S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728
Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
Present:
| General Bradley | Mr. Nitze |
| General Bolte | Mr. Bohlen |
| Admiral Duncan | Mr. Rusk |
| General White | Mr. Merchant |
| Admiral Davis | Mr. Ferguson |
| Admiral Lalor | Mr. Stelle4 |
| Admiral Ingersoll2 | Mr. Nash5 |
| General Joe Smith3 | Mr. Gleason |
| Colonel Cams |
General Bradley: We just had a message from General Ridgway as the result of the telecon.6
[Page 956]General Bolte then read General Ridgway’s reply.
General Bradley: It is not quite clear to me just what line he would draw on the map first.
General Bolte: Two kilometers on each side of the battle line.
Mr. Nitze: I think he meant the line would be the southern boundary of the proposal made in August.
General Bradley: Let us get a map in and look at it. To Ridgway it apparently seems that if you retreat from the position you took at the last meeting it will show weakness. The Communists will think they can get more by holding out.
General White: I would like to suggest that we review the reasons why it is necessary we move the discussions out of Kaesong.
General Bolte: Your public opinion would go along with a change from Kaesong.
Mr. Bohlen: It is a question of time. If we had gone back to Kaesong right away, there would be no problem with public opinion. After all, the talks broke off because they objected to the dangers of the neutral zone. Those things become issues to the extent to which they are built up. Now that we have made the point, we have another situation. With the position made public by General Ridgway, you have the question of whether we can go back to Kaesong.
General Bradley: When we consented to Kaesong originally we thought it was in about the status of a point between the lines. I am inclined to think that the site is now an issue.
Mr. Nitze: Kaesong will be more vulnerable in the future, and if there is a break we are in a better position on a new proposal.
Mr. Bohlen: I would go along with that.
Admiral Duncan: The first proposal General Ridgway suggested did not specify a place, but this one does.
Mr. Bohlen: Yes, and that is better.
General Bolte: He has gone along with the telecon, except that instead of the bridge he suggests another site nearby.
General Bradley: I think to propose a place where the liaison officers have already been meeting has advantages.
Mr. Nitze: Of course, too, General Ridgway is only suggesting neutrality and protection during daylight hours in his new suggestion.
Mr. Rusk: Is it possible to authorize him to go ahead with his proposal without making Kaesong a breaking point? We have a consultation problem with the other governments. I think we should be explicit about this.
Mr. Bohlen: He doesn’t say anything about Kaesong in his proposal.
[Page 957]Mr. Rusk: Of course, we have to recognize that it is harder to go back to Kaesong after this proposal is made.
Mr. Nitze: I think we and the Ambassadors should recognize that we can’t go back.
General Bradley: I think General Ridgway has a good point in that it isn’t hard for them to come to the place he suggests. If they want an armistice, do you think this is too hard a pill for them to swallow? I leave that to you, but if it isn’t too difficult I would go along with General Ridgway.
Mr. Bohlen: It isn’t quite black and white with these fellows. They probably see it much as we do. It is not just a question of whether they do or do not want an armistice. It really isn’t an either/or proposition. Our attitude affects them as theirs does us. This problem is not so important that it will end the talks, I think, but you can’t quite tell. They did break from their position and offered to go back to Kaesong without getting satisfaction on their charges.
Admiral Davis: If we press the advantage and insist on a new site they might think we don’t want an armistice. However, General Ridgway’s proposal seems fair enough to stand up publicly.
Mr. Rusk: It would help us if in the proposal General Ridgway could say “or any other site of a similar kind.”
Mr. Nitze: I am not sure I would not accept his proposal as it stands but be clear with General Ridgway that if the Commies do suggest another similar place we would take it.
General Bradley: That raises the question whether I or some of us ought to go out there so our thinking does not get too far apart. None of the chiefs have been over since General Ridgway took command.
Admiral Davis: I was wrong about that. Admiral Sherman was over with Paul Nitze in July.
General Bradley: Well, I think we ought to go. When you are so close to those sons-of-bitches, you have different views.
Mr. Nitze: I think it is a good idea.
Mr. Bohlen: There is one point—if you were there when things broke up, that would receive a good deal of public attention. If your visit coincided with the crisis there would be a difficult problem.
Mr. Rusk: But the other side would cause the break.
Mr. Bohlen: Yes, but if they do cause the break, a different interpretation might be put on General Bradley’s going out.
Admiral Duncan: The only practical thing bearing on that is that General Collins is taking off to Europe and General Bradley for Turkey at about the same time.
General Bradley: The Turkish trip might be put off for about [Page 958] ten days. In the meantime I could go to Japan for a few days. I’d have to go to Korea.
Admiral Daves: I am inclined to disagree Chip. It is a little like saying you don’t send a ship some place because it may mean something. This trip of Brad’s would be natural and if there is a reason to go, why not go.
