Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 76: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

priority

Tokyo, 24 September 1951—10:01 a. m.

ZX–39138. Kim and Peng answer Ridgway. (Peiping radio, English, 0700, 24 Sept–RP).

Here is the full text of the reply from Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng The-Huai to General Ridgway:

“Commander-in-Chief M. B. Ridgway of the United Nations forces: “Your reply dated September 23 has been received. Although your message still refuses to acknowledge the various air and ground violations of the Kaesong neutrality agreement which were committed by the United Nations forces before September 10th and which made it impossible for the Kaesong armistice negotiations to proceed pretending that all the incidents had been fully investigated by your side, yet from our side there was every reason and right to go on demanding that your side deal responsibly with these incidents because we possess adequate evidence concerning them and your side has time and again refused to make reinvestigations.

“We have already instructed our delegates to put forward our demands for the appropriate machinery which should be set up by mutual agreement after the resumption of the Kaesong talks in order to deal with these unsettled incidents.

“It is generally known that what directly made it impossible for the Kaesong negotiations to continue was the provocative incident of August 22 and the series of similar incidents that followed all of which were created by your side. Naturally, therefore, your side has to bear the responsibility for it. Only since your side expressed regret for the September 10th incident, that is the latest Kaesong neutrality violation by the United Nations forces, and willingness to deal responsibly with the Kaesong neutrality agreement violations, we considered that the armistice negotiations should be resumed at Kaesong immediately and these unsettled incidents should not be allowed to go on impeding the progress of the negotiations between both sides.

“Our side has always requested that a strict agreement on the neutrality of the Kaesong area be worked out to avoid the future violations and to reduce or even eliminate any possibility of the negotiations being suspended in the future. But the working out of such specific and strict stipulations as will be agreeable to both sides at the same time must be done not by the liaison officers who have never had the power to do this but by the delegates of both sides in discussions.

“In order that the armistice negotiations may not be affected we proposed that appropriate machinery to deal with such matters be set up by discussion of both sides at the first meeting of the resumed Kaesong armistice negotiations. We hold that this is the most reasonable method.

“Therefore, we have ordered the liaison officer of our side to meet the liaison officer of your side at 10 A.M. on September 24 to discuss the date and time for resuming the negotiations in Kaesong.

“Signed: Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army.

“Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. “September 24, 1951.”¹

1. General Ridgway in his telegram C–51459, September 24, reported that the official text of the Communist reply had been received and did not differ materially from the above message.