At the 110th meeting, with the President presiding, the National Security
Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense
Mobilization adopted NSC 118/1, subject
to the revisions recommended by the Senior NSC Staff in the reference memorandum of December 19; to
revision of subparagraph l–a–(3) and the second
sentence of subparagraph 2–a–(5); and to
reference of the alternative versions of subparagraph 2–b–(6) to the Senior NSC Staff for review in the light of an analysis of the
traffic in and out of Communist China and of the probable effectiveness
of an embargo or blockade (NSC Action
No. 595). The report, as amended, is enclosed. Also enclosed is the
NSC Staff study contained in the
Annex to NSC 118/1, revised in the light
of the Council’s action.
The report, as amended, was subsequently submitted to the President for
consideration. The President has this date approved the statement of
policy in NSC 118/1, as amended and
enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate
executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the
coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.
The enclosed statement of policy is not to be construed as changing in
any manner the other policy provisions, objectives, and courses of
action in NSC 48/5, including those
pertaining to Communist China and Formosa which are set forth in
paragraph 8 and subparagraph 11(c) of the
latter.10
[Enclosure]
top secret
Statement of Policy Proposed by the National
Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of
Action in Korea
objectives
1. The United States should continue to seek in Korea the following
objectives, as set forth in paragraphs 6 e
and f of NSC
48/5 subject to amendment of paragraphs 6 e
and f as indicated below:
a. As an ultimate objective, continue to seek
by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of
the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and
democratic Korea. As a current objective, seek, through appropriate
UN machinery, a settlement of the Korean conflict acceptable to
United States security interests which would, as a minimum and
without jeopardizing the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, to
Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN:
- (1)
- Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice
arrangements.
- (2)
- Establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all
Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate,
to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military
defense, and, in general, not south of the 38th parallel.
- (3)
- Provide for the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean armed
forces from Korea as circumstances permit.
- (4)
- Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed
aggression by North Korean forces alone.
b. Seek to avoid the extension of hostilities
in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, or with Communist
China.
c. Continue the military action until an
armistice is agreed upon and continue economic and political
sanctions against the aggressor until at least the minimum
settlement is achieved.
d. In any event, continue to seek to develop
strong barriers against communist subversion and military aggression
in Korea, and to develop political and social conditions in Korea
which would facilitate a united, independent and democratic
Korea.
2. With respect to the situation in Korea, the United States should
pursue the following courses of action, in lieu of those set forth
in paragraph 9 of NSC 48/5:
a. In the event that an armistice is
achieved:
(1) Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a
UN Commission to undertake negotiations looking toward an
[Page 1385]
eventual political
settlement which would establish a united, independent and
democratic Korea.
(2) Maintain all existing political and economic sanctions against
Communist China and exert vigorous efforts to persuade our allies to
do likewise, at least until a minimum settlement of the Korean
conflict is achieved.
(3) Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members
of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long as UN forces are
required in Korea.
(4) Intensify, to the maximum practicable extent the organization,
training, and equipping of the armed forces of the ROK, so that they may assume increasing
responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK.
(5) Seek agreement among the nations participating in the hostilities
in Korea to the issuance of a joint declaration enunciating the
responsibility of the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes for
the strict observance of the armistice terms and warning that
military action without geographic limitation will be taken to meet
a renewal of the aggression. If agreement cannot be reached, the
United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China that
future military aggression in Korea will result in a military
reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic scope.
Efforts should be made to the end that other governments,
particularly the UK and France, take similar action.
(6) Endeavor to obtain in the Security Council or General Assembly a
resolution calling upon all parties to the armistice agreement
faithfully to observe its terms.
b. In the event that armistice negotiations
clearly fail:
(1) Determine and take whatever measures in addition to the current
mobilization effort would be required to meet the greater risk of
general war which would then exist.
(2) Increase the scale of military operations in the Korean area
consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to the
Commander in Chief of the UN forces whenever, in his judgment, such
operations will contribute materially to the destruction of enemy
forces and will not result in disproportionate losses to UN forces
under his command.
(3) Remove any restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea,
including restrictions against air attacks on the Yalu River dams
and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River but
excepting attacks against areas within approximately 12 miles of the
borders of the USSR.
(4) Remove restrictions against the employment (unilaterally and
[Page 1386]
on short notice, if the
situation so requires) of United States air forces to attack Chinese
Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity
threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States
forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be
specifically authorized by the President. (See paragraph 2 d (1) for action in case of enemy mass air
attack).