General Bolte: General Ridgway needs an answer on the site thing right away. He doesn’t have to have an answer on the line right away.
General Bradley: On the Turkish trip, they probably would be glad to see me, but not the British and the French. That is the trouble with trying to take the others along. If we could go first we could get the thing straightened out.
At this point General Bolte read the Ridgway proposed message to the Communists, at Mr. Bohlen’s request.
General Bradley: Paul suggests that you add: “or any other similar place.”
Mr. Nitze: My point was that we should make it clear to General Ridgway that we would consider any other similar place but he doesn’t need to say it in his message.
Mr. Rusk: The issue with the Communists probably won’t be on this particular village but on Kaesong. Perhaps we should just say some other equally satisfactory place.
Mr. Bohlen: I think you are better off specifying a place.
General Bradley: Admiral Duncan has a question about the opening of the message.
Admiral Duncan: Would it be better to say “since your liaison officers have stated that they are not authorized”?
General Bolte: Yes, I agree, that point should be changed.
General Bradley: What is your reaction?
Mr. Bohlen: I think, balancing everything, we should go along, with a change in the first sentence.
General Bradley: I think General Ridgway has got away from the point that you can kick these fellows but still be polite to them.
Mr. Bohlen: They have a technique of making you mad.
General Bradley: Even if he is madder than hell, he should still be polite.
Mr. Rusk: We would like to show this message to the Secretary and probably the President before it is sent.
General Bradley: Yes, it would also have to be shown to the President. He has become very interested in Kaesong. I think General Ridgway has gotten a little sticky on the question of the line.
At this point a map was brought in showing the southern boundary of the 20-mile zone which General Ridgway wished to propose.
[Page 959]General Bradley: The Ridgway line takes in some territory beyond his present position.
Mr. Bohlen: Then he isn’t even taking the line of contact as his southern boundary.
General Bradley: No, I think he will have a hard time with this line since in the east and west he wants more territory than he has. I think we want to leave it to you to say what the result of such a proposal would be.
Mr. Bohlen: When Ave suggested a 4-kilometer zone with the median line the line of the present contact, we thought there was still some give in our position.
Mr. Nitze: It seems to me that if his initial position was the line he suggested and the zone was 2 kilometers on either side it would not be too bad a line. But it looks unreasonable if our last position is the line he suggests and all of the zone is to be north of it.
General Bradley: I question the 20-kilometer zone and I also question the line, particularly in the west.
Mr. Bohlen: Leaving aside tactics, the main point is reciprocity. Under the latest Ridgway proposal, and all of the others we have made, it is the Commies who withdraw. Reciprocity means a lot to those people.
Mr. Nitze: If you use a 4-kilometer zone with the Ridgway line as a median line, it won’t be bad. Isn’t the issue whether our first proposal on the resumption of the talks should be closer to our ultimate position than his August proposal was. He is probably right that we should not go to our ultimate position now. But the old position seems bad. I would not be too worried if he proposed this line with an equal zone on each side.
At this point General Bradley read a revision of the proposed message to General Ridgway concerning the meeting place. Admirals Davis and Duncan then read further revisions.
Mr. Rusk: Should not we tell General Ridgway that Kaesong should not be the breaking point?
Mr. Bohlen: He should be told that if the Commies refuse his proposal he should not violate the neutral zone without further instructions.
Mr. Nitze: If he sends this message on, doesn’t he have to know what he is going to say about item 2 on the agenda?
General Bradley: Bolte’s draft covers the immediate point of the meeting place. We should tell him not to go ahead with other things until he receives instructions, and particularly not to remove the neutrality of the zone.
Mr. Bohlen: I think we ought to put a ticker in on the neutrality point.
[Page 960]General Bradley: We might add a sentence on that.
Mr. Rusk: I wonder if it isn’t necessary to get a message to him on both points today. Bureaucratically, it would be a lot easier to do both of them together.
General Bradley: Maybe that is right. We recently told him that on the resumption of talks we thought he should propose a 4-kilometer zone with the median line roughly the line of contact.
General Bolte: I think he has adequate authority to put in a line.
Mr. Nitze: Yes, but the line he proposes to put in is that contained in his last proposal in August.
General Bradley: Yes, that is the point we have to decide.
Mr. Rusk: I think General Ridgway’s idea is a disadvantageous proposal.
Mr. Bohlen: I like Paul’s suggestion that we use his line as the median line, that would still give us some leeway.
General Bolte: He is resisting making concessions.
General Bradley: Yes, he is disagreeing with us.
Mr. Bohlen: They will come in with a concession and they will expect one from us.
General Bolte: I don’t think they are going to get to the drawing of a line tomorrow or the next day.
General Bradley: General Ridgway has decided not to follow our views, so that is impossible in any case.
