Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

320/1–2051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret

Washington, January 20, 1951—11 a. m.

642. Re proposed Res Korea, if asked, you may reply that US does not consider passage this Res wld constitute authorization for extension gen hostilities against Chi mainland by Unified Command, nor wld Res constitute UN permission bomb Chi within meaning Pres statement, press conference Jan 4.¹ However, US Govt as Unified Command, has always maintained that it must reserve right to take action essential to protect UN forces under its command; e.g., in event of large-scale air attacks against UN troops from Manchurian bases, it must be free to bomb airfields from which such air attacks originated, or if Chi Commie forces, in support of their action in Korea, attack UN forces outside Korea, the Unified Command must be free to counteract.²

Acheson

1. On that occasion, President Truman had stated that the United States did not have under consideration the question of asking for United Nations permission to bomb Communist China. He also said that the United States would not bomb Communist China without checking it with the United Nations. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, pp. 2, 3)

2. In the draft telegram sent by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews to Major General Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, on January 15 for comment, the words “must be free to bomb airfields” had read “has the authority to bomb airfields” and the sentence had ended with the word “originated.” The last sentence in the draft had read: “In such circumstances United States would inform other nations participating in military action in Korea as far in advance of proposed action as possible so that they may have the opportunity to express their views.”

   The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum dated January 19 to the Secretary of Defense, who forwarded it the same day to the Secretary of State, recommended that the words “has authority to bomb airfields” be changed to read “would bomb airfields.” They also recommended that the last sentence of the draft be deleted and the following language be added to the preceding sentence: “or if Chinese Communist forces, in support of their action in Korea, attack United Nations forces outside Korea, the Unified Command must be free to counteract.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that, since U.N. forces would deliver air attacks against Manchurian airfields only if such attacks were essential for the protection of the U.N. forces, the exigencies of the situation under such circumstances in all probability would not permit the United States to give advance notice to nations participating in military action in Korea. In addition, the security of proposed air attacks might be jeopardized if the several nations were informed in advance of specific plans for air attacks. In any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the draft as revised clearly defined the Unified Command’s position, and, if the nations concerned so desired, they would have ample opportunity to express their views.

   The Department of State sent the following message to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in telegram 645, January 20, 5 p.m.:

   “Assurances Deptel 642 shld be treated as top secret and communicated other dels only as essential and on entirely top secret basis. You will understand importance not having information US intentions this subject reach Peiping. Publicity on US assurances wld be highly embarrassing.” (795B.5/1–2051)