(5) Seek both within and without UN the imposition on Communist China
of additional political and economic pressures such as agreement by
the maximum number of countries to the diplomatic isolation of
Communist China.
*[(6) Seek agreement from as
many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint
enforcement of a complete embargo on all their trade with Communist
China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries
calling at Chinese Communist ports, at the same time indicating to
these nations that failure to achieve increasingly effective
multilateral economic pressure upon Communist China’s aggressive
military potential through these means may require employment of UN
naval forces for search and seizure at sea, closure of ports or
imposition of a naval blockade of the China mainland coastline.]
*[(6) Press the major
maritime powers participating in the Korean campaign to impose,
immediately upon the failure of armistice negotiations, a naval
blockade on Communist China. Failing acceptance of this course, seek
agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to
participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all
shipments to Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships
of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports.]
(7) Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from
those countries already participating as well as to obtain
contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed
military forces.
(8) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed to:
(a) Aid to the maximum practicable extent
anti-communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea;
and
(b) Interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of
communications.
c. In the event a decision is reached that
the Communists are deliberately delaying armistice negotiations
indefinitely and are increasing their offensive capabilities,
increase pressures on the aggressor by stages and execute those
courses of action specified in paragraph 2 b
[Page 1387]
above, including
political and economic pressures, through UN and diplomatic
channels, to the extent feasible.
d. Whether or not an armistice in Korea is
achieved:
(1) Continue in effect standing instructions to the Commander in
Chief of UN forces in case the communists launch massive air attacks
against UN forces in the Korean area.
(2) Develop and equip dependable ROK
military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength,
with a view to their assuming eventually responsibility for the
defense of Korea.
(3) Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese
defense forces.
(4) Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist to the
maximum practicable extent the achievement of U.S. objectives
vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.
(5) If the USSR commits units of Soviet “volunteers” sufficient to
jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea, give immediate
consideration to withdrawing UN forces from Korea and placing the
United States in the best possible position of readiness for general
war.
(6) Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible,
continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of
the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United
Nations effort for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the
Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from Communist
control.
[Annex]
top secret
December 20,
1951.
NSC
Staff Study†
on United States Objectives and Courses of
Action in Korea
the problem
1. The essential question to be determined is whether, in case the
armistice negotiations fail to continue the policy of NSC 48/5, namely, to seek as an
ultimate objective a unified and independent Korea by political
means and as a limited objective a minimum settlement of the
military conflict, or whether to seek a definitive military and
political settlement to the Korean problem.
[Page 1388]
analysis
Nature of the Problem
2. The current efforts to achieve an armistice and a settlement, as
defined below, could fail because of (a) Communist refusal to agree
to minimum U.S. terms for a settlement; (b) Communist protraction or
termination of negotiations; (c) the unwillingness of the American
people to accept a stalemate; and (d) the potentially serious
consequences of expanding hostilities resulting, for example, from
the growing Communist air build-up in North Korea and Manchuria.
3. On the one hand there may develop certain pressures for the
adoption of United States courses of action in conflict with the
objectives in Korea set forth in NSC
48/5. From the U.S. military point of view, the immobilization of
U.S. ground, air and naval forces in inconclusive operations in
Korea during long and protracted negotiations over an indefinite
period of time with the attendant attrition of manpower and materiel
may become unacceptable. The increasing military power of Communist
China threatens U.S. basic security interests in the Far East. It
must be expected that, in the event armistice negotiations fail,
U.S. public opinion may demand the adoption of military measures
adequate to achieve a political and military decision of the Korean
struggle.
4. On the other hand, the pressures on the United States to reach an
early resolution of the Korean conflict through a cease-fire and an
armistice are also becoming stronger. The desire to end casualties
is strong. The deployment of U.S. military resources to Korea
reduces the power that the United States might otherwise be able to
exert in Western Europe and the Near East. Our allies, including the
Commonwealth, are constantly pressing for an armistice, are
reluctant to apply additional measures against Communist China, and
cannot or are unwilling to contribute any more forces to Korea.
Considerations Bearing on the Choice of
Objectives
5. The developing situation in Korea has reached a point where the
United States must decide on the objectives and general direction
which it now desires to pursue in Korea. The United States can
choose among three broad objectives: (a) abandonment of the U.S. and
UN commitment in Korea and complete withdrawal of UN forces; (b)
achievement by a military decision of the unification of Korea and
the withdrawal of Communist military forces from Korea; and (c)
achievement of an acceptable settlement of the Korean conflict by
military and other means and pursuance of unification only by
political means.
