Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/9–1351

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, September 13, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am now in a position to comment more extensively on the State Department’s redraft of the position paper (WFM T–10/1a) entitled “United Nations Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice”, and also on the same paper that Mr. Matthews submitted with his letter of 10 September 1951.¹

I am inclosing a memorandum of 12 September 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff combining their comments and suggested revisions of the position paper (WFM T–10/1a). I concur in these revisions. At the same time, the Department of Defense believes that United States policy on Korea in case of no armistice, as expressed in these two papers,² should receive additional study before a final position is adopted.

Faithfully yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, 12 September 1951.

Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T–10/1a), dated 6 September 1951,³ Entitled “United Nations Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice.”

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point of view, the following views on the Department of State draft position paper, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would express their concern over the procedure of the Department of State in regard to the subject position paper dealing largely with military matters. On the cover page of WFM T–10/1a it is stated that the document was revised to take into account comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that it now stands approved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the subject paper does not, in certain particulars, fully integrate their views. In addition, they question the accuracy of the statement regarding approval of the document inasmuch as they understand it does not now have the concurrence of the Department of Defense. On the other hand, they are informed that the subject matter of this document formed the basis for the position of the Secretary of State in discussions with His Majesty’s Foreign Minister on 11 September 1951.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also find a misstatement of fact in subparagraph 2a(7) Military Actions with respect to air attacks on Rashin.

4. In subparagraph 2a(9) Military Actions, it is stated that the United States should re-examine the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and against the China mainland. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to a re-examination of the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops against the China mainland. Such action would be consistent with subparagraph 8 f of NSC 48/5, which was approved by the President on 17 May 1951. On the other hand, they adhere to the decision communicated to the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) on 9 January 1951, to the effect that in view of the improbability of Chinese Nationalist forces having a decisive effect on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere, to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison in Formosa was not regarded favorably.

5. In subparagraph 3 d Actions in the United Nations, it is stated that the imposition of a naval blockade through action in the United Nations is probably impracticable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that the imposition of a naval blockade by the United States in concert with the sixteen participating nations is a practicable military measure. It is believed that the statement in the subject position paper quoted above refers to the practicability of obtaining political support within the United Nations.⁴

6. In the light of the foregoing considerations and statements of fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following changes in WFMT–10/1a:

a. Change the second sentence of subparagraph 2a(7) Military Actions to read:

“Air attacks on Rashin should continue in accordance with existing instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs”

b. Change subparagraph 2a(8) Military Actions to read:

“Take the necessary diplomatic measures for the imposition of a naval and economic blockade of Communist China;”

c. Change subparagraph 2a(9) Military Actions to read:

“Re-examine the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops against the China mainland”; and

d. Change the second sentence of subparagraph 3 d Actions in the United Nations to read:

“The imposition of a naval blockade through action in the United Nations is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable.”

7. Subject to the acceptance of the changes recommended in paragraph 6, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, concur in WFM T–10/1a. They would stress, however, in the event no armistice is achieved, the military importance of:

a. Implementation of all of the measures which were recommended by them in their memorandum to you dated 13 July 1951, subject, however, to a re-examination now being undertaken in the light of existing conditions of the measure outlined in paragraph 1 b of the memorandum referred to; and

b. The requirement for acceleration of the present pace of military preparation by the United States and its allies.⁵

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. For background information on this paper, see the memorandum by Mr. Merchant, September 7, p. 886; for the text of WFM T–10/1a, see p. 889; regarding Mr. Matthews’ letter, see footnote 1, ibid .
2. Although Mr. Lovett here refers to two papers, the reference in the preceding paragraph to the “same paper” is correct, since the texts of WFM T–10/1a, September 8, and the State Department re-draft mentioned in Merchant’s memorandum of September 7 as being transmitted to Secretary Marshall are identical.
3. See footnote 2 above; the September 6 paper was the one referred to in Mr. Merchant’s memorandum of September 7 to Ambassador Jessup.
4. The three points raised in numbered paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 had already been discussed on September 12 by Mr. Merchant and Mr. Kenneth Young of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at which time Mr. Merchant had made clear that the conditions for bombing of Rashin had already been clarified with the British, the use of KMT troops had been set aside by Mr. Acheson as a topic not to be raised at the ministerial talks, and the naval blockade was being viewed with regard to its political feasibility not its military practicality (memorandum by Merchant to Matthews, September 12; 795.00/9–1251).
5. No further revision of document WFM T–10/1a was made, presumably in view of the resolution of the points raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Messrs. Merchant and Young in their conversation as well as the conclusion of the Foreign Ministers meetings on September 14; see infra.