795.00/6–1951
Memorandum of Conversation, by Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea
| Participants: | Australia | —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary |
| Belgium | —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor | |
| Canada | —Ambassador Wrong, and Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary | |
| Colombia | —Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor | |
| Ethiopia | —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary | |
| France | —Mr. Millet, Counselor | |
| Great Britain | —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor | |
| Greece | —Ambassador Politis | |
| Luxembourg | — | |
| Netherlands | —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary | |
| New Zealand | —Mr. Laking, Counselor | |
| Philippines | —Dr. Gamboa, Counselor | |
| Thailand | —Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary | |
| Turkey | —Mr. Benler, First Secretary | |
| Union of South Africa | —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor | |
| United States | —FE, Mr. Rusk | |
| UNA, Mr. Hickerson | ||
| USUN, Mr. Gross | ||
| UNP, Mr. Wainhouse | ||
| EUR, Mr. Allen | ||
| UNP, Mr. Stein | ||
| R, Mr. Furnas | ||
| FE, Mr. Hackler | ||
| Army, Captain Pope |
Captain Pope stated that the heaviest enemy activity during the past three days had been in the area east of Kumhwa and north of Sohwa. Elsewhere, enemy activity had been limited to reaction and sometimes very determined reaction to aggressive UN patrols. He [Page 532] reported also that there had been an increase in enemy air activity since last Friday.1 He read a list of Soviet weapons which had been definitely identified as being used by the Chinese Communists; the Far Eastern Command, however, had not listed the number of the various types of weapons which had been captured nor the number which it was estimated the Chinese Communists still possess.
In summarizing a Far East Command discussion on the enemy’s capability to resume the offensive, Captain Pope reported that there had been no indications that reinforcement and re-supply had not continued. Enough time had elapsed to bring fresh troops to the patrol area and the enemy had been carefully screening his activities in the rear areas. In recent days the enemy had been extremely sensitive to UN probing patrols. If the usual pattern were followed, the enemy could now be expected to begin sending out probing patrols which would increase in size up to battalion or regimental strength, at which time of course a full offensive would be under way. In the past two weeks prisoners of war have referred to the last week in June as the time set for a new offensive. It was the estimate of G–2, however, that in view of his heavy losses the enemy would be hard-pressed to meet the deadline for an “anniversary” push.
Captain Pope pointed out a reduction in the enemy strengths which he listed as follows:
| NKA on front | 55,000 |
| CCF on front | 72,000 |
| Total | 127,000 |
| NKA in rear | 122,000 |
| CCF in rear | 205,000 |
| Guerrillas | 7,000 |
| Total | 461,000 |
Mr. Rusk referred to a proposal made at the last meeting by Mr. Tomlinson that a communication be addressed to the Secretary General concerning UN prisoners of war and asked Mr. Tomlinson if he had any further suggestion. Mr. Tomlinson stated that after further consideration of his proposal he felt that it would be better if each of the 16 governments sent separate communications to the Secretary General. He gave two reasons for this suggestion: one, that it would be impossible for all 16 governments to agree on the proper reference to the Chinese Communists since some governments recognized the Central People’s Government and others did not, and; two, it would not be appropriate for any one government to speak on behalf [Page 533] of another government without having been asked to do so. Mr. Tomlinson said that the UK was anxious to take action at once on the subject of UN prisoners of war and that he hoped the representatives present would be able to decide at the next meeting on action to be taken. It was his suggestion that all of the governments send communications which would be similar or at least not in disagreement. He distributed copies of a suggested communication to the Secretary General2 which, he said, contained the substance of the approach which the UK wished to make.
In response to a question from Ambassador Silvercruys, Mr. Tomlinson answered that it was only procedure and not a matter of substance which was at issue in deciding whether a joint communication or individual communications should be addressed to the Secretary General. Ambassador Silvercruys suggested that the communication come from the Unified Command and Mr. Rusk agreed that it might be possible for such a communication to be issued by the Unified Command after consultation with the other governments whose armed forces are fighting in Korea. Mr. Millet suggested that the Unified Command had nothing to do with the civilians who had been captured by the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists and that a communication from the Unified Command would not include them. Mr. Rusk pointed out that this question of civilian POWs was only one of the number of legal points which should be thoroughly examined. He proposed that all of the representatives attempt to determine the attitudes of their governments on the legal issues involved and the desirability of preparing a collective or individual communication so that the matter could be settled at the next meeting.
After pointing out that Mr. Gross, Deputy Representative to the UN, had come down from New York to attend this meeting, Mr. Rusk stated that there was no consensus either in Washington or at Lake Success on the general nature of any political step which could now be taken. He said that further suggestions would have to be made to see if any one could be accepted by all of the various groups involved. Mr. Gross said that he had nothing further to report. Mr. Rusk pointed out the serious problem in relation to any public statement which was posed by the attitude of the South Koreans; a public statement which clearly indicated a willingness to stop fighting before Korea was militarily unified, would undoubtedly cause very serious trouble in Korea for the UN forces. Practical complications as well as concern for the views of the South Koreans would have to be carefully considered.
Ambassador Silvercruys asked what was the lack of consensus. [Page 534] Mr. Rusk replied that among the questions which had not been solved were the desirability of issuing a public statement at any time, of issuing it now, the proper channel to use in making a further political move, and the future of the Good Offices Committee. Ambassador Silvercruys suggested that all of these problems be discussed informally and without commitment at future meetings of the present group and Mr. Rusk made it clear that he agreed that the group was fully competent to decide what to discuss and in what matter.
Ambassador Wrong raised the question of making a statement on the first anniversary of the attack on the Republic of Korea and suggested that the Secretary General of the UN or the Unified Command should make such an anniversary statement. It was generally agreed that a statement containing any new conditions for settlement would have to be an agreed text and that it would be almost impossible to obtain agreement from the 16 countries involved before June 25. Ambassador Wrong suggested that no one could take exception to a statement by either the UN or the UC which merely brought together all of the previous important statements which had been made concerning Korea. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Hickerson to report to the group on Friday any arrangements which were in preparation for a UN or a UC statement.
It was agreed that in the near future the group would discuss informally the problem of making a public statement concerning a settlement and the proper time for releasing it.3