Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/6–3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

secret

[Washington,] June 30, 1951.

Subject: ROK Position Concerning Armistice in Korea

Participants:	Dr. Yu Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
	Mr. Pyo Wook Han, First Secretary, Korean Embassy
	Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
	Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs.

The Korean Ambassador, Dr. Yang, called on Mr. Rusk this morning at 11:30 by previous appointment. In opening the conversation, the Ambassador expressed gratification at his having been invited to attend the periodic briefings of the Ambassadors of those United Nations countries having forces in Korea. He stated that he had reported this invitation to his Government. Mr. Rusk replied that he was pleased that the Ambassador would be joining the group and explained the details as to the briefing meetings. He pointed out that since the meetings were informal, no written invitation would be issued to the Ambassador unless he so requested. The Ambassador said that would not be necessary. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that if the Ambassador did not desire to attend all of the meetings personally, he could send a representative from his Embassy. Mr. Rusk explained the delay in issuing the invitation to the Ambassador on the basis that it had been necessary to get the reaction of the other members of the group, none of whom had raised objection. He therefore was certain that the Ambassador would find a very friendly atmosphere within the group.

Ambassador Yang then handed Mr. Rusk a communication addressed to the Secretary outlining five points which the Republic of Korea Government desired to bring to the attention of the United States Government as representing its position concerning an armistice in Korea (copy attached).¹ He explained that this communication was being given to the Department upon instructions from his Government, and that he wished to discuss it with the Department. The Ambassador remarked that he did not think that the Korean position on an armistice was too far removed from that of the United States, but that, in any event, his Government believed that it should place on public record its views concerning the question of an armistice. The Ambassador emphasized that despite any seeming differences which might be represented by the five points in relation to United States policy on this subject, he could assure the Department that the Korean Government would, in fact, cooperate with the United States and United Nations policy. Mr. Rusk replied that this was a very important point and that he would so report to President Truman. He stated that the United States fully sympathized with Korean aspirations for independence and unity, that the attainment of these objectives would continue to be the firm policy of the United States and the United Nations and that we would make no commitments in contradiction of that policy. Mr. Rusk pointed out, however, that the armistice was purely a military matter and that political questions would not be taken up in the armistice negotiations. He emphasized that this was an important distinction, which must be clearly understood.

In discussing the first of the five points contained in the Ambassador’s communication, Mr. Rusk stated that the United States contemplated a phased withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces on both sides. He expressed the view, however, that the timing of this withdrawal in relation to the implementation of the armistice was of great importance, since it would appear essential to keep at least token United Nations forces in Korea until the general situation was satisfactorily secure. Any insistence, therefore, upon an early withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops which, in the nature of things, would have to be accompanied by corresponding withdrawal of United Nations forces, would be premature if it resulted in any temptation to the Chinese Communists to renew the attack before a satisfactory security situation could be developed. The Ambassador said that he agreed with this and remarked that the failure of an armistice at this time would undoubtedly make World War III a much greater possibility.

With regard to the second and third points, Mr. Rusk recalled that there had been tremendous devastation in North Korea with a corresponding deterioration of military potential, and that the USSR had, on the basis of past experience, shown a marked disinclination to render assistance to the North Korean and Chinese Communists without exacting payment therefor; this had undoubtedly been a sore point with the Chinese Communists. Mr. Rusk believed, therefore, that any possible assistance which might be rendered to the North Koreans by the USSR, would clearly be more than counterbalanced by the broad program of assistance to the Republic of Korea which, as a matter of policy, the United States, together with the other United Nations Members, was determined to carry out. He cited the figure of $250 million in United Nations economic assistance which has been scheduled for the Korean economic rehabilitation program during the first year of operations, and remarked that President Truman was personally most deeply concerned that this rehabilitation program should be carried into full effectiveness. Mr. Rusk believed that the Koreans should also be reassured by the extensive program now being worked out by the American military authorities for the strengthening of the Republic of Korea forces in order that the security of South Korea be assured in the face of any possible future threat from North Korea. In this connection he emphasized the necessity for the training of competent ROK officers, particularly at the battalion level.

Ambassador Yang mentioned that President Rhee was anxious to send a number of senior ROK officers to the United States Command and General Staff School. He remarked that while the Koreans are not fundamentally a warlike people, they will fight desperately for their freedom if compelled to do so. He said that, speaking as an individual Korean, he was convinced that his Government would never sanction any use of ROK military forces, or take other action, which would be in conflict with United States policy. Dr. Yang stated that what his Government feared was the possibility that, following conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the United States and the other United Nations Members would relax their vigilance and be lulled into a sense of false security which might result in the ROK being exposed, without adequate safeguards, to a sudden fatal blow from the Communists.

Mr. Rusk replied that, regardless of the existence of an armistice in Korea, the United States, together with the other United Nations Members, would move forward with their program for strengthening the military resources of the free world; he referred specifically to the strengthening of Western Europe and the incorporation of Japan into the Western system of collective security.

Mr. Rusk again impressed upon the Ambassador that on the basis of the past record of the performance of the United States and the United Nations in rendering economic and military aid to Korea, it would be highly unlikely that we would remain indifferent to the welfare of Korea in the future. The Ambassador replied that the Koreans fully realized that their only salvation lay in supporting and cooperating with United States policy and that to do otherwise would mean disaster.

In connection with the fourth point, Mr. Rusk indicated that the Department fully concurred in the desirability of Korean representation in discussions and conferences bearing upon the future of Korea, remarking upon the excellent work which had been done by the Korean Delegation at the Paris meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,² and stated that the United States Government would continue to consult closely with the Republic of Korea. He pointed out that the United States intended that a senior ROK military officer should be on the staff of General Ridgway’s representative in any armistice negotiations with the Communists.

With regard to the last point in the Ambassador’s communication, Mr. Rusk again referred to the determination of the United States and the United Nations to continue to seek the unification and independence of Korea by political means, and emphasized the great importance of Korean interest in and support of our efforts along these lines. He summed up the Ambassador’s communication by saying that, with the possible exception of the first and second points, he could perceive nothing which would appear to present any particular problem.

The Ambassador then raised the question of the admittance of the Republic of Korea into the United Nations and wondered what steps might be taken to overcome the obstacle presented by the Soviet veto. Mr. Rusk thought that there was little chance that the United Nations Charter might be altered, but suggested that some other way of working out the problem might be found, as for instance, by mutual concession with the USSR on the admittance of various candidates which each side might put forward. Mr. Rusk remarked upon how much Mr. Hickerson of UNA had enjoyed his recent talk with the Ambassador and stated Mr. Hickerson was most conversant, from long experience, with the various ramifications of United Nations affairs. Mr. Rusk suggested that the Ambassador might take the opportunity to have further talks with Mr. Hickerson.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Rusk for this very frank and friendly talk and again reiterated the determination of his Government to work in harmony with the United States and United Nations.³

1. Not printed.
2. Reference is to the First Part of the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly held in Paris, September 21–December 12, 1948; for documentation relating to Korea, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 1079 ff.
3. The substance of this memorandum of conversation was communicated to the Embassy in Pusan in the Department’s telegram 1, July 1, not printed (795.00/6–3051).