795.00/7–451: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
10. I uninformed instructions under which cease-fire talks are to be conducted and so somewhat hesitant send this msg but polit import of any agreements reached is so self-evident I feel I must bring few points to Dept’s attn.
It appears basic that cease-fire arrangements shld envisage possibility no other settlement of territorial and polit issues will be reached in foreseeable future and that this premise shld be weighed with every decision. This fact shld influence composition of negotiating team. Believe Korean member shld be given as prominent public position as possible in order make decisions more palatable to ROK and for Asiatic public opinion.
I understand proposal may be made to set-up buffer zone about 20 miles wide. Immed problem this raises is question of admin such area. No doubt armistice commission wld police area to assure it remains demilitarized but negotiators shld be aware danger of creating, possibly on semi-permanent basis, third territorial entity in Korea. It therefore seems important not only to agree on northern and southern boundaries of buffer zone but also to give must careful attn to delimiting the line approx in middle of buffer zone which may for long time to come be frontier between two Koreas. It cld then be agreed that northern and southern halves of zone wld be under laws and admin of applicable Korean regime. In initial states, considering fact these districts are in forward area under mil control respective CAC units no doubt wld continue to operate pending their phasing out. (Same wld be true of all areas between new frontier and 38th Parallel).
From the beginning buffer zone shld be described and have significance and as demilitarized area. Psychologically it might be preferable not to speak of it as one zone but to speak of demilitarized districts of South Korea and North Korea. Pending unification of course. Point is it shld not be permitted to become no man’s land under separate non-Korean control. I shudder to think what wld happen if some UN group comprised of reps acceptable to both belligerent camps [Page 622] attempted cope with immed practical difficulties and polit headaches inherent in running such an entity over a long period. Econ problems alone wld present almost insuperable difficulties.
I aware importance of southern border of buffer zone as real mil frontier of ROK and believe we should go all out to get best possible strategic position. However, to get agreement we will have to recognize similar North Korean interests in setting northern boundary of zone. Seems important therefore to adopt principle of flexibility in determining width of buffer zone. I trust I correct in assuming 38th Parallel will take back seat in discussions and that we will insist territorial matters be discussed realistically on basis position our troops at the time. As Dept aware parallel is anathema to ROKs. Every public expression has been “no cease fire on 38th”. Any other line wld be less difficult. Loss of Ongjin Peninsula to ROK more than offset by gains elsewhere and unless border considerably north of 38th that peninsula strategic liability anyway.
One aspect POW problem has polit significance in ROK. I refer to ROK long standing claim that 40,000 Korean POW’s are South Koreans impressed into North Korean Army after first Commie advance into ROK. Dept aware this problem and CINCUNC policy, under strict interpretation Geneva Convention, to give this group no preferred treatment. Special problem this creates in connection cease-fire shld be studied at once. In any case they shld not be turned over to tender mercies of North Koreans. Views of ICRC wld be useful.
Question of return of North Korean refugees, particularly those evacuated from Hungnam, probably will be raised. This again requires policy decision. I assume no refugees be returned against their will in accordance traditional US policy toward polit refugees. Right of repatriation missions to visit camps with definite restrictions on their activities may have to be authorized.
All these problems if mishandled can boomerang on US Govt and Emb at later date, and I am putting these suggestions forward merely because I have no info whether these particular problems being actively considered, what policies adopted, or what guidance sent.
Sent Dept 10, rptd info Tokyo 4.