Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 66: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, 21 September 1951—4:47 p. m.

C–51315. This msg in 5 parts.

Part 1. Letter from Generals Kim and Peng dated 19 Sept was transmitted in my C–51219¹ and ZX 38349.²

Part 2. I am transmitting the following reply via liaison officers at Pan Mun Jom at 220900 and releasing it to the press simultaneously:

“Your msg of 19 Sept, received 20 Sept 1951, has been noted.

“I flatly reject your suggestion therein that there are instances of alleged violations of the Kaesong Neutral Zone which remain unsettled. Each of the several cases wherein you reported an alleged violation of the zone and requested an investigation was investigated fully at the time. Where UN forces were responsible, that fact was reported. Where UN forces were not involved you, were so advised. All cases were settled definitely, and, so far as I am concerned, are closed.

“Again, I emphatically reject the baseless charge repeated in your letter that alleged violations of the Kaesong Zone by UNC forces made it impossible to continue the negotiations. The responsibility for the inexcusable interruption in the armistice conference is completely yours.

“In your msg you have arbitrarily dismissed the need to discuss conditions incident to the resumption of negotiations, in spite of the obvious fact that the armistice discussions have been interrupted for prolonged periods because of incidents or alleged incidents. I have therefore given instructions to my liaison officers to insure that this vital subject receives careful attention in any future discussions with your liaison officers in order to minimize the likelihood of further interruptions.

“Since you are now ready to terminate the suspension of armistice talks which you declared on 23 August, my liaison officers will be at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom at 1000 on 24 Sept to meet your liaison officers and to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks.”

Part 3. As authorized by JCS 80658 of 6 Sept,³ I intend to use the initial meeting of liaison officers to explore more fully the possibility of securing enemy agreement on a new site. At the proposed meeting the liaison officers will observe the following guidance:

1. Inform Communists that CINCUNC’s instructions to UNC liaison officers are to seek agreement on the optimum conditions favoring progress towards an armistice.

2. Using the theme of CINCUNC’s msg of 6 Sept (my CX–50292),⁴ particularly the last sentence thereof, expound the desirability of a change of site, pointing out that a change of site would relieve a situation in which diametrically opposed views of the commanders has resulted in a virtual impasse.

3. If the Communists refuse to agree to or to discuss new site, the liaison officers will seek additional guidance from CINCUNC before proceeding further.

4. Make no commitment, and imply none, either to return to the Kaesong area, or to refuse to return to that area.

Part 4. If the Communists refuse to agree to or to discuss a new site, I shall then, in accordance with second para of your 80658 of 6 Sept, request your further consideration of the request I made in my 50115,⁵ namely, that I be authorized to categorically refuse any further negotiations within the Kaesong area.

Part 5. There is not the slightest change in the physical situation of the Kaesong Neutral Zone, nor in the reliability of the Communists who control it. Moreover, access to the zone can be had only by passage through enemy controlled territory and the safety of the UNC delegation is a matter of continuing urgent concern to me. In the interests of seeking to avoid further delay in progress toward an armistice I feel an effort to find an agreeable meeting place less conducive to incidents is the minimum action indicated.

1. Not printed; it merely stated that the official version of the letter from the Communist side was essentially the same as the English broadcast transmitted in telegram ZX–38349. (Black Book, Tab 64)
2. Dated September 20, p. 923.
3. This message was transmitted on September 5, p. 882.
4. Dated September 6, p. 884.
5. Dated September 3, p. 875.