[Page 1389]
Abandonment of Our Commitment in Korea:
6. Such a choice would irreparably damage the position of the United
States in Asia and throughout the world, signify the surrender of
the often-proclaimed UN objectives for Korea, and shatter the
prestige of the UN. The result would be a major victory for
Communism which would adversely affect the world-wide position of
the United States. The security interests of the United States would
be seriously jeopardized by this decision. It is unacceptable as a
voluntary choice. Therefore, our objective can either be the
unification of Korea through a military decision or through
achievement of an acceptable settlement of the Korean conflict. The
following are among the factors to be considered in determining that
choice.
Unification of Korea by a Military Decision:
7. Achievement of this objective implies the defeat of enemy forces
in Korea, the destruction or withdrawal from Korea of Chinese
forces, the reduction of the will to fight of the Chinese Communist
regime, and the establishment by force of a united Korea. The
courses of action necessary to achieve these results would require
the employment of significant additional UN forces and means
primarily furnished by the United States. These additional resources
would undoubtedly include substantial ground and air reinforcements,
imposition of a naval blockade against Communist China and possibly
the use of all available types of weapons. To pursue these courses
of action to completion, during 1952, would require immediate
decision so that necessary steps could be taken for the training,
supply, and transportation to Korea of the added forces involved.
After deployment of necessary forces and supplies, a decisive blow
could probably be delivered within sixty days and thereafter UN
forces could be materially reduced. Deferment of a decision to
employ these courses of action for even a few months would delay the
build-up to a date which would either require a winter campaign or
defer decisive operations until the spring of 1953. The adoption of
these courses of action would result in expanding the area of air
and naval hostilities into Manchuria and parts of China, in which
case the Korean action would develop into a de
facto war against Communist China and might increase the
possibility of general war. On the other hand, initial operations
and the threat implied by increased UN resources might cause the
Communists to seek a negotiated settlement acceptable to the United
States.
8. In favor of a decision to pursue this objective are the following
considerations. The strengthening of the present Stalinist regime in
China, through its alliance with the USSR, is the greatest threat in
the Far East to the security interests of the United States in Japan
[Page 1390]
and Southeast Asia.
An increasing consolidation of the power of the present regime in
China and extension of Soviet control over China’s power potential
would greatly facilitate eventual Soviet dominance in most of Asia.
Consequently, it is in the U.S. national interest to adopt policies
which are designed to reduce the power of the present regime in
China, weaken or dissolve the Moscow-Peiping Axis, and cause the
eventual destruction or reduction of Soviet power in Asia.
9. Owing to Communist China’s growing and potential vulnerabilities,
a de facto war with Communist China in Korea
continues to provide a significant strategic opportunity, perhaps
the last opportunity, for the United States to weaken and undermine
the Soviet Union’s principal ally, possibly without the costs of
general war either with the USSR or with Communist China itself. The
United States can exert its power in the Far East more effectively
upon concentrations of Chinese air and ground forces in the area of
north China, Manchuria, and Korea than upon Chinese forces in south
and central China or in Burma or Indochina. It is conceivable that
sufficient power applied against Communist forces in Korea could
defeat their armies and seriously shake the Peiping regime, and
might also succeed in weakening Commuinst China sufficiently so that
for several years it would not be in a position to challenge or
disrupt a definitive settlement of the Korean problem. The reduction
of Communist China’s growing military potential, if accomplished
without major war, would greatly enhance U.S. objectives in Asia,
and indirectly contribute to the security of the Atlantic
community.
10. A decisive defeat of the Communists in Korea would seriously
affect the future development of Communist forces now under the
control of the Soviet Union. It is clear that the USSR desires, and
is exerting substantial effort to create, a well-trained, well-armed
and effective Chinese fighting force to strengthen the military
capabilities of the Sino-Soviet partnership. Alarming progress has
already been made in the build-up of a Communist air force in China,
particularly strong in its jet fighter components.
11. Although hostilities in Korea have probably stimulated military
use of manpower and Soviet military aid, losses in men and equipment
may have hampered the construction of a modern military machine in
China. An armistice would relieve the pressure and thus permit more
rapid progress in military development, if the USSR continues to
supply military aid. Application by the United States of greatly
increased force against the Chinese in Korea would increase the
difficulties of carrying out Sino-Soviet plans for the construction
and expansion of this military machine.
