Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

793.5/12–1151

The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

secret
No. 242

Taipei, December 11, 1951.

Ref:

• Embdes 8 of July 6, 1951, “Initial MAAG Recommendations Submitted to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.”
• Army Attaché telegram TN102 for G–2 November 26, 1951.
• Army Attaché telegram AT 314 for G–2 November 26, 1951.
• Army Attaché telegram AT 315 for G–2 November 26, 1951.¹

Subject: The Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense.

An exchange of visits and communications has recently occurred between Chinese and American personnel concerned, with reference to the activities of the Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense. Accounts of these are enclosed with this despatch, as are the few local press accounts relating to this subject which have come to the attention of the Embassy so far.²

The interesting developments covered in the enclosures to this despatch primarily stem from the report (see first reference despatch) by Major General William C. Chase, Chief of the MAAG, dated June 15, 1951, and handed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek a few days later. This report was in response to a request by the Generalissimo when General Chase first arrived in Taipei. Point 10 of this report stated, “There is, throughout the Armed Forces, a highly objectionable system of Political Commissars, that acts to penalize initiative and undermine the authority of commanders of all echelons.” While the Generalissimo wrote to General Chase on June 27, 1951 that he agreed “in the main with your observations and recommendations”, it soon became evident that he did not find himself in agreement with Point 10. The Generalissimo expressed appreciation for General Chase’s frankness, however, and indicated that he was always ready to discuss in a frank and friendly manner any points of difference which may exist between the Chinese and American authorities. It will be seen from the series of enclosures that Lt. Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo has been equally receptive to frank discussion of the activities of the Political Department, which he directs.

General Chase and other American authorities concerned with the activities of the Political Department are by no means satisfied with the organization as it now exists. It is recognized that the Political Department serves some useful purposes—some of which are even indispensable, considering the comparatively low level of political maturity of the Chinese armed forces, and considering the ever-present possibility of the infiltration of subversive elements into the military establishment. The MAAG authorities have generally taken the position that there is no objection to political training as such, as long as it does not consume too much time, and as long as it does not introduce a separate chain of command within the military organizations, with the unfortunate results which that would entail. The approach so far has been based on the thesis that the Chinese authorities and their American advisers together can find a basis for modifying and improving the organization of the Political Department so that its objectionable features can be eliminated without affecting its useful activities.

The problem of resolving Chinese and American differences in this matter has not been solved, but some tangible progress has been made. Lt. Col. Charles H. Barber of the MAAG has been assigned to work in the Political Department, at General Chiang’s request; General Chiang has also invited Americans “to go out into the field to observe the (political) organization as it actually functions in the various services.” The time which a soldier is required to devote to political training has been reduced from 25% to 10% of the total time given to all training activities.

In all fairness, it should he pointed out that the Chinese authorities do not consider their Political Officers to be the equivalent of “political commissars”, nor do they call them by this name. The differences between the Communist and the Chinese Nationalist systems, from General Chiang Ching-kuo’s point of view, are dealt with in Section VI of Enclosure No. 4.

With the exception of a few minor attempts to put words into General Chase’s mouth, there has been no press treatment locally of the standpoint of American officials on this controversial subject. Chinese press treatment in Taipei up to the date of this despatch is included as Enclosures No. 6, 7 and 8.

K. L. Rankin

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Chief of the Navy Section of the Military Assistance Advisory Croup, Formosa (Beyerly) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase)

secret

Taipei, November 9, 1951.

Subj: Report of Visit with President Chiang Kai-shek.

At the first regularly scheduled weekly conference between the C-in-C Chinese Navy and Chief Navy Section MAAG Formosa on 2 November, after my return to Tso-Ying, the entire agenda was reserved for the Chief Navy Section, to talk about his recent trip to Washington. Among other things, I talked of the general impressions I had gained in Washington. In general, these impressions concerned the lack of sympathy toward a large scale aid program for the Chinese Navy and the bad publicity caused by controversial issues such as the Political Warfare Bureau. Upon completion, Admiral Kwei³ stated that he would like for me to give those impressions to the President, because no one would tell him the truth.

Wednesday afternoon, 7 November I received a long-distance telephone call from Ali Shan mountain from General Hsiao Sin-ju Pu, Gimo’s Aide, to the effect that the President wished to see me that night in Kaohsiung. Naturally I accepted the invitation, but later the meeting was postponed until 0800, 8 November, due to the late arrival of the President in Kaohsiung.

I was accompanied to the Beach House in Kaohsiung by Admiral Kwei and Captain Liu Ho Tu, the latter serving as interpreter.

The meeting was marked throughout by friendliness and receptiveness on the part of the Gimo. The meeting was opened with the usual greetings and well wishing, and then I proceeded with practically the same talk I had given to Admiral Kwei before. The following is an outline of what I talked about:

(a) Purpose of trip to Washington:

1. To familiarize myself with the workings of the vast MDAP organization.

2. To meet as many officers as possible who are responsible for formulating policies and principles of granting military aid.

