Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 99

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings, Tripartite, and British Talks¹

top secret
WFM T–10/1a

[Washington,] September 8, 1951.

Courses of Action in Korea in the Event no Armistice is Achieved

problem

1. To determine courses of action to be followed by the United States with respect to Korea in case negotiations for an armistice come to a definite end.

General Courses of Action

2. Military Actions.

a. The United States should:

(1) Accelerate the present pace of preparations to place the nation in the best possible position of readiness for general war on the assumption that the Communist action has greatly increased the likelihood of general hostilities;

(2) Direct the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) to increase immediately the scale of military operations in the Korean campaign to the maximum consistent with the capabilities and security of the forces now available or made available;

(3) Impose no restrictions on advances into North Korea at least to the neck of the North Korean Peninsula;

(4) Support a vigorous campaign of covert operations designed:

(a) To aid effectively anti-Communist guerrilla forces in Communist China and Korea; and

(b) To interfere with and disrupt enemy lines of communications;

(5) Expedite the organization, training and equipping of Japanese defense forces;

(6) Expedite the development and equipment of additional dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible, with a view to their assuming an increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea;

(7) Remove all restrictions against air attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River. Air attacks on Rashin should continue to be individually approved in advance by the JCS and UN aircraft should continue to remain well clear of the USSR border;

(8) Take the necessary UN and diplomatic measures as outlined below, looking toward a UN blockade of shipments to Communist China;

(9) Re-examine the desirability of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and against the China mainland.

b. In case the Communists launch massive air attacks against UN forces in the Korean area, General Ridgway should carry out standing instructions.²

3. Actions in the United Nations.

a. General Ridgway should report to the United Nations on the breakdown of the armistice negotiations;

b. The United States should initiate or support actions in the United Nations which would be considered effective in obtaining increased support for the UN action in Korea, such as a GA resolution reaffirming the UN determination to carry on the fight and requesting further assistance.

c. The United States should take appropriate action, both diplomatically and through an initiative in the United Nations, calculated to bring political pressure to bear on the Chinese and North Korean Communists.

d. The United States should press for additional economic measures against China, looking toward a complete economic blockade. The imposition of a naval blockade through action in the UN is probably impracticable. The US should seek agreement within the UN or unilaterally with as many nations as possible to prohibit their ships from calling at Chinese ports and to accept assistance from the UN in enforcing such prohibition.

4. Diplomatic Actions.

a. Additional vigorous efforts should be exerted to obtain increased military forces, on a basis acceptable to the JCS, from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from countries which have not yet contributed military forces.

5. Psychological Warfare Actions.

a. A program should be developed to inform the world that the Communists are responsible for the prolongation and extension of hostilities, that the UN intends to make every effort to avoid World War III;

b. Efforts should be exerted:

(1) To maintain and increase world support for continued UN action;

(2) To spread dissatisfaction among Chinese people;

(3) To promote discord between Peiping and Moscow.

6. Domestic Actions.

a. The President should address the nation;

b. Domestic opinion should be prepared for greater sacrifices and for an increased mobilization pace;

c. A public campaign should be instituted to stress patience and to resist pressures for a preventive war or measures likely to extend hostilities in the Far East.

1. A cover sheet to the source text in the form of a memorandum by Mr. Gilman indicated that this document now stood approved, having been revised to take into account the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was forwarded to Secretary of Defense Marshall under cover of a note from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews on September 10 (795.00/9–451).
2. See the telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway, dated April 28, p. 386.