12. In addition to the military effect on Communist China of a UN
effort to unify Korea by force, the political and economic
weaknesses
[Page 1391]
of the
Peiping regime would be intensified. The strains already placed on
the internal position of the regime by the losses in Korea would be
multiplied and might eventuate in a deterioration of central control
and serious dissatisfaction with the Kremlin ties.
13. Unification of Korea by a military decision would provide a
stronger security outpost to protect Japan and the off-shore island
chain, put an end to the aggression and permit the achievement of
the long-standing political objectives of the United Nations in
Korea. The defeat of the Communists in Korea would achieve the
unification of Korea and satisfy the aspirations of the Koreans.
14. It is therefore clear that if the UN, without provoking general
war, were able to impose a military decision upon the communists in
Korea and thus make possible the unification of Korea as part of the
free world, the resulting victory would, in addition to dealing a
serious blow to the Chinese Communist regime, immeasurably enhance
the prestige and position of the United States and the United
Nations throughout the world.
15. However, against the advantages described above must be weighed
the following disadvantages involved in a determination to achieve
the unification of Korea by military means.
16. Consideration of the employment in Korea of the “significant
additional United States forces and means” which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have said is necessary to a military decision, must take into
account the present security position of the United States, the
worldwide military commitments of the United States and the forces
and means available to meet these commitments.
17. The United States is faced with the continuing danger of global
war, as well as local aggression, in a situation of inadequate
military strength. Such forces as may be committed in Korea are not
necessarily in the best position to meet these dangers. Attrition
and materiel expenditure in Korea detract from our efforts
elsewhere, and the requirements of UN forces in Korea have already
served to reduce the possible flow of U.S. military assistance to
other allied areas.
18. The continuing danger of general war, the difficulties in
achieving military production targets, and the limited resources
presently available for stepping up the military action in Korea
suggest the problems and dangers of attempting to unify Korea by
military means. It is estimated that were such a course decided
upon, the necessary troop reinforcement might not be accomplished
until well into 1952. Such reinforcements would of necessity be
supplied largely by the United States, would delay the planned
build-up of forces in Europe, deplete the Army general reserve, and
result in an unsatisfactory deployment of U.S. military strength.
The logistical problems
[Page 1392]
involved in maintaining and supplying these additional forces in
Korea would present the most serious difficulties. Even if such a
build-up were started at once and met with favorable results, it is
questionable whether a decision could be reached and the ground
forces involved be redeployed prior to mid-1953.
19. A determination by the United States to enlarge its objectives
regarding Korea that would require a military decision necessarily
raises the question of the UN character of the action in Korea. The
United States would presumably attempt to persuade the nations
participating in the Korean action to accept this new objective. It
is unlikely that these nations would agree and the United States
would then be forced to take unilateral action, thereby losing the
support of its principal allies and transforming the Korean action
from a United Nations effort to a United States effort.
20. Finally, while such objectives and a military decision might be
achieved in Korea without provoking war with the Soviet Union, it is
clear that the risks of general war with the USSR and with Communist
China would be increased were we to decide to seek enlarged
objectives and to apply the necessary military means to unify all
Korea to the Yalu River and the territorial frontier. Such a course
of action would appear to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists as
a real threat to their security, and while it might lead to a direct
confrontation of American and Soviet air and ground forces in Korea,
it would more probably impel the Communists to seek an armistice
before unification by force had been accomplished. And, assuming
that, without Soviet intervention, we were able to secure a military
decision in Korea with the additional forces required for such an
operation, we might still face the problem of how to put an end to
the Chinese Communist aggression on more than a temporary basis and
permit the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea. Unless the
state of siege against Communist China were really effective, we
would be heavily committed indefinitely to hold a defense line along
the Yalu River between Korea and Communist China. There is little
reason to suppose the Communists would formally agree to any
settlement on that line or eventually would not seek to disrupt or
challenge it. In that unstable situation, not only would we be
unable to reduce our forces in Korea; we would be permanently
committed on the mainland of Asia for as long as the Communists
wished to keep us there. Minor Communist military efforts could
impose a heavy drain on our forces, since ROK troops would not be capable of defending the
frontier alone. Strategically, our forces would remain seriously
vulnerable in case of a Russian attack or all-out war. In summary,
even a decisive military victory in Korea and its unification by
force might
[Page 1393]
be a hollow
victory in the short term, and a major strategic error in the long
term. The risks of such an effort are clearly great, and might be
out of proportion to the possible gains.