Mr. Bohlen: I feel this way about the negotiating position. We would prefer what we sent to General Ridgway a few days ago, but if the fellows conducting the negotiations disagree you have to be careful. You will ruin General Ridgway if he operates partially on his views and partially on ours. That is why I think that going out there is a good idea.
General Bradley: One disadvantage in going during the negotiations is that the Commies will say that we have come out with instructions and that they will wait.
Mr. Bohlen: Yes, I think their reaction should come before. It may be that General Ridgway is right and these fellows will cave all along the line.
General Bradley: There is one out; if he would go back with some line and suggest a zone of 4 rather than 20 kilometers. But I still believe that on the left flank he has asked for something they cannot accept. That is a rice area.
Mr. Rusk: The South Koreans have raised a question about it for that reason.
General Bradley: Maybe Syngman Rhee has affected General Ridgway. If General Ridgway reduces his zone to 4 kilometers, that would be quite a concession.
[Page 961]Mr. Nitze: I prefer the idea of a median line. Maybe he could raise his line up 2 kilometers and make it a median line.
General Bradley: You think it should be a median line and not the southern boundary?
Mr. Nitze: Yes.
General Bradley: Your idea, Paul, is to suggest that maybe along the middle he would advance his line a little bit and then call it a median line?
Mr. Nitze: Yes.
Mr. Bohlen: This has the advantage of reciprocity, which I think is very important.
There was a further discussion of the revised message to General Ridgway on the site and conditions for resuming the meetings, and a telecon was agreed upon.7
Mr. Nitze: We had hoped that we might get to what we would do if negotiations broke down, and the hot pursuit question.
General Bradley: That is coming up in the NSC this afternoon.
Admiral Duncan: On the hot pursuit, I think we should get away from that phrase since what we propose means more than that and involves destruction of air fields and other things.
Mr. Nitze: If what one is discussing is the extension of air activities beyond the border, we thought that raised substantial questions, such questions as what is the probable reaction of the U.S.S.R., what would the outcome be, isn’t the object still to get a settlement in Korea and how this effect is to be produced.
General Bradley: The whole thing goes back to what you are going to do if negotiations break down. We have proposed certain things. This air action is one of them. I think our people are going to demand some further action. Our thought was that we were trying to win it this way. If you can’t, what else do you do? We can’t throw in any more troops, we don’t want to. We think you have to do something additional to a UN blockade.
Mr. Nitze: We have the additional problem with the sixteen countries that have troops there. We will have a difficult time persuading them to extend the air activities to Manchuria.
General Bradley: Then we can say we have to do something additional and ask them to send a minimum of four divisions.
Mr. Nitze: Is the air action something you want to do? If the Soviets increase their air aid to China, would that be in our interest?
General White: I don’t think it would be. This question came [Page 962] up when we were up around the Yalu. They would come up and make passes at our bombers.
General Bradley: If I were asked the question I would say that I doubt whether you gain anything now by hot pursuit. If you want to gain anything you would have to do more. It is a difficult job now. They have been increasing their MIGs about 100 a month.
Mr. Rusk: To put it bluntly, we have this problem with the 16 nations. They would probably go along if there was a military advantage to be gained and we were in a good military position to carry it out, but if we touch off something and can’t carry it through we are in a tough position.
General Bradley: If you go in to hit the bases you would need additional air.
Mr. Nitze: Can you make that diversion without affecting our strategic positions around the world?
General White: This question of air activity in Manchuria isn’t such a live issue now.
Mr. Nitze: If our position in the event of a breakdown isn’t a very good one to radically change the position of the Commies, then there is greater pressure to try to get an armistice.
General Bradley: Yes, I think that is right.
General White: The power installations are on the river and there you would get into hot pursuit if you went after them.
Mr. Rusk: I think we might consider working out a plan for fighter protection for missions of that sort.
General White: That would be broad enough to meet the present situation, I think.
Mr. Nitze: Is there any specific explanation for production of F–86s in August?
General White: It is probably a shortage of engines. They are not in production yet. Also, we are giving quite a lot to the Canadians. It takes a long time to get the production curve to go up. As for air frames, they are or could be made in larger numbers.
General Bradley: You were talking about a drop, Paul. I think the production was about the same.
General White: I think we have been producing about twelve a month for the last few months.
There was a further brief discussion of the revised message to General Ridgway.
General Bradley: Will you and General Bolte draft something on the question of the armistice line for us to consider. We could talk about a median line rather than a southern boundary.
- The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants.↩
- Charles C. Stelle, Deputy Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.↩
- Rear Adm. Stuart H. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).↩
- Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.↩
- Maj. Gen. Joseph Smith, Commander, Military Air Transport Service.↩
- Reference is to telegram CX–51655, supra.↩
- No evidence has been found to indicate that a teletype conference was held with General Ridgway prior to the dispatch of the message sent in telegram JCS 82438, infra.↩