Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/6–2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by John R. Heidemann of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] June 27, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Ambassador Spender
		Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys
		Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong
		Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	—Mr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	—Mr. Daridan, Minister Counselor
		Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Steel, Minister
		Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
	Greece	—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Ambassador van Roijen
		Mr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Laking, Counselor
	Philippines	—Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
	Thailand	—Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
	Turkey	—Mr. Benler, First Secretary
	Union of South Africa	—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
	United States	—FE—Mr. Rusk
		UMA, Mr. Hickerson
		FE, Mr. Merchant
		UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
		EUR, Mr. Raynor
		UNP, Mr. Stein
		FE, Mr. Conners
		S, Mr. White
		EUR, Mr. McClelland
		FE, Mr. Hackler
		FE, Mr. Heidemann
		Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope told the group that there had been fairly heavy ground activity in the preceding five days in the sector east of Kumhwa and north and northwest of Sohwa while ground activity elsewhere had been confined to small patrol clashes. He noted that enemy air activity was increasing, that from April [June?] 19 to April [June?] 26 there had been 18 incidents of air-to-air combat and that there had been some 15 heckler raids, generally within a 25 mile radius of Seoul and usually involving ancient, two-seater biplanes. When asked about enemy air activity south of the 38th parallel, Captain Pope said that there had been no air-to-air combat south of the Pyongyang area but that almost all of the heckler raids had occurred south of the parallel. Ambassador Spender asked whether any fortifications were being established back of the lines. Captain Pope replied that air observation had revealed that the enemy was erecting permanent or semi-permanent gun emplacements, tank traps, etc. in a line from Kumsong to Kaesong just back of the front. Other fortifications are being constructed by the enemy, he said, in the Pyongyang area, perhaps as a precaution against amphibious landings. Rusk noted that the enemy was also reported to be building fortifications along the Yalu River.

Shifting to the political situation, Rusk said that we had, of course, had no advance indication that Malik would make a proposal such as he did on June 23. We had heard that he had requested time on the UN radio and had expected that he would use this time for the kind of bombast which, in fact, did make up the first 95 per cent of his broadcast. Rusk observed that it was of interest that the Soviet press and radio had given good play, not only to Malik’s proposal, but also the comments made on it, including the remarks of President Truman on June 25. The Peiping radio, Rusk recalled, had remained silent for almost two days after Malik’s broadcast and, when it broke this silence, it was to quote an editorial in a Peiping paper to the effect that the authorities in Peiping approved of Malik’s line. After saying that if the Americans wanted peace they could accept all of the many offers made by the Chinese Communists, the Peiping radio dropped the subject and went back to emphasizing the current campaign to collect “donations” to buy war goods. Rusk remarked that the tone of the Peiping radio on the subject had been different from the tone of the Kremlin’s propaganda organs, but that we were unable to assess the significance of this difference.

We were, Rusk continued, inclined to be quite cautious over Malik’s proposal and, while we felt that no door to a peaceful settlement should be closed, we believed that Malik’s proposal called for further clarification. For example, Malik’s reference to the “Soviet people” raised a question as to the attitude of the Soviet Government; his reference to a “cease-fire and armistice” raised a question as to what distinction was being drawn between the two; his reference to “belligerents” raised a question of which parties were considered by the Soviets to be the belligerents in Korea, since, legalistically speaking, there were none and the Soviets insist they are not involved, the Chinese Communists insist on the “volunteer” label, and the North Koreans remain in the background. The degree of coordination and understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union was another and very important unanswered question, and we were hardly in a position to say what the Soviets meant. Rusk announced that we had asked our Ambassador in Moscow to see Gromyko, that he had done so but that a full report of the conversation had not yet been received in the Department. Rusk added that we had not heard of anyone’s having successfully gotten in touch with the “indisposed” Malik in New York, although, our representatives and the representatives of other members were prepared to see him to seek clarification.

Rusk then called the group’s attention to an observation made by Ambassador Spender: namely, that the group, upon meeting for the first time since Malik’s broadcast, could hardly escape the burden of saying something to the press. Spender noted that the group, which was certainly responsible enough to discharge some function other than listening to a description of the tactical situation, could at least tell the press that it had considered Malik’s statement and concluded thus and so. He said that his government felt that it would be a mistake to assume that the Malik offer was a fake. The free nations must, of course, be careful that it is not pure propaganda since the men in the Kremlin are master propagandists, propaganda being a major instrument of their foreign policy. Ambassador Spender offered a draft¹ of the kind of statement he felt the group could safely make. Rusk, noting that the Ambassador had been kind enough to hand us a copy of his draft statement before the meeting, offered a Department draft¹ which was in large part the Ambassador’s draft with some textual changes to make it more acceptable to the group. There followed a discussion of the merits of the two drafts and it was determined to combine the two. This was accomplished and the resulting statement was issued to the press (Department press release number 569).²

Hickerson reminded the group that July 3 had been set as the date for reaching a final agreement on the British proposal involving the appointment of a Protective Power for UN prisoners of war. Mr. Tomlinson noted that the French Ambassador had made reference to the desirability of including interned civilians and suggested that those nations having civilians interned by the communists could add a paragraph to that effect in their statements.

1. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
2. The main portion of this statement is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 78. It pointed out that the member states of the United Nations were bound by the Charter not only to resist aggression but also to settle disputes amicably, in the light of which, the 16 member states having armed forces in Korea expressed their view that they had always been and still were ready to take part in any action designed to ensure a real and lasting peace there.