Achievement of an Acceptable Settlement and
Continuation of Present Objectives:
21. In favor of seeking an acceptable settlement in Korea are the
following considerations. Pursuit of such an objective would not
require any large additional commitment of forces to Korea and might
eventually permit the diversion of matériel to other theatres. UN
casualties would stay relatively low and time would be gained to
build up the ROK forces. The United
Nations Command could remain in a relatively favorable defensive and
logistic position, since it has the defensive strength at present to
stop an offensive with extremely heavy and possibly crippling losses
on Communist forces. On the political side, this objective affords
perhaps the only opportunity of ending hostilities and settling the
Korean problem by some kind of modus vivendi
in Korea. Our allies, the United Nations, and world opinion fully
support this objective.
22. Moreover, an armistice in Korea would help to reduce the
heightening tension all over the world, and particularly in the Far
East, which in turn might facilitate solutions of other outstanding
issues in areas other than the Far East by setting an example of a
negotiated settlement of a critical conflict of interests. Equally
important, an armistice in Korea would bring temporary peace to an
afflicted people, put and end to the battle casualties, and permit
the orderly reconstruction of a large part of Korea.
23. This objective would not imply the imposition of maximum terms in
Korea, such as the unification of Korea, and therefore would not
risk provoking Soviet direct or increased indirect intervention,
since the USSR is probably not prepared to accept the risk of
general war to achieve its maximum objectives in Korea.
24. At the same time, achievement of this objective would permit the
U.S. and its allies to hold strong positions in Korea in order to
make good the already great sacrifice of the UN action against
aggression in Korea, to guard against its renewal, and to provide
protection for the security of Japan.
25. Concerning the disadvantages of this choice the following
considerations are pertinent. An acceptable settlement admittedly
will not produce the lasting and satisfactory solution of the Korean
problem which the United States would desire, nor are the courses of
action now underway or proposed likely to achieve the political
settlement which is the ultimate objective of the United States. If
the pursuit of these courses of action fails after a reasonable
period to
[Page 1394]
produce even a
satisfactory minimum settlement, the United States will have to
reexamine the choices which will be presented. Expansion of
hostilities into China may become unavoidable. In that event, a
limited objective would become increasingly difficult to follow. As
the delays in reaching any kind of settlement in Korea increase,
American public opinion will come less and less to support an
indefinite holding campaign in which the enemy retains the tactical
initiative, and which could develop into a permanent stalemate for
the United States. While a de facto cessation
of hostilities or a minimum armistice would necessarily delay
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and therefore adversely affect
our global military position, such a situation would permit the
communists to disengage for operations in the critical area of
Southeast Asia or against Formosa. Acceptance of this objective
might eliminate a major opportunity to retard the formation of a
modern military machine in Communist China.
26. An attempt to achieve this objective would also face serious
risks because the growing Communist air build-up in North China and
Manchuria may make the military courses of action in Korea difficult
to carry out, and prejudice the achievement of an acceptable
settlement. The implications of this build-up are considerable. Any
necessary counter-action by the United Nations Command might have
the effect of broadening the war in Korea to a war against Communist
China, which would invalidate the policy of confining hostilities to
Korea. The build-up already has reached a stage where serious
consequences to UN forces in the Korean area might result from
expanded employment of this enemy air potential. Inasmuch as it is
the responsibility of the United States to maintain the security of
its forces, it must be recognized that it may be necessary for the
United States to employ its air forces unilaterally and on short
notice to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases whenever the
scale of enemy air activity is such as seriously to jeopardize the
security of the United States forces in the Korean area.
27. An enemy decision to employ Communist aircraft against UN forces
in Korea at or beyond the battle line might begin by air attacks
against UN air bases in Korea. This might take place either through
a steadily increasing number of small-scale attacks on U.S. bases or
by a sudden massive attack without adequate advance warning. The
first might present a challenge to UN air forces, while the second
could cause serious damage to UN planes and facilities. In case of
massive attacks, the standing instructions to the Commander in Chief
of UN forces should be carried out. Thus, the only way to protect UN
forces in Korea from the effects of cumulative or massive enemy air
strikes may be by ending the restrictions on air operations in
Manchuria
[Page 1395]
and North
China in order to retaliate directly against Communist air
bases.
