Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: NSC 101/1

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

top secret
NSC 101/1

Washington, January 15, 1951.

U.S. Action To Counter Chinese Communist Aggression

Reference: NSC 101¹

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff at the direction of the President and in the light of a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in NSC 101, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on January 17.²

It is recommended that, in the form adopted by the Council, the enclosure be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Draft Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Action To Counter Chinese Communist Aggression

The United States should:

1. Limit major U.S. ground forces in the Far East to those now committed, unless the outcome of the present Chinese offensive should indicate that we can profitably remain in Korea with the number of U.S. divisions now committed. In that event, not to exceed two partly trained divisions might be deployed to Japan to increase its security if the Army could provide them and at the same time meet our commitments in Europe.

2. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea or evacuate them to Japan if forced out of Korea.

3. Perfect plans for the evacuation of ROK and other UN forces.

[4. Expedite the build-up of internal security and police forces in Japan pending the early conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty.]³ (Proposed by the Senior Members from State, Defense, NSRB and Mr. Harriman’s office.)

[4. Expedite the build-up of Japanese defense forces.] (Proposed by the Senior JCS Member.)

5. Move troops to Japan from Korea as necessary to defend Japan.

6. Continue our political and economic sanctions against Communist China and press other members of the UN to adopt similar sanctions.⁴

[7. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.] (Proposed by Senior Members from JCS, NSRB and Mr. Harriman’s office.)

[7. Prepare plans for a naval blockade of China for possible use only in cooperation with other friendly nations.] (Proposed by Senior Members from State, Defense, Treasury, and Office of Defense Mobilization.)

8. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria. (The Senior State Member reserves his position on this paragraph.)

[9. Remove now the restrictions on operations of anti-communist Chinese forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists, concurrently endeavoring to secure the agreement of our principal allies to this course of action.] (Proposed by the Senior JCS and NSRB Members.)

[9. Press its principal allies to agree that (a) present restrictions should be removed on operations of the anti-communist Chinese forces, under Chiang⁵ or some other leader who might emerge, and (b) such logistic support should be given to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists. If unable to obtain such agreement, consider taking these actions unilaterally.] (Proposed by Senior Members from State, Defense and Mr. Harriman’s office.)

10. Continue air and naval action against appropriate military targets in Korea.

11. Press for immediate UN action branding Communist China as an aggressor, following the rejection of a cease-fire.

12. Send a military training mission and increased MDAP to the Chinese on Formosa.

13. Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective anti-communist guerrilla forces in China.

[14. Prepare plans for initiating damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea, including troops in transit to or from Korea.] (Proposed by all Senior Members except NSRB.)

[14. Launch an open and sustained attack upon lines of communications in China and Korea; and also upon aggression-supporting industries in Manchuria as considered militarily advisable.] (Proposed by Senior NSRB Member.)

15. In the event of a serious air attack on UN forces in Korea or in transit to or from Korea, authorize air and naval action against the sources of such attack.

16. Increase existing MDAP to Indochina and assist training of the forces of the Associated States if requested by French and local authorities.⁶

17. Consult with Siamese authorities and, if requested, furnish a military mission and increase MDAP aid to Siam.⁷

18. Expedite the program relating to the Philippines set forth in NSC 84/2.⁸

1. Dated January 12, p. 70.

2. At the NSC meeting on January 17, the Council, with the President presiding, discussed NSC 101/1 with particular reference to paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 in light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed in their January 12 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, which had been circulated as NSC 101, p. 71. For Mr. Bishop’s report on the discussion, see p. 93. The Council then referred NSC 101/1 to the NSC Staff for revision and agreed that the revised study should concern itself with U.S. objectives as well as with U.S. courses of action.

   The Council also requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a detailed study of the military effectiveness of the possible use of the Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa against the mainland of China, including consideration of the effect of such use upon the defense of Formosa, and requested the Department of State to prepare a study on the effect upon China and other Asian countries of continued U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek. (NSC Action No. 420)

3. Brackets throughout in the source text. For documentation on the Japanese Peace Treaty, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.
4. For related documentation, see pp. 1874 ff.
5. Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.
6. For related documentation, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 332 ff.
7. For related documentation, see ibid., Part 2, pp. 1594 ff.
8. For text of NSC 84/2, November 9, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1514.