320.2–AC/4–2751: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
secret priority
New York, April 27,
1951—6:49 p. m.
1463. Deptel 881, Apr 26 re AMC. We have informed Sarper of Dept’s desire that mtg AMC be called. He indicated preference for May 3 and has advised secretariat. We have also informed UK and French dels we have made this request.
Analysis attitudes dels which are members AMC leads USUN to following conclusions which we suggest Dept consider before we proceed to lay substance our suggested program on table at mtg next week with view to early substantive action by AMC and subsequently by Comite 1 and GA.
- 1.
- Of twelve members AMC we are at moment reasonably assured that only four (Brazil, Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela) will support our position. Australia may or may not support; in present circumstances we cannot count on their support as certain. Our guess is that Mexico would abstain (a) from conviction, and (b) on excuse Padilla is member GOC. We do not see that we could get better than seven votes out of twelve, unless UK and France could be won over to support our position. It is clear that UK, France, Egypt, and probably Belgium and Canada are at present opposed.
- 2.
- We therefore risk (a) losing the vote in the AMC and the substance of our position, or (b) achieving at best a majority by thinnest possible margin. In our view it would be a mistake to push ahead in AMC on substance without assurance of British and French support.
- 3.
- To lose the vote on this issue would be disastrous. We wonder whether in either case (lose, or win by very narrow majority) the result could be described as “strong evidence of continued collective determination not to be intimidated by lawless use of force”. In either case we question whether the result would not (a) play directly into the hands of the Communist propagandists and give aid and comfort to the Chi Coms; (b) give evidence of disunity and disharmony in the UN which would greatly weaken the prestige of the organization and its effectiveness as an instrument of collective security in Korea and elsewhere; and (c) lay our closest friends open to renewed wave of attacks which could only serve further to weaken fabric of free world solidarity.
Austin