Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 112: Telegram
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)1
operational immediate
JCS–90083. From JCS.
Part I.
1. Analysis contained in your HNC 5882 most helpful. The firmness, patience and skill with which you and UNC Delegation are conducting these trying negots are appreciated and results thus far obtained viewed here as significant and gratifying.
2. View here is that there is small possibility that political discussions subsequent to an armistice will be successful in reaching any acceptable political settlement for Korea. Therefore likely that armistice will remain controlling agreement for a prolonged period. Consequently, its significance attains greater importance and its character must provide for greater degree of permanency than would otherwise be the case. Conditions of armistice must also be appropriate to Korean civilian economy and we cannot expect agreement on conditions whose enforcement would be impracticable over long period. In addition, it is of particular importance that the armistice agreement itself clearly provide that it will remain in effect until superseded by other arrangements.
3. While recognizing the possibility of renewed aggression in Korea [Page 1378] after an armistice, it appears more likely that Communist violations of armistice terms will be disturbances in nature of nuisance demonstrations, threats, equivocations and the like, samples of which we have encountered elsewhere in the world where living in juxtaposition to Communists rule. However, renewal of hostilities on our part would be most unlikely unless there were actual armed aggression by Communists or violations of armistice terms of such a character as to give clear indication of imminence of such aggression.
4. It is our view that safety of UN Forces and the major deterrent to renewal of aggression must in last analysis be dependent upon realization by Communists that a renewed aggression in Korea would result in a new war which would bring upon China the full retribution which United States and her Allies deem militarily desirable. Every effort is being made to obtain agreement of countries participating in the mil action in Korea to a declaration to this general effect to be issued immediately folg conclusion of an armistice. Preliminary discussions with UK show her support of this concept and we are hopeful that other Allies also will endorse it. It is still our intention to convey this warning unilaterally if necessary.
5. It is felt here that United States public opinion fully supports an acceptable mil armistice as the best of the alternatives which confront us in Korea. The public grows impatient only when it appears to them that we are quibbling over minor details. However, it is our belief that on issues which are manifestly of major importance, public opinion not only in United States but in other UN nations fighting in Korea stands staunchly behind our negotiators.
Part II.
6. Folg are positions you should firmly maintain in negots. We cannot state in advance that each one is absolutely final, as our judgment in this regard will be influenced by possible introduction by Communists of new variations which might be acceptable or by degree of support obtained from our major Allies for type declaration referred to in Para 4, Part I above. While complete disagreement on all these positions would be considered grounds for breaking off negotiations, United States Govt is unable now to state that failure to achieve agreement on only one or even several of final positions given below or elements thereof would, in last analysis, be considered in itself a breaking point.
A. Rehabilitation of Airfields. We agree that construction and rehabilitation of airfields will constitute an increased threat to security of UN Forces. However, we feel that as a long-range proposition complete prohibition on any rehabilitation will be impracticable to enforce. On other hand, there must be a prohibition against rehabilitation of those fields in Korea suitable for jet opns, against extension or enlargement of existing runways as well as against construction [Page 1379] of new fields or runways. Not to exceed an agreed number of specified fields, which number is left to your discretion, may be rehabilitated and maintained subj to above restrictions.
B. Aerial Observation. Aerial obsvn would be desirable but not essential, particularly after ground obsvn teams are in place. Accordingly, insistence on aerial obsvn should not be a part of your final position, and failure to effect agreement to provide for aerial obsvn, even if ground observer teams are not in place, should not be a breaking point. In this connection, see Para 7 Part III.
C. Rotation of Personnel. Rotation of personnel and replenishment of supplies and equipment should be separated for purposes of negotiation. We concur in your insistence on provisions for rotation of personnel. Unless agreement can be reached on a limiting number which would satisfy your max requirements for rotation, there should be no limit on number rotated in any month. Under any arrangement there must be a provision that at no time must the over-all level of personnel be greater than that which existed at the time the armistice goes into effect.
D. Replenishment of Supplies and Equipment. It is desirable that there be no increase in supply levels over those at the time the armistice goes into effect, and you should seek agreement in principle on this point. However, since this would be extremely difficult to monitor, it is not too important except that there should be a definite prohibition against increase in combat aircraft. On this specific prohibition you should be adamant.
