795.00/7–251: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
flash
CX 66188. Please refer to text of radio broadcast from Communist commanders in Korea transmitted to you in mymsg CX 66183. Their intent is clear that mil act shall be suspended from beginning of armistice negotiations. Such action might gravely prejudice safety and security of United Nations forces. I consider this wholly unacceptable and, unless otherwise instructed, I shall categorically reject it. My reasons follow:
Our intelligence to date indicates following:
- a.
- Buildup of hostile offensive capability continues.
- b.
- Total vehicular sightings by friendly air during past week are up approximately 70 per cent over preceding week, with our reconnaissance flights producing this intelligence up only 10 per cent.
- c.
- Bulk of this vehicular traffic was south of 39 parallel.
- d.
- Rail traffic likewise up during same period.
- e.
- Reports not verified of presence of one CCF mechanized Army in Koksan, coordinates BT 9999.
- f.
- Reports also received only partly confirmed of presence of Soviet antiaircraft matériel and personnel in Korea.
- g.
- Reports, unconfirmed of the presence in Korea of International Brigade of substantial strength.
- h.
- PW interrogations have repeatedly referred to next offensive as scheduled on or before 15 July.
- i.
- Weather conditions expected to deteriorate about same period with maximum hampering effect on our air and ground mobility beginning about that time.
- j.
- General Chu Te Commander in Chief CCF speaking on 30 June at Thirtieth Anniversary of Chinese Communist Party, declared that all US armed forces should be withdrawn from Korea as price of peace, failing which Chinese people will assist Koreans in repelling foreign troops and protecting Chinese northeast frontier. A pre-release of this speech was made on 28 June in numerous propaganda broadcasts.
- k.
- His efforts to build new and rehabilitate old airfields in North Korea continues.
To summarize. Intelligence to date reveals a clearly developing pattern of capability to exercise an increasing offensive potential at any time from 10 July on. It is to be expected that if exercised optimum advantage would be taken of weather. It is further to be expected that enemy will intensify his efforts to increase this offensive potential throughout the period of negotiations, if conducted as he suggests they be conducted. If negotiations so conducted, we would be incapable [Page 611] of checking his military activities in Korea, particularly his preparation for major offensive action by ground and air.
Request your approval of my proposed action soonest. Immediately upon receipt of your reply, I plan to answer the Communist commanders’ message accepting Kaesong as the location, making provision for cessation of hostilities along the Munsan-Kaesong road and in the Kaesong area, but urging that the date be advanced.