795.00/1–1751
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Various Problems Relating to Korea
| Participants: | Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs |
The Korean Ambassador called upon Mr. Rusk by prior appointment at 4:30 p. m. on January 17. In reply to Mr. Rusk’s question as to the Ambassador’s plans, the Ambassador replied that he was leaving for Korea at the end of this week and that his orders read “on consultation”. In view of this he did not know how long he would remain in Korea or whether he might not be returning to the United States.
The Ambassador stated that in view of his imminent return to Korea, there were a number of points upon which he felt he should have some clarification since he would undoubtedly be asked many questions on various phases of American policy upon his return to Korea. He wondered, for instance, what steps the United States now contemplated in relation to Communist China in view of the fact that Peiping had rejected the latest cease-fire proposals.
Mr. Rusk replied that now that the Chinese Communists had rejected the cease-fire, he thought the next step would be the immediate introduction [Page 95] into the UN of a resolution condemning Chinese aggression in Korea and demanding the withdrawal of Chinese troops, calling upon the members of the UN to refrain from assisting the Chinese Communists, and recommending that the Collective Measures Committee study the question of what sanctions might be applied against the Chinese Communist regime. Dr. Chang expressed the hope that the sanctions would be severe and that they would include military as well as political and economic steps against China, suggesting the bombing of Chinese bases in this latter connection.
Mr. Rusk said that he did not know what sanctions the Collective Measures Committee might come up with, but he assumed that a break of relations with Peiping and economic measures against the Chinese Communists might be among the steps recommended for adoption. The Ambassador was insistent that some stronger steps should be taken, and Mr. Rusk pointed out that certain military disadvantages would result from our bombing of Chinese bases, which might cause retaliation in Korea by the Communist air force, and further prejudice the safety of UN troops, pointing out that our refraining from bombing China had strong military as well as possible political justification. Dr. Chang wondered whether the British would go along with political and economic sanctions in view of the danger to Hong Kong, and Mr. Rusk thought that the British would now support such sanctions even if it meant increased peril to Hong Kong.
The Ambassador stated that his Government and the Korean people had been very upset by certain of the terms contained in the ceasefire proposal which had been sent to Peiping. In this connection, he mentioned specifically that the proposal would have envisaged the participation of the Chinese Communists on an equal basis in an around-the-table conference on Far Eastern problems, presumably as one of the “Big Four”, which the Ambassador said would violate all morale principles since the Chinese Communists were clearly bandits and aggressors with no right to be heard on such a basis. He added that his Government was also very much disturbed at the terms of the cease-fire proposal whereby some form of interim administration would be established for Korea following a cease-fire. He said that this provision would clearly have infringed upon the sovereignty of the ROK Government and that his Government could not accept such a condition. The Ambassador added that in general the acceptance by the majority of the UN of the proposed procedure for a cease-fire had seriously damaged the general morale of the Koreans and that the only desire of the Korean population was to continue the fight; for this they desperately needed the additional arms for the Youth Corps for which his Government had repeatedly asked.
[Page 96]Mr. Rusk emphasized the extent to which United States military resources were already being taxed in the fight to defend Korea and that we had stripped ourselves of badly-needed equipment in order to do it. He pointed out, however, that General Collins, who has been in Tokyo conferring with General MacArthur, would probably bring back with him General MacArthur’s views on this question. Mr. Emmons asked the Ambassador if he knew whether recruiting for the ROK Army had fallen off or was presenting a problem, and that in essence it appeared to boil down to a question of not so much actual manpower as of obtaining the requisite arms. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the question of leadership was also of vital importance in the effective use of manpower and that much might depend upon the availability of sufficient, trained Korean leaders to take over command of newly formed units.
The Ambassador said that the Koreans were still very much worried about the UN pulling out of Korea and leaving them to their fate. He felt that he should carry back with him to Korea some reassurance on this point. Mr. Rusk referred to the statements by General Ridgeway and General Collins that we were going to stay in Korea and fight the thing through and that there was no disposition to give up.
