320/1–1651: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
Delga 520. From Gross. Re Korea—conversation with Tsiang. In [Page 89] conversation with Tsiang, held at his request, he told me he had been in touch with his Government which had instructed him to clarify certain points giving them great concern. He said his government guessed that Peiping might respond to the cease-fire group statement of principles in either of following ways:
(1) By proposing that body contemplated in paragraph 5 be established at once and meet as soon as possible to take up issues with ceasefire arrangements as the first item on the agenda. If this step were agreed to, Taipei feared that Peiping would suggest cease-fire problem be referred to committee of military experts and would propose that body turn at once to substantive questions. Tsiang requested our views if Peiping attempted this gambit.
I replied that it was our fixed position that we would not get into negotiations of substantive questions while hostilities continued and would therefore oppose any effort on the part of the Peiping Government or anyone else to take us into this room through the back door. At the same time I expressed the personal view that we did not have fixed views re the form or body in which cease-fire arrangements might be discussed. We had supported the Asian suggestion for the establishment of the three-man cease-fire group, but this did not necessarily mean that we considered the group the only appropriate mechanism or forum for exploring the basis for a satisfactory cease-fire. Hence, if Peiping suggested the substitution for the cease-fire group of some appropriately composed body for the purpose of exploring a cease-fire arrangement, I did not think we would reject such a suggestion out of hand. However, this flexibility did not impair or modify our set view that a cessation of hostilities in Korea must precede discussion of substantive issues.
(2) Peiping might request UN views concerning the “principles” upon which it was proposed that discussions re Formosa and other issues might take place. In other words, Peiping might ask whether the discussion of the Formosa question would be based upon the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. What would our attitude be in the face of such a reply?
I said that this would seem to be a clear attempt upon the part of the Peiping Government to draw up into a preliminary discussion of the substance or merits of the question at issue and we would reject such an effort since it would merely be a disguised way of attempting to precipitate a substantive discussion while hostilities continued.
Tsiang expressed complete satisfaction with these observations. He then turned to the report of the cease-fire group itself. He said he was completely unable to understand why the statement of principles did not specifically call for the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea and he asked how it was we had agreed to the statement [Page 90] of principles in its present form. I replied that our position remained precisely what it was when we outlined to the cease-fire group our analysis of points which we felt might be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire. I called Tsiang’s attention particularly to the first 3 points which were embodied in the first report of the cease-fire group (A/C.1/643) as to which the group had commented that in the circumstances they “felt constituted a reasonable basis for discussion”. I pointed out that the supplementary report in no way superseded the first report of the cease-fire group, and it was our position that the basis for a satisfactory cease-fire which had been summarized by the group in its first report still remained in our view a valid basis. The supplementary report referred only to withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea and therefore did not in any way prejudice the principle that North Korean forces must be withdrawn from south of the 38th parallel.
Tsiang said that he had not understood this point and was certain that many of the other delegates which had discussed the matter with him did not realize that the second report of the cease-fire group was merely “supplementary” to the first report and did not affect the basis for a cease-fire which had been envisaged in the first report. He expressed gratification for my explanation and added that he had strong doubt that the Chinese Communists would accept the statement of principles if they realized that the conditions for a cease-fire remained as set forth in the first report of the cease-fire group.
Tsiang then turned to the question of the composition of the body contemplated in paragraph 5. He wanted to know what our position was re the participation of his government in discussions relating to Formosa and representation. I replied that the paragraph as drawn contemplated that governments directly interested in problems which were under discussion should be invited to participate in discussion of such problems and that we assumed the GA would accordingly invite the Nationalist Government of China to participate in discussions relating to Formosa and Chinese representation. Tsiang said he could not conceive that the Chinese Communists would participate in discussions which included his government and he asked whether the cease-fire group agreed with my interpretation. I replied that I could not speak for the cease-fire group and did not know what their interpretations were. I added that we had not formulated or participated in the formulation of the statement of principles and took no responsibility for them. However, our interpretation was as I had stated it and I assumed the GA would interpret it in the same sense.
The conversation concluded by Tsiang commenting that our talk had been “extremely useful and comforting” and would allay much concern felt by his government.
[Page 91]I left with Tsiang an outline of points for a resolution of condemnation of aggression. [Gross.]