Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/7–351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] July 3, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys
		Mr. Rothschild. Counselor
	Canada	—Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor
		Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	—Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	—Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary
	Great Britain	—Mr. Steel, Minister
		Mr. Greenhill, First Secretary
	Greece	—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
	Korea	—Ambassador Yu Chan Yang
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
		Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Corner, First Secretary
	Philippines	—Ambassador Elizalde
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
		Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary
	Turkey	—Mr. Benler, First Secretary
	Union of South Africa	—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
		Mr. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk, First Secretary
	United States	—FE, Mr. Rusk
		UNA, Mr. Hickerson
		NA, Mr. Johnson
		WE, Mr. McClelland
		UNP, Mr. Henkin
		UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
		R, Mr. Trueheart
		FE, Mr. Hackler
		FE, Mr. Lockhart
		Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope stated that the enemy over the week-end continued to make probing attacks at various points on the central front in the Kumwha area and that while these attacks were for the most part light ones there had been a notable increase in the amount of enemy artillery and mortar fire directed at the United Nations forces. He added that enemy air activity continued to be light and confined to defensive action in the Yalu River area. There were, however, two air incidents further south; an unidentified plane made a strafing attack near Seoul and another unidentified plane dropped flares near Chorwon. Captain Pope added that United Nations naval units exchanged fire with enemy shore batteries off Wonsan and that naval units of the Republic of Korea supported landings of guerrilla units on the west coast.

After giving the locations and engagements of the individual units of the United Nations forces, Captain Pope discussed enemy capabilities, stating that reports of an enemy buildup in the Sibyon area had been received. He also stated that there were reports that Chinese Communists were relieving the North Koreans on the east coast and that Chinese Communists were located southeast of Wonson: both reports, he said, were unconfirmed. Air sightings of enemy vehicular traffic over the week-end, however, confirmed the enemy buildup in the immediate rear areas looking toward an early resumption of the offensive, the number of southbound vehicles sighted being more than adequate to supply the daily enemy requirements and stockpile needs. He said that the Far Eastern Command estimated that, barring substantial Soviet commitments, the enemy did not have the capability of launching a sustained offensive. Mr. Hickerson inquired as to the possibilities of a limited enemy offensive prior to or during the armistice talks and asked whether from a military standpoint the enemy could improve his field position in any way bearing upon the armistice talks. Captain Pope replied that it was difficult to assess what the enemy stood to gain militarily by launching an offensive during the armistice talks and that in his opinion the enemy, with the strength it now possesses and could move into position before next week, could launch an offensive on a scale equal to its last offensive but could probably make but limited gains. In reply to another question by Mr. Hickerson as to an enemy air buildup, Captain Pope stated that the Far Eastern Air Force considers that the enemy pilots are now battlewise. He added that the Far Eastern Air Force estimates that the enemy intends to continue its defense of the Yalu River area and to broaden its defensive air operations to cover all communist-held areas.

Enemy strength in Korea was listed as:

North Koreans at the front	55,000
Chinese Communists at the front	74,000
North Koreans in the rear	170,000
Chinese Communists in the rear	204,000
Guerrillas	7,000
	510,000

After welcoming the Korean Ambassador upon the occasion of his initial participation as an observer at the briefing sessions, Mr. Rusk stated that the pending armistice talks brought up the question of whether to proceed to act on the British proposal for the appointment of a Protecting Power to look after the interests of the United Nations personnel held as prisoners by the other side, since the question of prisoners of war would be one of the topics in the armistice talks. Mr. Hickerson stated that the United States was inclined to proceed on a business-as-usual basis but wished the views of the Ambassadors. The South African representative questioned whether the proposal might not have an adverse effect upon public opinion if published during the armistice talks. The British representative pointed out that it would probably be impossible to issue the statement before the beginning of the talks because a text agreed upon during the briefing sessions would have to be cleared with the Foreign Office in London. Mr. Rusk pointed out that there might well be a protracted period during the talks and before an armistice could come into force and be implemented in which a Protecting Power could be of service. The British representative stated that the proposal might be regarded in some circles as a political matter, coming as it would from the briefing sessions and might in that sense interfere with the purely military discussions at the armistice talks, thus probably leading to an undesirable situation. The Belgian Ambassador suggested the possibility of amending the text without prejudice to the contemplated armistice negotiations, thus having as a matter of record the position of the United Nations countries having forces fighting the aggression if the armistice talks prove abortive. It was agreed to hold over action on the British proposal until the next briefing session, affording the representatives the opportunity to discuss the question with the Department and with their governments.