28. Therefore, the choice of this objective concerning Korea
eventually may raise the issue of whether to leave the initiative to
the Communists to bomb and attack our air bases—to try to end our
air sanctuary; or whether to take anticipatory and preventive action
to end their sanctuary by destroying Communist planes on the ground
in Manchuria or North China before they actually attack our air
bases. Success or failure in ending the respective air sanctuaries
in Korea or in Manchuria may lie with the air force that strikes
first. However, there are many strong reasons for the United States
not to take that initiative unilaterally. Since the Communists
appear to want a cessation of hostilities (NIE–55), it is probably a safe assumption that the
enemy will continue to prefer to retain his own air sanctuary. Since
anticipatory action might risk attacks on the crucial supply base of
Pusan, direct Soviet air intervention, and the possibility of global
war, it might lead to an even more untenable situation than would be
the case of leaving the initiative to the enemy to break the UN
sanctuary. It would certainly raise such difficult questions as
obtaining support from our allies and committing additional air
resources to Korea to implement such an action.
29. On balance, it is apparent that both the Soviet side and the free
world find advantage in not trying at this time to reach their
respective maximum objectives in Korea by force. In this situation,
U.S. national interests would be better served if we continue to
seek the objectives set forth in NSC
48/5 rather than expanded objectives. At the same time, it may
become necessary to increase military and other pressures on the
enemy to achieve our limited objectives. The risks and drawbacks of
attempting to secure the unification of Korea by force and the
defeat there of Communist armies, particularly the considerable
uncertainties and costs of this objective, outweigh the
disadvantages of continuing to seek an armistice, a minimum
settlement of the Korean conflict, and the unification of Korea by
political means.
Nature of an Acceptable Settlement in Korea
30. A settlement for Korea would include three distinct phases:
first, a satisfactory armistice; second, an acceptable minimum
settlement of the Korean conflict; and third, a political settlement
establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea. Each of
these phases is an objective in itself for the United States. Each
has certain problems which are analyzed in the following
paragraphs.
a. A Satisfactory Armistice: A satisfactory
armistice agreement would provide for a cease-fire, a demilitarized
zone based on a demarcation line, a system of inspection and
observation, and an exchange of
[Page 1396]
prisoners which would return all UN and
ROK military prisoners. The
degree and nature of inspection and observation would be subject to
negotiation.
b. An Acceptable Minimum Settlement:
Following an armistice, the principal objectives to be achieved
would be the establishment of ROK
authority over all of Korea south of the demilitarized zone, the
development of sufficient ROK
Military power to deter or repel a renewed aggression by North
Korean forces alone, and the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean
military forces from Korea as circumstances permit. No settlement
should be accepted which would hinder the strengthening of ROK military forces, retard the
rehabilitation of the ROK, or
jeopardize the U.S. position with respect to the USSR, Formosa, or
the seating of Communist China in the UN. The problem of withdrawal
of forces will undoubtedly be most difficult to solve. Since the
United States will not be prepared to sacrifice the security of the
ROK forces, it is likely that no
agreement will be reached quickly. The Chinese forces will be likely
to remain in Korea for a considerable length of time, and it will
therefore be necessary for the UN forces to remain for a like
period.
c. A Political Settlement: The ultimate
objective for Korea, as declared repeatedly by the United States and
as embodied in a series of resolutions by the Security Council and
General Assembly of the United Nations, is the unity and
independence of the country. The United States could not agree to
any political settlement for Korea which did not fulfill this
objective. Certainly the Korean people would never accept a
political settlement which perpetuated the division of their
country. The Communists will sacrifice their direct control over
North Korea in favor of a political settlement only in the event
they become convinced that their control of the whole country can be
easily achieved through subversion. Consequently the likelihood of
achieving a political settlement is remote and a divided Korea is to
be expected for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the United
States should take the initiative in negotiations looking toward a
political settlement for Korea. It will be important to make clear
to the world that the United States seeks through the United Nations
an equitable political settlement for Korea and that responsibility
for the frustration of this settlement, when it develops, will lie
directly with the communists.
Courses of Action
31. The courses of action which the United States should pursue in
order to achieve our objectives in Korea necessarily vary according
to the contingencies which may arise, namely, achievement of an
armistice, failure of armistice negotiations, and unacceptable
protraction of the armistice negotiations.
