Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

794A.00/11–151

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, November 1, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am forwarding herewith for your consideration the attached copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 24 October 1951, on the US position with respect to Formosa. This memorandum comments on the two draft position papers¹ prepared by the Department of State regarding the position that the United States should take on the question of Formosa should it arise during the forthcoming Sixth Session of the General Assembly.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which I concur, reinforce what appears to be the intent of these two position papers to prevent and avoid consideration of this subject at the forthcoming Session. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the revisions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 be incorporated in the final position paper for the US Delegation.

But this memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also sets forth US security requirements regarding Formosa on the basis of developments since their memorandum of 2 January 1951 on the strategic importance of Formosa. In this respect, I would like to call your attention in particular to paragraphs 2a, 2g, and 2h. In view of the scope of the attached memorandum I believe that it might be useful to refer this memorandum for information to the National Security Council, with a view possibly to reexamining US national policy on Formosa as now stated in NSC 48/5.²

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

secret

Washington, October 24, 1951.

Subject: United States Position with Respect to Formosa

1. This memorandum is in reply to your memorandum, dated 10 October 1951,³ in which you requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their views and recommendations on two draft position papers prepared by the Department of State regarding the position that the United States should take on the question of Formosa, should it arise during the forthcoming Sixth Session of the General Assembly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also included views on the “Comment” which accompanied the two draft position papers.

2. The following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are presented as background for their comments on the subject papers:

a. The position of the United States in the Far East, and the security interests of the United States now and in the foreseeable future demand that:

(1) The island of Formosa be denied to the Communists, Chinese or otherwise; and

(2) The government in power on Formosa continue to be oriented to the United States;

b. Accordingly, the United States should continue to support a friendly Chinese regime, of potential military value, on Formosa;

c. In light of the possibility of expanded hostilities in the Far East, the military potential of the Chinese Nationalist Forces on Formosa must be developed and maintained to the end that those forces may effectively support United States policies in the Far East;

d. The United States and the USSR are engaged in a “cold war” and not in active hostilities. On the other hand, from a realistic point of view, the fighting between the forces of Communist China (satellite of the USSR) and of the United States is tantamount to war between these nations, with the scene of action confined to the area of Korea. There is no assurance that the fighting will remain localized;

e. There is every indication that the Soviet regime desires that Formosa come under Chinese Communist control. Moreover, certain other members of the United Nations favor such an eventuality. There are indications that the policies of those nations in that regard are, in general, predicated upon self-interest;

f. The total population of Formosa is of the order of 7,850,000 persons. Of these, approximately 1,800,000, or slightly less than one quarter of the total number, are Chinese Nationalists. Therefore, if the Formosa question is considered under circumstances in which the security interest of the United States is not paramount, such consideration must, in order to maintain United States military prestige in the Far East, place emphasis on the well-being and wishes of the Chinese Nationalists as well as of the indigenous population. In this connection, failure to safeguard the rights of the Chinese Nationalist people on Formosa could deprive the United States of military support of allies (present and future) amongst the Asian peoples, particularly the South Koreans;

g. Among the Western nations, the United States is now the dominant power in the Western Pacific. Consequently, in any conflict of interest arising between the United States and other Western Powers which may affect the position of the United States in the Far East, the United States should, in its own interest, insist that United States security considerations in that area be overriding; and

h. The security interests of the United States in Formosa are of such importance that the United States, if necessary, should take unilateral action to preserve its military position there.

3. In light of the foregoing and of the world situation in general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that both the draft position papers and the “Comment” be revised to incorporate the following views:

a. The problem of the status and ultimate disposition of Formosa should not be submitted to an international conference for examination prior to the restoration of peace and security in the Pacific Area, in any event not before the satisfactory settlement of certain international problems, among which are:

(1) A political settlement of the Korean problem;

(2) The rearmament of Japan sufficient to enable that nation to make a material contribution to its own defense;

(3) A settlement of the Indochinese problem; and

(4) The establishment or restoration of a regime not aligned with or dominated by the USSR on the Chinese mainland.

Specifically with reference to paragraph 2⁴ of the recommendations of the first draft position paper, it is noted that an armistice does not of necessity end hostilities although it does suspend them. Further, the existence of a military armistice in Korea without the achievement of a political settlement does not constitute sufficient justification for an international re-examination of the Formosa question;

b. The United States position in the Far East is such that in any settlement or international discussions of the Formosa question, United States security interests must be given overriding consideration;

c. With respect to Formosa, it is in the security interests of the United States to:

(1) Support a friendly Chinese regime on Formosa to the end that it will be firmly aligned with the United States;

(2) Develop and maintain the military potential of that regime; and

(3) Place due emphasis on the well-being and wishes of the Chinese Nationalist population of Formosa.

In connection with the foregoing it must be recognized that “Nationalist control of the island” is a continuing reality; and

d. The present United States course of action with respect to Formosa, as set forth in NSC 48/5, does not constitute merely “neutralization of Formosa.” Consequently, that term and concept should not be included in a United States position paper on Formosa.

4. In light both of the prestige of the United States in the United Nations, and of the interest of the United States in the Formosa question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unwilling to accept the implication of the clause appearing in paragraph D of the “Comment”:

“In the event that the consideration of the Formosa question becomes unavoidable …”

The importance of the United States position in the Far East is such that the United States should take those measures necessary to prevent consideration of the Formosa question in the Sixth Session of the General Assembly or in any other international forum established thereby.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States actions in the Formosa question should, in United States self-interest, be guided by the realities of the “cold war” and of the explosive nature of the situation in the Far East, rather than by the framework of public pronouncements and declarations which antedate intervention of Communist China in the war in Korea.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The two draft position papers, both dated October 2, are not printed. One paper was based on the assumption that an armistice would be concluded in Korea; for the text of the final position paper based on that assumption, see p. 1020. The other paper was based on the assumption that there would be no armistice at the time the question of Formosa came under consideration at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly; for text, see p. 1016 (JCS Files). Earlier drafts of the two papers, dated September 25, are filed with a covering memorandum from Troy Perkins to W. Bradley Connors, September 26, 1951 (611.94A/9–2651).
2. For text of NSC 48/5, May 17, 1951, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 33. See also the memorandum, p. 439.
3. Not printed.

4. The paragraph under reference read as follows:

   “2. It is in the interest of the United States to avoid discussion of the question of Formosa at the Sixth Session. Public discussion in present circumstances could only expose and underline the differences between us and our allies. We should inform other delegations, if questioned regarding our views, that while the armistice ended hostilities, peace and security were not yet fully restored; in the circumstances it does not appear that a satisfactory permanent solution could be achieved at this time. The question could be re-examined when there is a political settlement in Korea or when the armistice had been in effect sufficient time to establish Chinese Communist good faith and intentions.” (JCS Files)