Copies of the text of the joint message from General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai accepting the offer to meet to discuss an armistice,¹ and of the text of General Ridgway’s reply were distributed.² Mr. Rusk stated that the joint enemy message contained several interesting points. It was couched in courteous tones and indicated that they would like to have a meeting. It also contained the first enemy acknowledgment of the United Nations forces as such. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the enemy’s use of the words “we are authorized” brought up the interesting point of just who authorized Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai to conduct jointly the talks since Kim was ostensibly head of state of North Korea and Peng was ostensibly commander of the unofficial “Chinese volunteers”. Rusk also pointed out that the enemy acceptance established the objective of the talks as being the “cessation of military action and establishment of peace”, whereas Gromyko’s clarification of Malik’s speech defined the talks as involving only “military and not political or territorial matters” and as constituting an entering upon of “the path to a peaceful settlement”. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that General Ridgway in his reply avoided the generality of “in the area of Kaesong” by saying “at Kaesong” and also omitted any reference to the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk also speculated that the enemy’s suggestion to set the date of July 10–15 could possibly be explained in the enemy’s own terminology; that there were technical difficulties. He noted that there are in fact technical difficulties involved, such as security, communications, guaranteeing the demilitarization of the area of the talks, safe passage, identification and the like. Mr. Rusk also admitted that we too had been thinking in terms of Kaesong as an alternative site for the meeting.

Mr. Rusk, after noting that Drew Pearson³ had picked up the published January 2 peace terms as a “scoop” in the day’s column, stated that our general approach to the conditions of an armistice was as follows:

1. The talks would be confined to strictly military matters. Any agreement would be military in character and would not involve political questions. No commitment would be made involving a violation of the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Korea. Gromyko had specified that the talks were to be limited to military matters. Mr. Rusk stated that we prefer this course since a meeting of field commanders does not constitute a proper forum for a discussion of political and territorial questions.

2. No limitation would be imposed upon General Ridgway’s conduct of the military campaign until an agreement is reached. Details of a military line and arrangements on the details of a demilitarized zone must be left with some discretion to him. A bare cease-fire especially involving a cessation of UN air activity during the negotiations before an armistice would place the United Nations in a disadvantageous position and permit an enemy buildup and therefore neither a preliminary cease-fire nor the permitting of any change in the enemy’s military position is contemplated. The forces of the United Nations are to remain in their present strong and favorable positions, which we do not wish to give up and later find ourselves in a vulnerable position if the talks should break down. Comment on a final military line must be withheld at this time.

3. Final armistice arrangements would apply to all air, ground, naval and guerrilla forces. Respect for the demilitarized area, areas in the hands of the opposing forces and the territorial waters within the 3 mile limit would be observed.

4. No military reinforcement, either in personnel or in the level of supply, would be permitted. Exchanges on a man for man basis, such as the United States rotation system, would be permitted.

5. Prisoners of war would be exchanged initially on a man to man basis since a wholesale repatriation of prisoners of war would virtually restore intact to North Korea forces equivalent to the number it possessed at the time of the aggression and thus entirely change the military situation. This problem involves great difficulty since there are some 150,000 prisoners in United Nations hands and less than 10,000 United Nations personnel in enemy hands.

6. One of our greatest concerns is over proper supervision of the implementation of the armistice. The representatives at the talks might arrange a mixed military commission for observation to assure each side against military buildups. The Soviet bloc in the past has not taken kindly to military observation teams having complete freedom of movement, but such a commission might be permitted to observe key points, such as the Yalu River bridges, rail junctions, important ports in order to give assurances. Full reciprocity would be required and both sides must have assurances that the armistice was not being violated. Our view is that such a commission would be composed of military representatives of the two sides to the conflict but we would be willing to consider the possibility of the commission being composed of parties neutral to the conflict.

In reply to a question as to when the United Nations would have an official connection with the negotiations, Mr. Hickerson stated that the agreement in the field should be sent to the United Nations, either the General Assembly or the Security Council, but it was not contemplated that the armistice would be held up pending an approval of the agreement by the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk suggested that open discussion of armistice terms be held over for future briefing sessions, especially since the enemy terms and intentions were not now known and since the exact course of the negotiations could not be ascertained in advance.

1. Reference is to the message embodied in Part I of telegram JCS 95438, supra.

2. General Ridgway’s reply to the message from the enemy commanders was issued at 2:30 p. m. on July 3 in Tokyo; the text, as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 43, read:

   “To General Kim Il Sung

   “General Peng Teh-Huai

   “I have received your reply to my message of 30 June. I am prepared for my representatives to meet yours at Kaesong on July 10, or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations before that date. Since agreement on Armistice terms has to precede cessation of hostilities, delay in initiating the meetings and in reaching agreement will prolong the fighting and increase the losses. To insure efficient arrangement of the many details connected with the first meeting, I propose that not to exceed 3 of my liaison officers have a preliminary meeting with an equal number of yours in Kaesong on 5 July, or as soon thereafter as practicable. If you concur, my liaison officers, the senior of whom will not be above the rank of Colonel will depart Kimpo Airfield, southwest of Seoul by helicopter at 2300 GMT on 4 July (0900, 5 July, Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting, proceeding direct to Kaesong.

   “In the event of bad weather, these officers will proceed in a convoy of 3 unarmed 1-quarter ton trucks, commonly known as jeeps, along the main road from Seoul to Kaesong. Each vehicle will bear a large white flag. The convoy will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at about 2300 hours GMT, 4 July (0900, 5 July, Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting. The convoy bearing your liaison officers to and from the meeting will be granted immunity from attack by my forces, providing you advise me of its route and schedule, and the manner by which my forces may identify it.

   “Your reply is requested.

   “M. B. Ridgway

   “General, United States Army

   “Commander-in-Chief

   “United Nations Command”

3. American journalist whose syndicated column appeared in the Washington Post.