Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/1–1551: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices ¹

secret

Washington, January 15, 1951—7 p. m.

387. While Chi Commies considering cease-fire principles transmitted by GA (reported wireless bulletin, Jan 11), Dept desires continue consultations re next step to be taken by UN provided this intermediate effort does not succeed. In that event US continues believe strongly UN shld face squarely facts of situation by taking prompt action along lines Depcirtel 384,² and it is our hope that majority Members will be prepared such action since failure current effort shld make clear that all reasonable possibilities for pacific settlement will have been exhausted.

We have therefore authorized USUN Del consult other Dels re text possible res embodying fol specific substantive points, which you authorized discuss FonMin:

1) (Alternative one) A finding that CPG of PRC has committed aggression;

1) (Alternative two) A finding that CPG of PRC, in violation of UN Charter (a) has given assistance to NK Authorities against which UN is taking action in pursuance of SC finding of breach of peace; (b) has used force against territorial integrity and political independence of Korea, and (c) has sent its armies into Korea and attacked UN forces there;

2) A call upon CPG to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against UN forces and to withdraw from Korea;

3) A reaffirmation of UN’s determination to continue its action in Korea;

4) A call upon all states and authorities to give every assistance to UN in such action and to refrain from giving any assistance to CPG in its intervention in Korea;

5) A request that Collective Measures Committee as matter urgency consider what additional measures should now be employed to carry out purposes this res and make recommendations to GA thereon;

6) An affirmation that it continues to be UN policy to bring about cessation of hostilities in Korea by peaceful means, and a request to some appropriate designated body at any suitable opportunity to use its good offices to this end.

Re alternative form first paragraph it is Dept’s position that GA need not shrink from making express finding of aggression and prelim consultations by USUN will be on basis first alternative only. If initial soundings indicate reluctance other Dels employ word “aggression”, second alternative will be put forward. You shld not, therefore, for present mention second alternative until further word from Dept. FYI it is Dept’s basic view that label of “aggression” is not paramount and either alternative acceptable. What is important is that UN face squarely facts of what Chi Commies have done. One of our principal objectives is to maintain maximum unity of free world and get as large vote as possible for res, both for record and in terms action which UN Members wld be willing take in furtherance of recommendations of CMC. Realistically both alternatives are equally strong and it wld be unfortunate if word “aggression” became a shibboleth which determined willingness or unwillingness of free world to condemn Chi Commie action in Korea. Dept wld appreciate ur comments re these alternatives.

Fol are additional aspects of foregoing outline of res some of which represent adjustments in points outlined reftel and which shld lessen some of previous apprehensions re this approach:

1) Language wld make clear that res wld not automatically call on Members to take additional measures at present time;

2) While res wld envisage some additional measures in future, any recommendations of CMC to this end wld be made to GA and not directly to Members. Thus opportunity wld be given all Members debate such measures before approval.

3) In genl above points shld help quiet fears other countries that condemnation of Chi Commies wld necessarily result in spread of hostilities or inevitably involve chain reaction series of events leading to war.

In discussing this matter you may also assure FonMin that US intends to do everything it can to prevent hostilities spreading from Korea to wider areas in FE. What Peiping Govt will do we, of course, do not know. But we do not believe for a moment that Commies either in Peiping or elsewhere wld extend theatre of war by reason their being named as aggressors or of UN recognizing facts of their conduct in Korea. Therefore, it seems to us that whether or not hostilities can be prevented from spreading depends essentially upon deliberate choice of Peiping or those who inspire that regime. Nevertheless, we believe that in CMC’s recommendations re nature and extent of any action that shld follow this res only practical steps shld be proposed and great care exercised avoid steps which wld lead to broadening conflict.

Some initial reactions previously reported to reftel indicate in our view insufficient weight being given to fact that all alternatives facing UN in Korea entail some disadvantages. They also indicate insufficient realization of consequences of failure to act. In further discussions with FonMin this matter, suggest fol additional points be made: While we recognize other Govts also have problems meeting public opinion, Dept deeply apprehensive that failure UN recognize present Chi Commie action in Korea for what it is and to face it squarely wld create wave of isolationism in this country which wld seriously jeopardize all we are trying to do with and for Atlantic Pact countries. Thus Eur countries have this additional and vital interest in supporting UN action along lines indicated.

We believe that prompt and continued UN resistance to original aggression in Korea has gained valuable time for free world. We believe that continued resistance, approval of res along above lines and taking of such additional practical measures under it as may be agreed upon are all necessary to help prevent early and decisive Communist victory in Korea and consequent consolidation of their position which wld facilitate further aggression. Since countries West Eur understandably preoccuped with desire gain time build their own defenses, we believe our suggested course of action is in their own direct interest and shld, therefore, be appealing.

Acheson

1. This telegram was sent for information to Moscow and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. It was sent for action to the Embassies in Belgrade, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, and Stockholm. A similar but shorter message was sent for action to the Embassies in Canberra, Pretoria, and Wellington in circular telegram 386, not printed (795.00/1–1551).
2. Dated January 3, p. 7.