S/S Files: NSC 118 Series
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
NSC Meeting
NSC 118/1 was adopted with the following changes:
All the changes proposed by the Senior Staff in its memorandum of December 19, 19511
In regard to Paragraph 2 a (5) on page 4—first, it was agreed to be inserted in the minutes that this paragraph was a statement of policy and was not meant to prescribe the language of the warning.
The words “in any event” in the second sentence were stricken out and the words “if agreement cannot be reached” inserted. At the end of the sentence, the words “or in the methods of warfare employed” were stricken out. In the last sentence, “the heads of” were stricken out.
In paragraph 2 b (1) on page 5, the proposed amendment by the JCS was not made. However, it was agreed that there should be a note in the minutes to the effect that the Council understood that the enlargement of the war contemplated in Paragraph b might call for increased military forces beyond those presently contemplated.
In Paragraph 2 b–2, 3 and 4, the two notes for the minutes which I proposed were adopted.2 I forgot to give Mr. Lay copies of these notes.
The State-Defense disagreement about Article 6 was not resolved, but these two proposals were returned to the Senior Staff … for the purpose of making a further report as to whether the proposed embargo [Page 1376] had any practical importance. Mr. Lovett’s view was that this might be controlling.
In paragraph 1 a (3), the language was changed to read “provide for the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea as circumstances permit”. I believe this is correct although I may be wrong about the phrase “by stages”. The change was made solely because all members thought that it meant exactly what the language of the paper meant. Mr. Lovett revealed the views of the Joint Secretaries which received no support—that is, it was the view that there could not be a precipitate withdrawal, but that as the circumstance developed decisions on withdrawal would have to be reached in a way which reconciled military needs and military security with the equally important objective of maintaining South Korean morale and resistance to subversion. It was clearly understood that no advance commitments could be made on this subject.
[Here follows discussion of topics not connected directly with NSC 118/1. For the text of NSC 118/2, December 20, as adopted and approved by President Truman, see page 1382.]