Mr. Rusk suggested that the Ambassador might assist in strengthening Korean morale if, upon his return, he were to emphasize that the Koreans themselves must demonstrate to the world, in every way, their will and determination to their fight for their lives and their liberty, and thus, by example, to spur the other nations to the maximum help which they could render. He suggested that emphasis should be not on what foreign aid was or was not being given to the Koreans but upon the extent to which the Koreans themselves were fully dedicating themselves to the fight.
Dr. Chang then brought up the question of relief supplies to the Korean civilian population and said that such supplies did not seem to be coming through very fast. He felt that he might be criticized by his Government for not having pressed hard enough to have these supplies expedited. The Ambassador explained that he had talked recently with Mr. Ringland of E/VFA, who had explained to him the general procedure for handling voluntary aid for Korea and the machinery through which contributions from various private agencies were sent forward. Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador if he knew of any specific bottlenecks in the supply line and said that we would be glad to know of them and that we would look into this question. Mr. Emmons mentioned that he had just talked with a representative of General MacArthur’s G–4 Section, who had been engaged in relief matters for Korea and that this officer had given him the impression that [Page 97] civilian relief supplies were coming through in very substantial quantities. Mr. Rusk suggested that if the Ambassador felt any embarrassment upon this point, he might make a statement to the press pointing out that while in this country he had consistently emphasized the importance of Korean relief and had pressed for the expediting of relief supplies.
The Ambassador then referred to his note verbale of January 4 containing a request for the participation of the Korean Government in peace treaty negotiations with Japan.1 He explained that the phraseology of his note might not have conveyed the right impression and that his Government was not “requesting” such participation but that it desired to emphasize its “right” to have a voice in the negotiation of such a treaty. He added that if this “right” were not recognized, then his Government wished to conclude a separate treaty with Japan. Mr. Emmons asked him whether, in this connection, he meant a treaty of commerce and friendship or a treaty of peace. The Ambassador replied that he meant a treaty of peace, since it was the position of the ROK that the Korean Provisional Government existing at the time of Japan’s occupation had certain legitimate residual claims for reparations against Japan as a result of the Japanese occupation of Korea which the present government would wish to press. Mr. Rusk remarked that it would be hard to sell the United States Government on such an idea since we had for some time been supporting a minimum standard of living for the Japanese at great cost to ourselves and that any reparations which might be paid to the Koreans by the Japanese would in fact come from the United States taxpayers.
The Ambassador again referred to the question of Korean morale and stated that the Koreans were very much preoccupied over reports of Japanese rearmament; he felt that any American arms which were being devoted to such a program should more properly be given to the Koreans since they were the ones who were actively combatting Communism at the present time. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States was not in fact “rearming” Japan but merely supplying sufficient weapons to strengthen a Japanese police force for internal security and to provide at least a minimum of protection to Japan, in view of the fact that virtually all American occupation troops were now fighting the war in Korea. He emphasized the necessity of giving Japan at least minimum protection at this stage, among other things, in order to protect the rear of our operations in Korea.
Dr. Chang then asked whether the Department had any further thoughts which he could take back to his Government on the question [Page 98] of a Korean Government-in-exile if events should make this necessary, and suggested the possibility of using the Hawaii Islands, where he stated that there were already some 7,000 Koreans who could assist in the assimilation of a new group of Koreans into the population. Mr. Rusk replied that we were going to fight it out in Korea every inch of the way and even from the southern Korean islands if necessary. He added that while he did not believe that the Department had developed any new ideas on the question of a government-in-exile beyond those which had been previously discussed with the Ambassador, he felt that there was going to be plenty of time to examine the problem.
As the Ambassador was leaving, Mr. Rusk expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity to see him again before his departure for Korea.
- The Korean note verbale is not printed, but, for documentation on this subject, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.↩