32. It is recognized that the armistice is the first step in reaching
a minimum settlement. The greatest danger in an armistice situation
will be renewal of the aggression. Whatever system of inspection may
be evolved, this cannot in itself be depended upon as a deterrent to
the communists. A more powerful deterrent will be the knowledge
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by Moscow and Peiping
that the renewal of the aggression will bring prompt and certain
retaliation, not only in Korea but upon China itself. Commitment on
the part of the United States to take such retaliatory action
involves grave risks including that of global war. However, once
having accepted an armistice, it is unlikely that the communists
would decide to invade the ROK until
they had had a considerable period to build up the necessary forces.
It appears more likely that the next communist move would come in
another part of the world, where success might be more easily
achieved. During this period of time the strength of the free world
would continue to increase and we should be better prepared for the
risk. The publicly expressed determination of the United States and
our principal allies to retaliate against China in case of renewed
aggression would serve notice on the communist world which they
would regard with the greatest seriousness. It thus would become the
“greater sanction”, the strongest deterrent to aggression which we
could devise, and therefore worth the risk.
33. The “greater sanction” would take the form of agreement among our
principal allies to a public declaration that renewal of the
aggression would be met by military action without geographic
limitation. It would be desirable to obtain agreement to such a
statement from as many as possible of the sixteen nations
participating in the Korean action. If agreement cannot be reached,
the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China
that future military aggression in Korea will result in a military
reaction that would not necessarily be limited in geographic
scope.11
34. In the second contingency, that of a failure of armistice
negotiations, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, would
step up the military action against the communists to the extent
permitted by the forces available to him. These forces are presently
sufficient only to maintain military pressure against the Communist
front and are not adequate to achieve a conclusive military
decision.
35. A clear failure of armistice negotiations could come about in
several ways:
-
a.
- Announcement by the communists that they are terminating
negotiations with no intention to resume them.
-
b.
- Renewal of large-scale hostilities by the communists, with or
without announcement.
-
c.
- Decision by the United States and allies to break off
negotiations.
[Page 1398]
36. A U.S. decision to break off negotiations would of course be
taken only after the most careful consideration of the consequences.
Such a decision would imply willingness to increase substantially
the scale of military action and to extend the conflict. It would
presumably be taken only after the exhaustion of UN efforts to
obtain agreement to an armistice and would therefore occur after the
situation of protracted negotiations had developed, and which is
described below.
37. In the case of failure of armistice negotiations, the most
vigorous efforts would be exerted to bring about a complete embargo
on shipments and shipping to Communist China. It would probably be
necessary, in addition, to impose a naval blockade in order to
achieve an effective interdiction of Communist Chinese seaborne
imports. Whether other nations, particularly the United Kingdom,
would agree to a naval blockade, is of course open to question.
Unless the blockade were applied to Dairen and Port Arthur, large
loopholes would exist. It might also be necessary to stop Soviet
ships proceeding to other ports, and their resistance and our
possible retaliation pose risks which must be calculated. The effect
of a blockade and possible communist reaction to it are estimated in
a separate study (SE–20).
38. It would appear desirable to attempt to secure cooperation from
our principal allies in imposing maximum controls designed to bring
about complete economic isolation of Communist China. Whether this
can be accomplished by a naval blockade or by coordinated action
short of a blockade depends in large degree upon the willingness of
the other nations to participate. The United States will need to use
maximum influence to persuade other nations, particularly the United
Kingdom, to join in such action. It may be that we can succeed in
getting agreement to increase controls and finally to impose a
blockade. The strongest and most persistent diplomatic action will
be required.
39. The third contingency is that of an indefinite protraction of
negotiations. In this case our objective would be to bring the enemy
to the point of agreement to a satisfactory armistice. Consequently,
depending upon continuous estimates of enemy build-up and
intentions, such courses of action should be taken as might be
determined to be effective in the circumstances. The situation would
not indicate the same degree of gravity as a clear failure of
negotiations and consequently additional measures could be applied
in stages.
40. If negotiations become indefinitely prolonged, the disadvantages
of the deployment and maintenance of U.S. forces without a
conclusive result in Korea will produce an increase of strains,
dissatisfaction on
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the
part of our allies, and increasingly unfavorable reaction in the
United States. Public pressure would certainly increase to the point
where demands for a clear-cut victory might seriously divide the
American people, hurt U.S. prestige throughout the world, and
endanger the basic strategic position of the United States.
