
The reports of the recent conferences between the Secretary and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France again emphasize that while there is no real division in our common resolve to resist Communist aggression, there are real and basic differences in the views of our respective Governments about how we should deal with the problem of Communist China. While the United States Government adheres firmly to and prosecutes as vigorously as compatible with good international relations with our allies our own theory of harsh economic controls against Communist China, and a strict policy, though somewhat less harsh because of the realities of the economic situation of Western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, against the Soviet bloc, we do recognize the right of our Allies to hold differeing views. Our effort, therefore, is to persuade the nations of the Free World that the common interest dictates our making common cause in this field of economic controls as in the areas of military re-armament and mutual defense planning.
It is apparent that Mr. Lewis’ paper attempts a middle line between the stern and perhaps inflexible measures which have been widely discussed for attempted imposition in the event of a definitive breakdown in the Korean negotiations and the attitude which it is reasonable to believe the British and French and other free nations of Western Europe hold, that we should avoid increased provocative measures against the Chinese people which will inevitably drive them deeper into the Russian grasp.
This memorandum urges immediate action in the United Nations looking to a further enforcement of the UN strategic embargo Resolution through shipping controls, whether or not the situation in the Kaesong talks develops more favorably. In that respect, it offers a proposal which should be most carefully considered by those in the Department charged with primary responsibility for the carrying on of relations with the Western Powers. The proposal should also be examined closely by FE, since its effect would be not only the attempted shoring-up of the UN strategic embargo Resolution, but it [Page 2021] might also represent, in the eyes of many Far Eastern nations, a further advance toward a feared all-out economic warfare against China.
Whether we would lose more in the often grudging cooperation of our European and Far Eastern neighbors than we would gain in attempting to deny more goods to the Chinese Communists, and incidentally in making a gesture toward satisfying a segment of Congressional and public opinion, may well be the final test for judging this proposal and other economic sanctions proposals which will undoubtedly follow from various sources within the United States Government.
I recommend that this study, because of its intrinsic factual value and timeliness, be widely circulated within the Department, and that expressions of views be sought. It seems to me that some such analysis and caveat as this memorandum should accompany the study, to avoid any appearance that FE and CA, which under greatest pressure have succeeded generally in exerting a calming influence in a sometimes hysterical atmosphere, may be felt to be unduly anxious to volunteer economic warfare measures in order to better their “public relations”.