Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

320.2–AC/6–1251: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, June 12, 1951—7:12 p. m.

1635. Re US report to UN AMC. I briefed Muniz today on probable content US report to UN AMC under May 18 res along lines indicated in Depcirtel 784, June 11.¹ I stressed comprehensive character US controls going considerably beyond May 18 res and indicated we would, of course, be gratified to extent other govts felt it possible to apply controls similar ours. With reference to shipping I emphasized extent of US controls, confidential report we had received that shipping might be one of ChiCom’s most vulnerable spots, and expressed hope that in their reports other govts might find it possible to indicate they were prohibiting their shipping from calling at ChiCom or NK ports or, as minimum, that they were prohibiting shipping from carrying embargo commodities, this as means of preventing circumvention.

Muniz expressed himself quite strongly in favor of complete economic embargo and/or naval blockade. He said he thought such action might become necessary as alternative to action against China such as “bombing Manchuria” as means of increasing pressure on ChiComs without risking spread of conflict. He said he had been much impressed by Sherman’s testimony and wondered if we were actively considering naval blockade. He made these comments in context of remarks to effect that since there were no signs that Commies wanted peace it was essential to continue war of attrition to point of Communist exhaustion. I told Muniz we were, of course, studying carefully implications of complete economic embargo and naval blockade, first step being, however, to make May 18 embargo as airtight as possible and in this connection I reemphasized importance we attached to shipping controls. In line with Muniz’ general theses I said I thought first task of AMC was to analyze and evaluate reports under May 18 res in order to determine its effectiveness. Meanwhile I said I thought personally that members of AMC should be thinking about AMC program in general, and inquired of Muniz whether he had given any thought to question of possible political measures.

Muniz, in line with his general views, thought that consideration should be given to political measures. He thought there would be no difficulty concerning a ban on further recognition by UN members of ChiComs, that withdrawal of recognition would be more difficult politically but that continued recognition of ChiComs by certain govts has anomalies.

Muniz appreciated info concerning our forthcoming report as he had not yet had even preliminary indication from his govt concerning their report.

Ross

1. Circular telegram 784, June 11 (not printed) was sent for action to 65 U.S. diplomatic and consular offices, and for information to 4 more. It contained a summary of the report which the United States was shortly to make to the U.N. Additional Measures Committee on the measures which the United States had taken in accordance with the resolution of May 18, and asked that the substance of the report be conveyed to the Foreign Offices of the various governments. The U.S. diplomatic and consular offices were, at their discretion, to convey the hope that the U.S. positive list, as contained in the report, would be helpful to other governments in determining specific items falling within the formula and in maintaining consistent terminology. The U.S. offices were further requested to express the hope that those governments with substantial merchant marines would apply, at an early stage, adequate controls on the shipment of cargoes of materials to mainland China covered by the May 18 resolution, as effected by the U.S. T–1 order, and report on the same to the Additional Measures Committee. (493.009/6–1151)

   The responses to circular telegram 784 may be found principally in Department of State decimal files 320.2–AC and 493.009.