795.00/6–2751: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1730. Re Malik peace proposal. In conversation with Cory today Bebler (Yugo) offered fol insights into Malik proposal:
Bebler thought proposal has considerable substance and that, although it should be treated with reserve (as Belgrade has said), nevertheless facts that proposal made at all, the Sov press treatment of it as recounted in today’s NY Times give promise that Sov Govt now ready for settlement in Korea. Bebler warned however that any Korean settlement would only be tactical move to relieve Kremlin [Page 564] from awkward position in Korea and free it for possible further operations against free world in some such place as Iran or Indochina where the Bao Dai-French Govt would get little sympathy from many UN members in case of a massive Chi Comm intervention a few months hence. Bebler seemed unworried by Cory’s suggestion that those operations might be directed against Yugo and Cory’s mention of article in today’s NY Times recounting depopulation since June 15 of 30-mile strip of Rumanian territory along Yugo border. He appeared only slightly dismayed by Cory’s observation that North Koreans performed similar depopulation along strip just north of 38th parallel approximately six months prior to their attack a year ago. Bebler said that Yugos are not like South Koreans, that they would be tough and dangerous nut for USSR to crack, that USSR knows this and also that oppressed Hungarians, Rumanians and Bulgarians would hardly have morale for such operation. Bebler thus seemed little disturbed by Cory’s suggestion that present Sov peace moves may have some similarities to North Korean propaganda campaign which for some five weeks preceded North Korean aggression last year. He thought that Sovs this time are speaking sincerely as far as Korea concerned.
Cory suggested that if Malik peace maneuver is only camouflage for new aggression then presumably it has been under preparation for several months just as must have been North Korean campaign of year ago and that consequently goal of such Sov maneuver hardly likely to be Iran since Iranian crisis only about a month old. Bebler replied that while this is conceivably true he still thinks Yugo has not been chosen as next target of Sov aggression and that, even if it had been, Sov policy would be sufficiently flexible to permit rapid shifting from Yugo to Iran as target of aggression if opportunities arise.
Bebler explained fact that USSR made peace proposal in public broadcast rather than in response to private overtures from US by suggesting that USSR chose broadcast method in order to earn Kudos as protagonist of peace and thus avoid onus of responding favorably to a prior US peace proposal for which US would get credit.
Cory commented that he has impression Chi Comms seem more royalist than Sov King in their enthusiasm for Korean war and that they give impression of trying to draw Russians into war while Russians seem trying to draw Chi Comms out. Bebler enthusiastically endorsed this suggestion and said he personally feels Chi Comms, in full flush of their own revolution, are now trying to grasp leadership of Comm revolution in Asia while USSR, which wants always to [Page 565] retain all reins in its own hand, is resisting. He said this would tend to explain why Chi Comms now publicly complain about insufficient delivery of Sov arms for Chi Comms in Korea. Bebler said, as he has said before, that he is convinced USSR does not want powerful Comm China. As another reason for Sov failure to send more arms to Chi Comms, Bebler offered as he put it, a dialectician’s explanation that a quantitative increase in Sov arms shipments to Comm China would eventually cause a qualitative change in Sov position in Korea. He said he was referring to fact that large amounts of Sov jet planes and heavy equipment would cause qualitative change in sense that Sov involvement in Korean war would become much greater and more apparent, a thing which USSR is trying to avoid.
When questioned about possible prior agreement between USSR and Comm Chi re Malik broadcast, Bebler said that typical Sov technique would be to “inform but not ask” Chi Comms for their approval just before broadcast. He said he thought Chi Comms thus had some warning at last minute and were enabled to reorientate their propaganda and public statements quickly but not immediately.
Bebler said a matter of such importance as Malik broadcast ordinarily is directed by very few men in Kremlin. He recalled occasion in 1946 when Molotov, without any warning, made in UN first Sov proposals on disarmament. Bebler said he himself was thunderstruck as he listened to Molotov’s speech in GA. After speech, Bebler said, Molotov asked him what he thought of it. Bebler said he replied that Molotov’s proposals hit GA like “an atomic bomb”. Bebler continued that Molotov then smiled in satisfaction and said his speech on disarmament had been prepared in Moscow with such secrecy that it had not even been discussed in Politburo. Bebler concluded from this story that Stalin and Molotov must have prepared Sov disarmament proposals themselves. Bebler also recalled that in 1946 Molotov once undercut Yugo claims to Trieste in very abrupt and dishonest manner, notwithstanding close Yugo-Sov relations which existed at time.
Bebler said he thought whole story of Malik peace proposal probably held with great secrecy even in Kremlin and that Malik himself sees very little of whole picture. Bebler added that he is himself well acquainted with workings of Sov bureaucracy and believes Malik’s alleged indisposition yesterday can be explained merely by fact Malik has not yet recd instructions from Moscow as to further action he shld take and that when these instructions do arrive they will come to Malik in bits and pieces. Bebler repeated statement he had made on previous occasions that Malik is not well informed of inner Kremlin policy.