793B.00/6–1151: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 1
3576. Personal and confidential for McGhee and Mathews (SOA). Wilkins returned from Darjeeling and Kalimpong June 10 fol convs with Tsepon Shakabpa and other Tibetan officials.
Accordance Dept instructions, Shakabpa’s questions as stated Embtel 3398, May 29 were answered along lines Emb suggestions in that tel as qualified by Deptel 2051, June 2. Shakabpa was informed simultaneously answers based our assumption terms Sino-Tibetan agreement unacceptable established Tibetan Govt and combined pol and mil pressure might be exerted on Tibet. It was also made clear US cld not assume responsibility guidance Tibetan Govt. When questioned re Peiping radio broadcasts Tibetan del with full powers had signed agreement, Shakabpa said that Dalai Lama had telegraphed him recently Dalai Lama and Tibetan Govt did not recognize Sino-Tibetan agreement and that instructions had been sent Tibetan del Peiping to [Page 1708] inform Commie Chi it was unacceptable Tibet. Shakabpa stated Tibetan del did not have full powers and was required under its instructions refer all important points Yatung. Shakabpa speculated Tibetan del had been forced by pressure and threats re its personal safety sign agreement. Sitn Lhasa described Khatmandu press report was not true and was probably garbled acct arrival more than six months ago Tak-Tse Rimpochi and others from Kumbum monastery in Chi.
Shakabpa said Tibetan Govt had been informed by Tibetan del Peiping ten-man Commie Chi del left Peiping June 5 for Yatung via India to “congratulate” Dalai Lama on conclusion agreement. Some members Tibetan del wld probably return with Chi del. Shakabpa said Commie Chi Govt wld probably not be informed unacceptability Sino-Tibetan agreement until all members Tibetan del had left Chi; otherwise their lives might be endangered. Shakabpa speculated Tibetan Govt delayed public announcement from Yatung re its official reaction Sino-Tibetan agreement for that reason.
On day second and concluding conv Shakabpa said he just reed urgent msg from Dalai Lama who was informed re “all these matters”, now under discussion, as well as fact they being discussed. … Shakabpa indicated msg meant that if there were any prospect assistance from US, Dalai Lama, who was opposed terms Sino-Tibetan agreement and was determined not give up control Tibetan defense, was prepared leave Tibet but that if US unable assist there seemed little hope Tib cld successfully resist. It was at this point Shakabpa said he himself extremely pleased and happy with US replies his questions and was certain they wld be equally satisfactory Dalai Lama and Tibetan Govt. Shakabpa planned fully inform Dalai Lama re US replies and promised keep Emb reps advised re further developments.
Throughout course convs Shakabpa repeatedly stated govt and people Tibet were opposed terms Sino-Tibetan agreement and wld resist to best ability at borders outer Tibet. It wld be absolutely essential for Dalai Lama leave Yatung for India because he cld easily be cut off there and there was no place in Tibet where he wld be safe from capture by Commie Chinese. Continued US assistance and support for Tibetan resistance groups within Tibet wld be most essential. High importance GOI attitude, because of India’s geographical proximity to Tibet, was completely understood and appreciated by Shakabpa and other Tibetan officials.
Shakabpa commented re new appeal UN under question 1, it wld under present circumstances be preferable postpone appeal until after public announcement by Dalai Lama and Tibetan Govt re unacceptability [Page 1709] Sino-Tibetan agreement and until after Dalai Lama had reached India. Shakabpa commented re asylum Ceylon under question 2, it wld be helpful if US wld immediately approach Ceylon Govt informally. It wld be difficult Tibet do so because they had no established relations Ceylon and because departure any Tibetan reps wld immediately become known GOI. Wilkins informed Shakabpa if Dalai Lama and Tibetan Govt requested informal US approach, action wld be taken, Shakabpa promised tel Dalai Lama and reply shortly.
Re asylum US under question 3, Shakabpa again indicated Dalai Lama and between 100 and 200 followers including families wld prefer asylum in US. Shakabpa agreed, however, it wld be wiser Dalai Lama remain India or Ceylon and thoroughly understands importance their doing so. Shakabpa also understands US cannot assume any responsibility personal expenses Dalai Lama and retinue. Shakabpa considered US willingness receive Dalai Lama and retinue if it shld subsequently prove necessary one of most important points US response.
Re US assistance arms and loans money under question 4, Shakabpa appreciated reaffirmation US promise based on certain conditions limited mil assistance but pressed for more definite statement re help through loans money. Shakabpa informed more definite statement cld not be made as wld depend developments Tibet; nevertheless US was prepared give consideration act in [action?] which might be effective in encouraging Tibet regain and maintain autonomy. Shakabpa considered this aspect sitn another most important point US response. Tibetans have not recently approached GOI re arms because they were negotiating Peiping and did not expect unacceptable agreement.
In view last tel from Dalai Lama, quoted in para 5, Shakabpa stated that after Dalai Lama and Tibetan Govt had considered US replies his questions, Shakabpa wld probably be instructed approach GOI not only regarding Dalai Lama’s departure for India but also re GOI support for new Tibetan appeal UK [UN?], arms and other questions which wld arise as result unacceptability Sino-Tibetan agreement to Tibet.
Re US informal rep under question 5, Shakabpa hoped some American official cld remain Kalimpong during next few weeks as many important questions wld arise. Emb undertook do what it cld and will make some arrangement either from Calcutta or Delhi.
Re Tak-Tse Rimpochi under question 6, Shakabpa informed he had arrived Kalimpong and Dalai Lama wished him proceed US soonest as Commie Chinese wld probably make his presence India difficult. Tak-Tse subsequently informed Wilkins he was carrying identifying letter from Dalai Lama which also stated that Dalai Lama desired [Page 1710] close relations US and its help and that Tak-Tse spoke for him.2 Tak-Tse plans, however, proceed US in unofficial capacity. Subsequent tel follows re Tak-Tse visit.3
Other Tibetan officials including Llushar did not have Shakabpa’s info re govt reaction Sino-Tibetan agreement and took somewhat pessimistic line re possibility opposition to it although indicating it might be necessary Dalai Lama leave Tibet.
Detailed account convs being forwarded by pouch June 14.4
- Action was assigned to the Office of Chinese Affairs, which was handling matters concerning Tibet. An undated memorandum attached to the source text, from Edward E. Rice of that office to Troy L. Perkins, the office’s Deputy Director, stated that Rice had discussed the telegram with Thomas W. Ireland of the Office of South Asian Affairs and indicated that Deputy Under Secretary Matthews wanted to be informed of any telegrams of a substantive nature concerning Tibet.↩
- The text of an English translation of the letter was transmitted to the Department in telegram 3666 from New Delhi, June 16, 1951. (793B.00/6–1651)↩
- Telegram 3616 from New Delhi, June 13, 1951, not printed, recommended that the Department approve Taktser Rimpoche’s proposed visit to the United States, permit him and his servant to enter the United States with an affidavit in lieu of a passport, and, if necessary, provide financial assistance (793B.00/6–1351). Telegram 2194 to New Delhi, June 18, 1951, not printed, approved the Embassy’s recommendations (739B.00/6–1351).↩
- Under cover of despatch 3030 from New Delhi, June 14, 1951, not printed.↩