E. Non-Combatant Observer Teams and Mil Armistice Commission. Some countries which have been contacted on the matter of providing personnel for observer teams have indicated that they prefer designation “non-combatant” rather than “neutral”. Your position on non-combatant obsvn teams and the MAC is approved. Regardless of composition of teams, no voting or other procedures should be accepted which would limit agreed freedom of movement or restrict the right of reporting by teams or individual members thereof. We concur that observer teams must be located at major ground, sea, and air ports of entry specified in armistice agreement with freedom of movement as required to perform their duties.
Part III.
7. Re Para 1 Part 3 HNC 588. Armistice should go into effect on an agreed date specified in armistice agreement. It should be keyed directly to having MAC and some observer teams in Korea but not necessarily in place. We recognize risk involved thereby, but feel effective date of armistice should not be delayed through inability to get teams in place. Suggest possibility of aerial obsvn by noncombatant teams on temp basis pending complete locating of ground teams.
[Page 1380]8. For reasons stated in Para 6 Part II above, we consider that time has not arrived for you to initiate procedure of announcing and reiterating final positions as such as referred to in Paras 3 and 5 d (1) of Part 2 HNC 588 nor are we able to approve now recom in Para 1 Part 6 HNC 588 for authority to announce final positions.
9. As deadline approaches, if progress is still being made and depending upon status of negots, you are authorized to propose or agree to an extension for a period not to exceed 15 days.
Part IV.
10. We do not accord priority to civilians over POWs, but nevertheless, as suggested in Paras 6 f (1), 6 f (2), and 6 h of Part 4 HNC 588, you should not oppose all-for-all exchange of POW provided a specified number of selected civilians are included by Communists. Actual exchange of POW by UNC for POW and listed civilians by Communists, would be on a one-for-one basis, until prisoners and listed civilians held by enemy are exhausted. Release of remaining POW would be in accordance with principle of voluntary repatriation along gen lines outlined in Para 6 f (2) HNC 588.
11. On question of exchange of civilians you should be guided by folg:
- A.
- Strong effort should be made to obtain release of UN civilians and ROK Governmental personnel (list of UN civilians furnished you in JCS 89189.3 State is consulting with Amb Muccio to develop a comparable ROK list.)
- B.
- Similar effort, though of lesser priority, should be made to obtain release of all remaining internees and refugees held by Communists.
- C.
- You should consult with Amb Muccio on all phases of exchange of Korean civilians.
12. If not successful in obtaining Communist agreement to position in Para 10 above, you shld request authority from Wash before taking final position to secure release of POWs only.
13. Any position requiring forced return of personnel held by UNC must have prior approval by Wash.
Part V.
14. In discussion of Item 5 Armistice Agenda, you should adopt the folg statement as initial position:
“The Mil Cdrs have not considered questions concerning a political settlement in Korea, including unification of Korea under an independent, democratic govt and other questions arising from but not resolved by Armistice Agreement. The Mil Cdrs recommend to Govts and authorities concerned that early steps be taken to deal with these matters at a political level.”
15. Inclusion of phrase “the unification of Korea under an independent, democratic govt” is desirable at least initially for reasons [Page 1381] of UN and Korean public opinion. If Communists oppose inclusion phrase they suffer propaganda reverse and you are authorized, at your discretion, to omit it from final recommendation.
16. While initially no mention should be made of withdrawal of troops, it is recognized that some reference to this matter may have to be made in final recommendation. If Communists insist inclusion subj, you are authorized to add words “such as withdrawal of non-Korean forces” to end of first sentence.
Part VI.
17. Any prior instructions in conflict with instructions in this msg are hereby rescinded.4
- The substance of this message was apparently discussed at a State–JCS meeting on December 19. A handwritten set of notes of a meeting with the date “12/19/51” penciled in and drafts of several proposed messages to General Ridgway are filed with the Department of State records of the State–JCS meetings in Lot 64D563, Box 728.↩
- Dated December 18, p. 1366.↩
- See the editorial note, p. 1296.↩
-
General Ridgway sent the following brief response in telegram C–59747, December 20, from Tokyo:
↩“Most grateful for prompt and positive guidance in your 90083. Recognize intensive efforts contributed by great numbers of individuals in State and Defense, most of them already heavily burdened. We wish you all happiness at Christmas time. Faithfully.” (Black Book, Tab 118)