CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 158
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1
WFMT–10/2a
China and North Korea
The Continuance of United Nations Controls Against China and North Korea
problem
What position should the United States Government present to the British and French Foreign Ministers on the continuance of UN economic controls against Communist China and North Korea?
united states objective
The United States objective is to obtain maximum multilateral cooperation in a program of economic controls for Communist China and North Korea, the severity and scope of which should be determined by Chinese Communist intention and capability to engage in aggressive activities which threaten the security of the Free World in the Pacific area.
position of british and french governments
The French and British Governments, after some delay, gave full support to the GA strategic embargo Resolution of May 18. British controls being applied at Hong Kong and throughout other areas [Page 2010] under British jurisdiction are considerably more severe than those they apply to the USSR and Eastern Europe. This is also true of French controls. The British and French are reluctant to apply controls, particularly in the shipping and financial fields, as severe as those of the United States. Both countries are keenly aware, particularly since the MacArthur hearings, of U.S. interest in stopping trade with Communist China. Both must deal however, with domestic public opinion which is reluctant to engage in all-out economic warfare against Communist China or any other part of the Soviet sphere.
united states position
The position of the United States will differ depending upon the outcome of the Kaesong talks:
(a) Situation during a cease-fire:
In the view of the United States Government, a cease-fire resulting from the Kaesong talks would be merely an interim situation, neither reducing the military potential of the Chinese Communist aggressors nor radically affecting their military position in such a manner as to lessen the need for economic controls. Accordingly, in this situation the United States believes that the GA Resolution of May 18 should be continued and that the NATO and other countries should continue to apply to Communist China and North Korea controls more stringent than they apply to the rest of the Soviet Bloc. If there is a prolonged armistice faithfully adhered to by the Communists but failure to reach agreement on a political settlement in Korea, the matter of economic controls on China should then be re-examined. We would assume that other NATO Governments would in any event continue to apply controls at least as severe as those applied to other members of the Soviet Bloc.
(b) Conclusion of a satisfactory political settlement in Korea:
If there is a settlement in Korea, satisfactory to the UN and US (by definition including unification of Korea on democratic basis with genuine assurances against resumption of aggression) the GA Resolution of May 18 would, of course, be revoked. However, in this event we believe the NATO countries should apply to Communist China the same controls that they apply to other parts of the Soviet Bloc.
(c) Breakdown of negotiations at Kaesong:
In the event of a breakdown of the Kaesong negotiations, the United States would seek more stringent UN action than that envisaged by the May 18 GA Resolution.
- Prepared as a briefing paper for the Secretary of State prior to meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, held in Washington, September 10 through 14. For further documentation on these meetings, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff. For the minutes of the meeting of September 11 between Secretary Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Morrison, which dealt with the alignment of U.S. and U.K. policies in the Far East, see p. 893.↩