Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/12–2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

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[Washington,] December 24, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement on Greater Sanctions in Korea

Participants:	Ambassador Hume Wrong of Canada
	Mr. Peter Campbell, Canadian Embassy
	Mr. Johnson, FE
	Mr. Henkin, UNP

Ambassador Wrong called today to present his government’s reaction to the proposed sixteen-power statement on Korea, and left with me the attached memorandum. He noted that his government agreed to join in the proposed statement and was generally satisfied with the text which had been prepared. The Canadian Government preferred the British version of the final paragraph, but since the United Kingdom was prepared to accept the compromise draft which the Department had offered, the Canadian Government would also acquiesce.

Ambassador Wrong explained his government’s suggestion for a change in the last two sentences. They thought that the reference to the renewal of an aggression was perhaps provocative and that it might be deemed to imply that a new finding of aggression might have to be made by the Security Council or the General Assembly. That sentence also left some doubt as to whether the statement was limited to a new attack in Korea, and contained no limitation as to the time for which this statement was to be effective. His government therefore suggested a reference to a “breach of the armistice” which would make it clear that we were speaking of renewal of hostilities in Korea during the life of the armistice.

I indicated to Ambassador Wrong that there was no difference between us and the Canadian Government as to what was intended, and that the drafting problem which concerned his government had troubled us also. We had been reluctant to use the phrase “breach of the armistice” because it might seem too broad, since it would seem to apply also in the case of a lesser violation of the armistice than a renewal of hostilities. Even the phrase “a major breach of the armistice” would not be entirely satisfactory. Perhaps we might substitute the phrase “renewal of the armed attack.” In any event I told Ambassador Wrong that we would take the Canadian suggestion into account and try to work out a satisfactory formulation.

U. Alexis Johnson

[Attachment]

The Canadian Embassy to the Department of State

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Memorandum

1. If an armistice is concluded in Korea, the Government of Canada is prepared to concur in the publication of a warning declaration by the governments with combat forces in Korea, provided that a change is made in the last two sentences of the draft submitted to the Canadian Embassy by the Department of State on December 18th and that the Department of State is in agreement with the understandings set forth below.

2. On the text of the declaration, the Canadian Government considers that the warning in the last paragraph should be restricted to Korea and should refer to a serious breach of the armistice rather than to an act of aggression. The purpose of the declaration is to seek to ensure the faithful observance of the armistice by the Communists until a political settlement can be achieved. Furthermore, the use of a term “another act of aggression” instead of “breach of the armistice” might be interpreted to mean that the Security Council or General Assembly would have to find that a new act of aggression had taken place before action was possible. The adoption of the following language in these sentences would meet this point:

“We affirm that if there is a breach of the armistice which challenges again the principles of the United Nations we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea”.

3. The Canadian Government would prefer that the warning of the consequences in the final sentence of the declaration should be in less specific language such as: “The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that it might then prove impossible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea”. It is, however, prepared to accept the stronger language suggested by the Department of State if the other governments concerned consider that this would be acceptable.

4. It is the understanding of the Canadian Government that participation in the declaration does not commit the parties to any particular form of sanctions if a major breach of the armistice takes place.

5. It would be preferable for the declaration to be made by the United Nations rather than by the sixteen governments with forces in Korea, but the serious difficulties in the way of embodying a satisfactory declaration in a resolution of the United Nations are recognized. The Canadian Government, however, is firmly of the opinion that the declaration should, if possible, be endorsed in some way by United Nations’ action, or at the very least brought formally to the attention of the United Nations.

6. An early expression of the views of the Department of State on these suggestions would be welcomed.¹

Washington, December 24th, 1951.

1. On December 26, Mr. Johnson met with George Ignatieff, Counselor of the Canadian Embassy, to discuss again the proposed statement. On the question of a United Nations role in the promulgation of the statement, Mr. Johnson’s memorandum of their conversation read as follows:

   “With respect to Mr. Ignatieff’s question concerning the desirability of having the declaration made by the UN rather than the sixteen governments, I stated that we thought this was entirely impractical. However, we agreed that if possible it would probably be desirable to have the UN take note of the statement, with approval after it had been issued. I said that, as he knew, we contemplated that UN action would be required following the conclusion of an armistice and that that action might well incorporate the statement by reference in some way, and that we would certainly consult with Canada and the other concerned countries with regard to this matter as quickly as appropriate.” (795.00/12–2651)