320/12–151: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)1 to the Secretary of State
Delga 464. Subject Korea.
1. Gross and staff have been considering points for GA res on Korea if there is an armistice. We have considered Gadel 151 of November 15, but corresponding changes in discussion section position paper have not yet been recd and we are not entirely aware motivation Dept’s changes embodied Gadel 151. In prospective discussions here we conclude fol considerations shld underlie proposals to be advanced:
- (a)
- There shld be maximum UN participation future steps Korean settlement;
- (b)
- Korean settlement involves difficult East West issue;
- (c)
- Direct US participation in working out settlement is essential;
- (d)
- Opportunity for USSR participation accordingly also shld be provided.
2. We question whether Comm of 5 or 7 members intended to enter into negots with govts and authorities in the field for the purpose of seeking a basis for a unified Korea wld provide an effective UN instrumentality for reaching this result. If such comm is to have hq in Korea, heavy expenses wld be involved and depending on quality of personnel of comm it is likely to add to rather than ease the already difficult political [garbled group.] If such negotiating comm is proposed, doubt concerning seriousness of US determination to move forward might result. Therefore we doubt advisability of creating negotiating comm with wide powers authorized to operate in the field.
3. As alternatives we see:
- (a)
- UN rep of US nationality appointed by SYG not acting under US instructions but advised by comm composed of permanent UN reps sitting in NY and exercising advisory functions.
- (b)
- UN comm composed as suggested by Gadel 151, but headquartered in NY and with terms of reference emphasizing “good offices” rather than active “negotiating” function. Comm wld be authorized to travel and to act through its chairman or through an [Page 1209] agent or rep of its own choice. If Sov did not participate in work of comm, it cld operate through a permanent US chairman. If Sov did participate, the comm could decide how it wished to proceed in light of developing circumstances.
4. Alternative “a” has advantage of single negotiator of US nationality who wld be so selected as to be sympathetic to US policy. Advisory comm wld permit representation of some states actively participating in Korea and seat wld be open for USSR. UN rep wld be negotiating agent with emphasis on UN concern re Korea. It wld also provide flexibility so that USSR cld sit in comm or otherwise get into contact with UN rep at any time there is a break and any desire on part of USSR to settle Korean issue.
On the other hand, UN rep wld not technically be acting under US instructions, and there is problem of finding right man and causing his appointment by SYG. Although terms of ref of UN rep and advisory comm wld clearly limit their scope to [garbled group] Korean issue, this wld potentially give considerable power to uninstructed US citizen.
5. Alternative “b” affords flexibility in that comm cld operate in accordance with changing circumstances. Stressing the “good offices” concept discourages members of comm from free-wheeling attempts to negotiate.
Disadvantage this alternative is danger that comm having more than advisory powers tending to turn itself into executive pol authority. This disadvantage is even more serious in respect of comm having “negotiating” authority, as suggested in Gadel 151.
6. We do not now make recommendation for choice between alternatives a or b whose pro’s and con’s are set out above. We shld as soon as possible discuss these points as well as others relating to SC and GA res with our UK and Fr colleagues as well as others directly interested, including of course ROK. UK, Aust and ROK reps have already approached us on our views.
7. We also propose to suggest to them that all these procedural questions be canvassed with USSR if once there is an armistice.
This is on the theory that the over-all issue cannot be solved without some degree of Sov acquiescence. We are further considering whether it wld be the Brit, Fr or ourselves who shld raise these questions with USSR rep.
8. In connection with current armistice negots, we assume that discussions in Korea of the last agenda item, “recommendations to govts,” wld not be so broad as to decide questions of the nature of future UN procedures.2