3. To lay groundwork for justification of military aid which would be requested for the Chinese Navy.

4. To expedite the shipment of the most urgently needed training material and personnel.

(b) General Impressions:

1. Everyone seemed to be of the opinion the military aid program should be carried out on Formosa, but there was a lack of sympathy or enthusiasm for a large scale aid program. Officers were reluctant to approve anything but a most austere program for the Navy because they had serious doubts as to the capability of the Chinese to absorb and carry out a large scale program.

2. My opinion of the reason for this lack of sympathy is the many unfavorable reports heard about Formosa. Some of these reports are incomplete or inaccurate, but all of them stress the unfavorable side of controversial issues and never give due credit to favorable sides if there is such a side.

a. The most damaging and widespread of these controversial reports are those concerning the Political Warfare Bureau.

These reports indicate that the power and authority vested in the Political Warfare Officers encroach on the responsibility and authority of the CO’s.

It is strongly felt in our Navy that the military command structure must be inviolate. The Commanders must have full authority to carry out their responsibilities. There must be no coercion, direct or indirect, by non-military or political observers. We feel that such a flaw in the command structure can jeopardize the fighting efficiency of an otherwise well constituted and well trained navy.

I am of the opinion that there exists a need for this organization in China, and although I don’t know everything about it I am aware of some of its good points as well as bad. I don’t believe we Americans would object to political training as such, as long as it doesn’t consume too much time, and as long as it does not introduce a separate chain of command within the military organization.

I believe the members of MAAG and the Chinese can by mutual understanding and earnest cooperation find a basis for modifying and improving this organization so that no one would object to it, and so that it would still serve a useful purpose to China.

Upon being asked for a recommendation, I stated that I could not make an official recommendation without sending it thru General Chase. However, I stated that my recommendations to General Chase would be along this line: Within each organization of Navy, afloat and ashore, the duties presently carried out by members of the Political Warfare Bureau should be assigned to qualified Naval Officers already serving in those organizations. (The President seemed receptive to this idea and turned to Admiral Kwei and told him to take it up with Chiang Ching-kuo.)

b. Some people entertained doubt that we could carry out a successful training program while there were other groups such as TAG and Yuan Shan School carrying out concurrent programs whose aims could be directed along opposite lines.

I too have been opposed to these concurrent programs and I am pleased that TAG has been concluded and that Yuan Shan School will close shop at end of present class.

c. I also encountered officers who had the impression that ex-U.S. Navy material was being wantonly scrapped and sold.

All instances of scrapping of which I had become aware have been justified.

I will continue to advise the Chinese Navy in these matters in accordance with MND’s request and General Chase’s direction.

d. Everyone with whom I talked in Washington was pleased to hear that I am getting such splended cooperation from Admiral Kwei and to hear that we are achieving good results in our underway training program.

(c) The Navy Section MAAG and Chinese Navy will continue to carry out its aims:

1. Make all ships operational and ready for war as rapidly as possible.

2. Train Navy personnel in proper upkeep and maintenance procedures.

3. Improve organization.

4. Train Navy in principles of Naval Warfare.

5. Develop realistic expansion programs.

(d) Local Observations:

1. MND has all but eliminated fund allocated for ship repair. Not only should it be reinstated, but should also be increased to meet the increased repair work incident to ships becoming operational and to more extensive operations.

2. Government should reinstate rice allowance for Navy Yard and Shop Workers, otherwise the fund allocated for ship repair will suffer.

3. Food for officers and enlisted men on board ship should be further improved. Morale factor.

The President was very attentive to everything I had to say and after each part of conversation was interpreted into Chinese, his nods and brief comments seemed to indicate assent or agreement. Upon completion he thanked me for being frank with him.

Admiral Kwei and Liu Ho Tu were very enthusiastic as to the President’s reaction. The Admiral stated that I had told the President things that no one ever had before. “Even the Premier can’t talk like you did to him.” They reiterated emphatically his favorable reaction.

The President did not make any inquiries as to the magnitude of aid program for Navy. No mention was made of number of ships promised.

I believe now is the time for MAAG to get together with Chiang Ching-kuo with the view of modifying the Political Warfare Bureau.

I. F. Beyerly

1. For the reference despatch, see p. 1730; the reference telegrams are not printed.
2. For the text of one enclosure, see below; the other enclosures are not here printed. They consisted of reports by Major General Chase and Colonel Barrett of meetings on November 14, 17, and 19 with Lieutenant General Chiang Ching-kuo and other Chinese officers, a statement issued to the press on November 24 by Chiang Ching-kuo, and other press reports on the subject.
3. Vice Adm. Kwei Yung-ching, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Navy.