Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/12–2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Paris, December 28, 1951—8 p. m.

3850. Deptels 3589 Dec 19 and 3664 Dec 26.¹

Bonsal² was called this afternoon to FonOff by La Tournelle³ and handed fol draft of proposed statement on Kor sitn representing views of French Govt:

We, the nations participating in the Kor action, support the decision of the Commander in Chief of the UN Command to conclude an armistice agrmt. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agrmt will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

We declare again our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Kor, our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Kor prob and our faith in the principles and purposes of the UN.

We affirm that any other act of aggression challenging again the principles of the UN wld find us again united and prompt to resist.

La Tournelle stated that this draft had received approval of PriMin,⁴ FonMin⁵ and Min of Assoc States.⁶ He described changes from our draft (we had furnished him with modified final para) as fols:

1. French Govt believes that statement of this nature which refers to armistice agrmt shld not contain ref to ultimate polit settlement which UN envisages. La Tournelle implied that ultimate goal of “a united, independent and democratic Kor seemed perhaps today less realistic than when it was first enunciated by the UN and he referred in this connection to a recent Lippman art. French advocate omission of our entire second para.

2. French Govt believes that our final para and particularly final sentence thereof re probable impossibility of confining hostilities within frontiers of Kor in event of renewed aggression involves threat which wld run risk of seriously troubling atmosphere of subsequent negotiations. In reply to Bonsai’s question, La Tournelle also made it clear that French desired to be able to interpret their proposed wording re “any other act of aggression” to include aggression against Indochina. La Tournelle stated that Pleven had wished to include specific mention of Indochina in statement, but had been dissuaded by FonOff.

Bonsal stated that he wld convey French draft to Dept, but that he believed that Dept wld consider that French proposal failed to meet our objective of permitting flexibility in armistice negotiations re inspection, etc, on basis that clear, precise post-armistice agrmt declaration by UN nations directly concerned in resisting aggression in Kor wld be deterrent to renewed aggression in that it wld leave potential aggressors no possible grounds for misunderstanding of consequences of such renewed aggression.

On specific points, Bonsai advanced fol preliminary comments:

1. Regardless of attainability of UN polit objective of a united, independent and democratic Kor, fact remained that this was related UN objective, that failure to mention it might be interpreted as abandonment, and wld be highly undesirable at start of polit discussions.

2. Failure to mention consequences of renewed aggression in shape of possible extention of hostilities beyond frontiers of Kor wld lead enemy to belief that renewed aggression might enjoy same impunities as that which has already taken place. Whole point of statement from our point of view was to clear this point definitively.

3. Speaking entirely personally and stressing absence of instructions from Dept, Bonsai said that French view that “any other act of aggression” might include aggression against Indochina wld seem to stop French and other UN nations concerned from considering present or even increased degree of Chi assistance to Viet Minh as act of aggression in UN sense and might therefore limit French freedom of action in dealing with this prob, increasing gravity of which has been stressed by Fr spokesmen recently. In reply, La Tournelle gave it, as his personal view, that French did not desire such liberty of action in dealing with present situ in Indochina and that their interpretation of “any other act of aggression” wld involve so far as Indochina is concerned qualitative rather than quantitative changes in present sitn. We are about to hear further from French on this subj in response to inquiry made in accordance with Deptel 3613 Dec 20.⁷

We are not repeating this message to other recipients reftels on assumption that Dept is keeping Embs in all capitals concerned informed of developments. We are, however, repeating to London.

Sent Department 3850, repeated info London 1024.

Bruce

1. See footnotes 1 and 2, supra.
2. Philip W. Bonsal, Counselor of the American Embassy in Paris.
3. Guy Le Roy de la Tournelle, Director-General of Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. René Pleven.
5. Robert Schuman.
6. Jean Letourneau.
7. For text, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 563.