795.00/12–2851: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
priority
3756. For Ambassador. Urtel 3850 Dec 28. We are seriously concerned over Fr failure appreciate basic purpose our statement as evidenced by proposed revision handed Bonsai. We wld judge from account Bonsai’s conversation with La Tournelle that Fr have also seized upon statement as opportunity secure commitment from states participating in Kor mil operation to cover possible future action in Indochina. While Fr are aware we continue to regard defense of Indochina matter greatest urgency to US (cite tripartite mil conversations) we cannot agree it is practicable deal with Indochina problem in projected statement on Kor. We cannot modify projected statement so as completely rob it of its intended signif merely in order broaden its application to Indochina.
We see no point to Fr objection second para our statement. Quite aside from disastrous effect on ROK, with which UN and US must work in future, omission ref to ultimate pol settlement for Kor wld generally be regarded as retreat from established UN objectives. It wld be interpreted as acknowledgment that to this extent at least aggression in Kor was successful. This we are not prepared do.
We are equally unable accept alterations suggested in final para our statement, altho we have no objection revision first sentence thereof as it appears in Fr draft. However, we do not perceive any substantive difference between two versions first sentence. As was well stated by Bonsai, we regard our formulation as strongest practicable deterrent renewal commie aggression in Kor and vital component in ability terminate hostilities on basis only type armis agreement attainable.
You are requested see Pleven soonest (or Schuman if Pleven unavailable) explaining to him reasons Fr redraft unacceptable to us and urging approval our draft. We suggest point be made that we are now close to agreement among all other participating states on text our statement. For Fr now to persist in proposing fundamental revision wld gravely complicate course armis negots. If as a result armis talks shld fail, and Kor hostilities be continued, effect on US interest in Indochina and on gen US mil and econ assistance Indochina and elsewhere cld not but be adverse. In our view it is in long-range interest Fr as well as ourselves immed to reach agreement to issue proposed statement soon as armis signed so that free world posture of vigorous retaliation to renewal attack in Kor may be made perfectly clear to all, and implications thereof for other areas subject commie aggression can be drawn by commies.